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ABSTRACT
Studies suggest that timing and location of emissions can change the amount of ozone formed
from a given amount of nitrogen oxide (NOx) by a factor of five (Mauzerall et al. 2005). Yet
existing NOx cap-and-trade programs require stationary sources in the Eastern U.S. to reduce
emissions without reference to timing or location. This work is part of a larger study on whether a
NOx cap-and-trade program that differentiates across emissions by time and location could
reduce ozone concentrations more cost-effectively than simple aggregate reductions in the NOx
cap in the Eastern United States.
To gauge possible gains relative to existing regulations, this work examines compliance data from
coal power plants in 2002 and 2005 to estimate the effectiveness of existing un-differentiated
regulations. It finds that some plant operators chose to remain under aggregated caps by emitting
less NOx during early summer months when effects on ozone formation are low and emitting
more NOx during late summer months when effects on ozone formation are great. This behavior
was at once individually rational, environmentally damaging, and perfectly legal.
To evaluate potential challenges to implementation, the study assesses the technical feasibility
and the distributional effects of spatially and temporally differentiated regulatory systems.
* Are power plants in the Eastern U.S. technically capable of reducing NOx emissions in
response to incentives that changed in time and by location given network constraints? To
address these questions, this work used a zonal model based on an abstract network graph and
optimal power flow simulations to estimate potential short-term NOx reductions and associated
costs from redispatch of power plants in the original Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM)
power system. Both methods estimated that power plants could respond with hourly NOx
reductions of between 15 and 30% and that network constraints had little effect.
* Are the distributional effects of a differentiated regulation likely to motivate and/or enable legal
challenges that could undercut such a program? The distributional effects of differentiated
regulation would depend on the timing and locations of reductions, and legal challenges could
constrain implementation. But the inability of un-differentiated regulations to fully solve ozone
problems, combined with scientific and economic justifications, and the ability of power plants to
respond, justify further inquiry into the feasibility of differentiation.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Ground-level ozone is a pollutant that damages public health and the
environment. To protect public health and welfare, Congress mandated that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set a National Ambient Air Quality Standard
(NAAQS) for ozone in the United States in the Clean Air Act of 1970. The EPA
implemented the ozone standard in 1971 and made it more stringent in 1997.1 Some areas
of the United States have had difficulty achieving the ozone standard despite regulations
requiring considerable reductions in the precursor emissions that contribute to ozone
formation - nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Areas of the
Eastern U.S. have found it particularly difficult to achieve the ozone air quality standard
even though seasonal NOx cap-and-trade programs for stationary sources have reduced
NOx emissions substantially since 1999.2 Recent regulation requires decreases in the
seasonal cap on NOx emissions from stationary sources in 2010 and 2015, but the EPA
still does not expect all areas of the Eastern U.S. to attain the ozone standard by 2015
(U.S. EPA 2006b).3 One potential reason for the persistent nonattainment is that ozone
formation depends not only on the quantities of precursor emissions but on their timing
and location.
1.1. Problem statement and contribution
This dissertation contributes to a broader research effort that is seeking to
determine whether it would be more cost-effective to directly address the temporal and
1 The EPA is currently considering a further increase in stringency of the ozone air quality standard.
2 The Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) NOx Budget Trading Program (implemented in 1999) and State
Implementation Plan (SIP) NOx Budget Trading Program (implemented in 2003) have reduced NOx emissions from
stationary sources in the Eastern U.S. by 72% from 1990 levels (U.S. EPA 2006b).
3 The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) se 70 Federal Register 25162 (May 12, 2005).
locational impacts of NOx emissions from power plants on ozone formation in the
Eastern United States rather than to further reduce the aggregate cap of the seasonal cap-
and-trade program now in place.4 To contribute to the research addressing this question,
this dissertation first examines scientific and economic reasons to use a temporally and
spatially differentiated cap-and-trade program to regulate NOx emissions from power
plants. Then, using historical data to test the hypothesis that the operators of some power
plants reduced emissions more during times when ozone formation was least likely under
un-differentiated cap-and-trade programs, this dissertation provides a detailed example of
a potential benefit of differentiation.
While there are scientific and economic justifications for the use of differentiated
regulations, there are implementation challenges as well. These challenges are the reason
that differentiation in regulations and policies has not been implemented to address the
ozone problem. By simulating one of the electric power systems in the Eastern United
States, this dissertation also analyzes the feasibility of overcoming two implementation
challenges. The first is whether power plants could respond to a differentiated regulation
given network constraints - the finding is that they could. The second is whether the
distributional effects of a differentiated regulation could constrain its implementation or
reduce its effectiveness. This constraint on implementation may have a slightly larger
effect in the case of a differentiated regulation but would not necessarily negate the
potential benefits of differentiation.
An important finding of this work was that network constraints would not greatly
constrain the potential NOx reductions from power plants. A misperception prior to this
study was that network constraints would limit the redispatch 5 of power plants as a
4 The research is a project of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT. See also: Martin, K.C.,
P.L. Joskow, and A.D. Ellerman (2007), "Time and Location Differentiated NOx Control in Competitive Electricity
Markets Using Cap-and-Trade Mechanisms," Centerfor Energy and Environmental Policy Research Working Paper.
5 "Redispatching" power plants implies changing which particular generating units fill electricity demand at a given
time. Power plants are typically economically dispatched, which means that the lowest cost generating units are used
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potential response to a differentiated cap-and-trade program. The overall conclusion of
this work is that the evidence of differentiation's potential benefits and the fact that
power plants could respond with NOx reductions to differentiated incentives justify
further inquiry into the feasibility of using a differentiated cap-and-trade program to
address the ozone problem in the Eastern United States. The temporal and spatial features
of the ozone problem are particularly important. But other environmental problems, like
particulate matter pollution, have some similar characteristics. If a differentiated
regulation could succeed for ozone pollution, it might also be applied in other cases.
1.2. Summary
The atmospheric chemistry literature shows that NOx emissions reductions at
some times and locations affect ozone formation more than at others. The contribution of
NOx emissions to ozone formation depends on sunlight, temperature, and concentrations
of VOC emissions. All of these factors vary in time and by location. Sunlight and
temperature vary with the weather. Biogenic sources like oak trees emit about 60% of the
VOCs in the Eastern United States. The VOCs emissions from these sources not only
vary by location but also in time because many natural sources emit more VOCs when it
is hot and sunny. NOx emissions tend to cause more ozone during hot, sunny conditions
in areas with high concentrations of VOC emissions. For example, one study found that
NOx emitted under these conditions caused five times more ozone to form as the same
amount of NOx emissions under conditions less conducive to ozone formation
(Mauzerall et. al. 2005). Winds can also transport NOx emissions and cause ozone
formation displaced in time and space from the original source. This further complicates
the relationships between emission sources and ozone concentrations. This literature
suggests that the effectiveness of regulations like the NOx cap-and-trade programs in the
first to fill demand provided that network constraints and other system requirements are met. These simulations assume
that a price on NOx emissions changes the relative costs of generating units due to differences in the units' NOx
emission rates and therefore a high NOx price would change the order in which the units are dispatched.
Eastern United states could be limited by their failure to specifically address the temporal
and spatial aspects of the contribution of NOx emissions to ozone formation.
The environmental economics literature discusses the potential efficiencies
associated with using differentiated regulations to address environmental problems with
time and spatial dimensions, like ozone. A differentiated regulation could improve cost-
effectiveness compared to a un-differentiated regulation by providing incentives for
emission sources to reduce NOx when they would most likely mitigate ozone formation
and by not requiring emission reductions in times and locations when they would not
improve air quality. In the particular case of ozone pollution in the Eastern United States,
this dissertation presents an analysis of historical data from coal power plants to illustrate
this potential benefit of using a differentiated cap-and-trade program. Under the un-
differentiated cap-and-trade program now in place, the operators of some power plants
reduced NOx emissions more during times when ozone formation was least likely. This
behavior was consistent with economic incentives provided by the NOx cap-and-trade
program and the wholesale electricity markets in which the power plants participated. An
effective differentiated regulation could provide the strongest incentives for NOx
reductions when they would be most likely to mitigate ozone formation. Although the
specific emission reductions required by a differentiated cap-and-trade program could be
more costly than those undertaken in the un-differentiated case, the differentiated
regulation would improve cost-effectiveness by not requiring ineffective reductions.
Compelling scientific and economic arguments support the use of a differentiated
regulation rather than further reductions in the cap of the current regulation, but there are
challenges to implementation. This dissertation examines two of these challenges. The
first is technical and economic: could power plants respond to incentives for short-term
NOx reductions that changed in time and by location and what would this type of flexible
abatement cost? The second challenge is political, economic, and legal: the distributional
effects of a differentiated program could constrain its effectiveness. Small changes in the
definitions of the locations and timing of required emission reductions could have large
benefits for industries or states. These affected parties could use political influence or
legal disputes over the modeling necessary to support a differentiated regulation to shape
the details of the regulation and this could limit the regulation's effectiveness.
This dissertation analyses the first technical and economic challenge in detail and
proposes that it is tractable. Simulations of potential NOx reductions from the redispatch
of power plants suggest that it would be technically feasible to reduce emissions
nontrivially in response to incentives that changed in time and by location. The initial
misperception that motivated this work was that network constraints would prevent the
redispatch of power plants as a short-term response to differentiated incentives for NOx
reductions. The simulations suggested that network constraints would not greatly
constrain the potential NOx reductions because the exchange of generation that reduced
NOx occurred locally and did not require large-scale transfers of power across the
network. The estimated costs of these NOx reductions were comparable to other more
conventional approaches (like requiring NOx control technologies on some uncontrolled
power plants).
The second implementation challenge is more difficult to resolve. The simulations
of potential NOx reductions from the redispatch of power plants illustrated that the
distributional effects of a differentiated regulation would depend on the specifics of when
and where emission reductions were required. The distributional effects of environmental
regulations often motivate industry and state governments to contest or try to influence
the specific details of the regulations because small changes in a regulation can yield
large benefits. They typically use claims of fairness and disputes over the uncertainties in
the modeling used to support a regulation as the legal means to influence the details of a
regulation. In these ways, a differentiated regulation would not differ greatly from other
environmental regulations. But two factors could amplify the effects of legal disputes on
differentiated regulation compared to other environmental regulations. First, if the
uncertainties associated with the modeling required to support a differentiated regulation
were greater because of the need for more detailed spatial resolution, for example,
interested parties could more easily contest the regulation by using their own models to
show that their emissions do not affect the air quality in targeted areas. Second, if small
changes in the locations, times, or quantities of the required emissions reductions could
hinder a differentiated regulation's effectiveness then affected parties' attempts to shape
the regulation's details to their benefit could be a problem.
While recognizing that political and legal processes could constrain the effective
implementation of a differentiated cap-and-trade program, this dissertation focuses on the
questions of whether or not such a regulation could be beneficial in the case of ozone
pollution in the Eastern United States and on whether it would be technically feasible
from the perspective of obtaining flexible emission reductions from power plants. The
primary reason for this focus is that the conception of an implementable differentiated
regulation is still its early stages. The environmental economics literature has
recommended that regulations differentiate between emissions by providing the strongest
incentives to reduce the most environmentally damaging (or problematic) emissions since
the early 1970s (Montgomery 1972 and Mendelsohn 1986). But the complexities of
implementing differentiated cap-and-trade programs and related high transaction costs
have impeded their use (e.g. Tietenberg 1995). One such complexity in the case of ozone
is that the contribution of NOx emissions to ozone formation fluctuates with the weather,
which means that weather and atmospheric chemistry forecasting must be used to alter
incentives for NOx reductions. The atmospheric chemistry literature suggests that
advances in air quality forecasting and modeling may now mitigate this challenge and
further work is currently being undertaken to validate these results.6
This dissertation assesses another specific technical challenge. An impediment
specific to applying a differentiated regulation to NOx emissions from power plants is the
perception that thermal and security constraints in the electric power network would limit
potential short-term reductions in NOx emissions especially during times of peak
electricity demand. The results of simulations that used two different methods suggest
that network constraints do not greatly limit the potential for short-term emission
reductions from power plants. Simulations of the redispatch of power plants in the
portion of the PJM electric power network that covers Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Maryland, Delaware and the District of Columbia ("Classic PJM") suggest that it is
technically and economically feasible to reduce NOx emissions by between 6 tons (or
15%) in the highest demand hours and 8 tons (or 30%) in average demand hours. This
dissertation advances the discussion of whether ozone regulations could make use of
scientific information about the importance of the timing and location of NOx emissions,
as well as advances in air quality forecasting to improve the cost-effectiveness of the
regulation of NOx emissions from power plants: power plants could respond to a
differentiated regulation with short-term NOx reductions.
Future work will show whether or not the potential emission reductions from
power plants would be enough to help areas in the Eastern United State attain the ozone
air quality standards. If these reductions could help improve air quality, it would be
worthwhile to consider other implementation challenges, like political constraints, in
more detail. If, however, the potential short-term reductions from power plants are not
sufficient to drastically improve air quality the focus of analysis could move away from
6 This work is currently being undertaken at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT.
power plants to assess the contribution of other sources of NOx emissions like mobile
sources to ozone air quality problems.
1.3. Overview of chapters
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the atmospheric
chemistry literature, which suggests that nonlinearities in the chemistry of ozone
formation create the need for a temporally and spatially differentiated regulation for NOx
emissions. The chapter also discusses the feasibility of forecasting ozone concentrations
and categorizing areas or times important for NOx reductions. Both of these factors could
help enable the implementation of a differentiated regulation. In order to motivate the
need for reductions in ozone, Chapter 2 also summarizes the environmental and health
effects of ozone and its precursor emissions. This discussion explains the justifications
for policies that limit ozone concentrations as well as the reasons other than ozone to
limit NOx and VOC emissions. The reasons to reduce NOx emissions involve tradeoffs.
Section 2.2.2 discusses an example in which reductions in NOx emissions reduced ozone
concentrations but increased particulate matter concentrations. Tradeoffs like this are a
challenge for environmental policy in the U.S. because of the statutory framework for air
quality. Section 2.4.3 discusses whether a differentiated regulation could help regulators
address tradeoffs while working within the statutory framework. This discussion also
explains why the statutory framework for air quality regulation in the United States
requires a focus on achieving the air quality standards for ozone rather than on balancing
the costs and benefits of reducing ozone in each area of the country.
Chapter 2 also examines the sources of ozone precursor emissions and the
historical trends in those emissions. One barrier to implementing a differentiated
regulation for sources other than large stationary sources is that few data are available on
how emissions from other sources (like mobile sources) vary in time and by location. The
joint discussion of the science and policy backgrounds of the ozone problem in Chapter 2
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helps explain why policies to reduce ozone concentrations have not been entirely
successful even though they have caused dramatic reductions in ozone precursor
emissions.
Chapter 3 begins by reviewing the environmental economics literature that
discusses differentiated regulations. In doing so it explains the economic rational for
using a differentiated approach to regulate NOx emissions. The environmental economics
literature also explains why differentiated regulations are difficult to implement. A
review of this literature helps clarify the reasons why differentiated regulations have not
been used to address the ozone air quality problem despite persistence of the problem and
the scientific and economic justifications for differentiation.
Chapter 3 then discusses the NOx cap-and-trade programs that have regulated
emissions from stationary sources in the Eastern United States. It reviews studies that
have analyzed the effectiveness of these regulations. The studies find that the regulations
have been effective in achieving their targeted NOx reductions and in doing so at low
cost. However, although ozone air quality in the Eastern U.S. has improved substantially
since the implementation of these regulations, the problem has not been completely
solved. In fact, some studies suggest that the costs of the NOx reductions achieved by
these programs cannot be justified by improvements in ozone air quality alone. However,
the programs' costs can be justified by the combination of reductions in particulate matter
and ozone pollution. This explains one of the arguments against a differentiated
regulation for NOx emissions raised by environmental groups: reductions in NOx
emissions have other benefits and are therefore always justified. The tradeoffs between
reducing ozone and particulate matter pollution discussed in Section 2.2.2 suggest that
this argument is too simple. Also, NOx reductions certainly have benefits beyond
reducing ozone concentrations, but federal law mandates that all areas achieve the ozone
air quality standards. The EPA's air quality modeling shows that the reductions in NOx
emissions required by the Clean Air Interstate Rule, which focuses on reducing
particulate matter pollution as well as ozone, will not guarantee that all areas of the
Eastern U.S. attain the ozone air quality standards by 2015 (U.S. EPA 200b). This means
that despite the other benefits of NOx reductions, a careful approach that considers ozone
formation chemistry is needed if the ozone air quality standards are to be attained.
Chapter 4 turns to the NOx emission characteristics of coal power plants in order
to examine the hypothesis that the operators of coal power plants have counterproductive
incentives to reduce NOx emissions at the times when ozone formation is least likely
under the summertime cap-and-trade programs in the Eastern United States. A simple
economic model that builds from the technical NOx emission characteristics of coal
power plans describes why some plant operators might have incentives to reduce NOx
emissions more when power prices are lower during the cooler parts of the summer (e.g.
May and June compared to July and August). This is potentially problematic because
peak ozone concentrations are less likely during the cooler parts of the summer.
Historical data on emissions, generation and electricity, fuel, and NOx prices were then
used to estimate counterfactual emissions for what the emissions of coal power plants
would have been without the cap-and-trade programs. The operators of some power
plants reduced emissions more during May and June, which is consistent with the
incentives. However, at the aggregate level nearly equal reductions occurred during the
entire summer. This analysis illustrates a potential benefit of a differentiated regulation: it
could help ensure that all sources undertake the most effective NOx reductions.
Chapter 5 presents the results of the simulations that used two methods to
estimate the potential short-term NOx reductions from power plants under a differentiated
cap-and-trade program. The simulations were performed for the electric power network
that covers Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and the District of Columbia
(called "Classic PJM"). Both simulation methods - a zonal model based on an abstract
representation of the network and Optimal Power Flow (OPF) simulations - accounted
for thermal and security constraints. Both methods suggested that power plant redispatch
could reduce hourly NOx emissions from power plants by between 6 tons (or 15%) on
the highest demand days and 8 tons (or 30%) on average demand days. Both methods
also suggested that network constraints did not constrain the potential reductions largely
because the exchanges of generation that caused the reductions occurred locally.
(Chapter 5 also compares the different methods in more detail.) Other Eastern U.S. power
systems share key characteristics with Classic PJM that suggest these results may hold
more generally.
Chapter 5 also discusses the results of simulations that estimated the relationship
between assumed NOx prices and abatement from redispatch. The costs are high but
comparable to other strategies for NOx reductions being considered by state
governments. The same simulations suggested the distributional effects of a differentiated
cap-and-trade program applied to power plants would not only depend on the allocation
of NOx emission allowances, as is typically the case with cap-and-trade programs, but
also on the timing and locations of the required NOx reductions.
Chapter 6 summarizes and offers opportunities for future work.

Chapter 2- The Science of Ground-level Ozone
Pollution and the History of U.S. Ozone
Policy
This chapter first presents background information on the science of ozone
formation in order to explain why the atmospheric chemistry literature suggests that a
differentiated approach to controlling NOx emissions is needed to reduce ozone
concentrations (Section 2.1). This literature also suggests it may be possible to forecast
and categorize ozone episodes, which could aid implementation of differentiation.
Section 2.2 then discusses the damages caused by ozone and ozone precursor emissions,
which justify policies that limit ozone and its precursor emissions. Section 2.3 discusses
the sources of and historical trends in these pollutants. This discussion explains that
regulators have focused on reducing NOx emissions in the Eastern U.S. because of high
biogenic concentrations of VOC emissions. It also explains why a cap-and-trade program
for stationary sources might be easier to implement than one for mobile sources: few data
are available on how NOx emissions from mobile sources vary in time and by location.
Section 2.4 discusses the federal ozone air quality standards and the areas of the
country that have had difficulties attaining them. This section also discusses the statutory
framework for air quality policy and why this framework requires a focus on attaining air
quality standards, rather than on the costs and benefits of reducing ozone concentrations.
The joint discussion of the science and policy backgrounds of the ozone problem helps
explain why policies to reduce ozone concentrations have not been entirely successful
even though they have caused dramatic reductions in ozone precursor emissions. The
history of NOx regulations in Section 2.5 shows that state and federal regulators
acknowledged the chemistry of ozone formation when they switched their focus away
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from VOC emissions to NOx reductions in the Eastern United States. But it also shows
that practical considerations have led policy makers to implement straightforward
regulations that have not fully accounted for the impacts of the time and location of NOx
emissions on the formation of ozone in areas of concern.
2.1. Basic ozone chemistry
Ground-level ozone forms in the lowest level of the earth's atmosphere, the
troposphere.8 The basic reactions that form ozone are reactions of VOCs that create
compounds that react with nitric oxide (NO), the latter being emitted from the burning of
fossil fuel, to form nitrogen dioxide (NO2) (see Borrell 2003 for more details). The NO2
created by these reactions, absorbs sunlight during the daytime. This creates an extra
oxygen atom that can combine with 02 to form ozone (03):
NO2 + (400 nm) - NO + O
0 + 02 - 03
In areas of high concentrations of NOx, the concentrations of ozone are kept low by a
reaction called the titration reaction:
NO + 03 - NO2 +02
These three reactions and the resulting ozone concentrations depend on the
relative concentrations of VOCs and NOx (NO + NO2), on the temperature, and on the
amount of sunlight. Areas, or times, characterized by high concentrations in NOx and
relatively low concentrations of VOCs, are said to be VOC-limited. This means that a
reduction in VOCs will likely reduce ozone-formation but a reduction in NOx will stop
the titration reaction and actually increase ozone concentrations. Most non-urban areas in
7 Areas of concern include counties that are out of compliance with the federal air quality standard for ozone as well as
highly populated areas with, even occasional, high ozone concentrations.
s See the EPA's "Basic Concepts in Environmental Sciences," Chapter 6: Ozone at
http://www.epa.gov/eogapti I !/module6/ozone/formation/formation.htm.
the Northeastern U.S. are NOx-limited, meaning that reductions in NOx will decrease
ozone formation, although this does vary with time, as the amount of sunlight, wind, and
the temperature vary. Additionally, in the Eastern U.S., ozone's lifetime is typically less
than, or up to, two days (Fiore et. al. 2002). 9 This is long enough to make the transport of
ozone and its precursors to downwind areas a problem. The wind in the Eastern U.S.
typically transports the pollutants from west to east.
The right combinations of precursor emission levels, sunlight, and wind
occasionally produce periods of high ozone concentrations (above 0.08 ppm), called
ozone episodes, which typically last for a few hours up to a few days - and ozone
concentrations typically dip below the standard during the night. As the public health
impacts from ozone exposure worsen with increasing concentration, it is these episodes
that are of particular importance in air quality policy.
2.1.1. Policy implications of ozone chemistry
Experience and the literature have highlighted the policy implications of the
chemistry of ozone formation. For example, the counterintuitive relationship that very
high concentrations of NOx can suppress ozone formation explains the "weekend effect"
in the Los Angeles air basin: ozone concentrations were higher on weekends when NOx
emissions from diesel trucks were lower (CARB 2004). Also, Ryerson et. al. (2001)
found that ozone is less likely to form in the concentrated plumes from the largest power
plants compared to the plumes from smaller plants. In addition, reductions of NOx from
power plants located near natural sources of VOCs, like oak forests, reduce ozone
formation more than reductions from those far from VOC sources (Ryerson et. al. 2001,
Chameides et. al. 1988). Ryerson et al. (2001) summarize that a reduction of one ton of
NOx from a dilute power plant plume into an area with high ambient VOCs
9 The lifetime of ozone in the troposphere in general is longer, 6 to 10 days, but factors like a shallow mixing layer and
interactions with biogenic VOCs make ozone's lifetime shorter over the Eastern United States (Fiore et al. 2002).
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concentrations would result in at least twice the amount of reduction in ozone formation
compared to a reduction of one ton of NOx from a concentrated plume in an area with
low ambient VOC concentrations. These authors suggest that these relationships should
be taken into account when designing NOx permit trading programs in the Eastern United
States.
More recent papers have used techniques that integrate atmospheric chemistry
modeling with economic and demographic data in order to link the variable role of NOx
emissions in ozone formation to human exposure and health impacts. Mauzerall et. al.
(2005) examined differences in health effects of ozone formation and exposure from NOx
emissions from large point sources at different locations and times. They chose times and
locations that captured relevant ranges of variation in temperature and local biogenic
VOC emissions. They found that the ozone produced from the same amount of NOx
emissions at these different times and places can vary by up to a factor of five. The public
health impacts of the NOx also depend on locational variations in demographics that
influence exposure (Mauzerall et. al. 2005). Tong et. al. (2006) used similar techniques to
study the ozone-caused NOx damages around Atlanta. They found that the marginal
damages of NOx emissions vary greatly across the Atlanta metropolitan area because of
ozone formation chemistry, including the effects of the titration reaction.
2.1.2. Predicting and categorizing the effects of NOx on ozone episodes
A time- and location-differentiated cap-and-trade program could incorporate the
role of meteorology and chemistry in the conversion of NOx to ozone if two conditions
concerning predicting and categorizing ozone episodes hold. The first is that weather and
atmospheric chemistry forecasting can predict the conditions conducive to ozone
formation with sufficient accuracy and lead-time (at least 48 hours) to influence
electricity markets (or other decisions, such as where the regulations applied to vehicles
or other sources). The second condition is that the spatial zones and time intervals in
which the surrender ratio for the NOx emissions permits would be varied can be
identified with sufficient regularity that a reasonably simple and stable system of
differentiated permit exchange rates triggered by transparent weather and atmospheric
chemistry indicators can be implemented.
The literature suggests that these conditions are feasible.'l For example, slow-
moving, high-pressure systems drive the worst ozone episodes in the Eastern United
States (NRC 1991 citing RTI 1975, Decker et al. 1976). This means that forecasting
ozone episodes requires forecasting these high-pressure systems. The latter are generally
predictable with a lead-time of 3 to 5 days (NRC 1991 citing Chen 1989, van den Dool
and Saha 1990). The literature suggests that categorizing the relationships between NOx
emissions, meteorology, and ozone in defined geographic areas is possible. For example,
Lehman et. al. (2004) studied rural and suburban ozone concentrations in the Eastern
United States between 1993 and 2002. They found that the Eastern U.S. could be divided
into five distinct regions (e.g. Mid-Atlantic, Great Lakes) that each exhibited distinct
temporal patterns (e.g. seasonal trends and persistency) in ozone concentrations. They
suggest that their "results suggest that there is a statistically based rationale for
delineating geographical areas when interpreting 03 concentrations" (Lehman et. al.
2004, pg. 4368). They propose further work that will categorize the effects of
meteorology on ozone concentration in a similar manner.
2.2. Damages from Ozone Pollution and its Precursors
As discussed in Section 2.1, weather conditions and precursor emissions drive ozone
formation. These factors can sometimes combine to cause periods of high ozone
concentrations. It is these times of high concentration that harm human health. This
section reviews the evidence that ozone damages human health and welfare. It also
o1 Further research on these issues is out of the scope of this dissertation but will continue under the broader project at
the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, which supported this research.
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discusses the non-ozone related damages of NOx and VOC emissions. The argument of
some environmental groups that differentiation for NOx reductions is not worthwhile
because NOx reductions always reduce harmful quantities of some pollutants even if they
do not reduce ozone is not always founded. The examples in this section illustrate the
tradeoffs that reducing NOx can create. For example, NOx reductions that decrease ozone
concentrations can simultaneously increase the concentrations of harmful particulate
matter in some situations.
2.2.1. Ozone (03)
Epidemiological and toxicological studies, including controlled human exposure
studies, have linked short-term, or acute, ozone exposure (i.e. exposure that lasts less than
8 hours) to health problems for concentrations of ozone at or above 0.08 ppm (for an
extensive literature review see U.S. EPA 2006a). The associated health problems include
a reduction in lung function in healthy adults, the onset or aggravation of asthma and of
other respiratory diseases, and an increased susceptibility to infections. Some recent
controlled human exposure studies have also linked ozone exposure at lower
concentrations to respiratory effects in healthy young adults. For example, Adams 2006
found that 6.6 hour-long exposures to 0.06 ppm significantly affected the lung function of
health young adults as they exercised (Adams 2006). Epidemiological studies of children
and toxicological animal studies show that longer term, or repeated ozone exposure may
permanently damage the lungs and cause premature death (see U.S. EPA 2006a, pg. 8-
50). Ozone can also reduce agricultural yield, damage tree foliage, and reduce visibility
(for a summary see U.S. EPA 2006a, Chapter 9).
Recent results suggest that there is a relationship between exposure to ozone at
concentrations observed in many U.S. cities and increased mortality risk. Bell et al. 2004
estimated the association between mortality and daily and weekly exposure to ozone in
95 U.S. cities that account for 40% of the U.S. population. Their lagged model estimated
the effects of ozone concentrations in a particular day on subsequent days' mortality
figures. They also estimated the association between the risk of mortality and to the
previous week's cumulative ozone levels. They found, for example, that an increase of
0.01 ppb in ozone from the previous week's concentration was associated with a 0.52%
increase in non-injury-related daily mortality and a 0.64% increase in cardiovascular and
respiratory mortality (Bell et al. 2004). Subsequent studies have supported these findings
(e.g. Bell et al. 2005, Ito et al. 2005, and Levy et al. 2005). These results are important
because, as discussed later, the association between mortality and pollutant
concentrations greatly increases the estimated benefits from reductions in the ambient
concentrations of that pollutant in populated areas.
2.2.2. Nitrogen oxides (NOx)
Beyond their role in the formation of ground level ozone, NOx emissions cause
and contribute to other environmental and human health problems. NOx emissions
contribute to the formation of acid rain and some types of particulate matter (PM)
pollution like particulate nitrate (NO3-). Small, or fine, particulate matter (i.e. particles
less than 2.5 ptm in diameter) is very detrimental to human health and nitrate is one of
these particles, although it is not known whether NOx-based PM or SO02-based PM or
other species are more harmful than others (see U.S. EPA 2004, Chapter 8). Vehicle
catalytic converters turn nitrogen oxides into nitrous oxide (N20), which is a greenhouse
gas (U.S. EIA 2006, Chapter 4). Nitrogen oxides can directly affect ecosystems through
nutrient overloading. For example, the dry and wet deposition of NOx from the air can
cause nitrogen overloading in bodies of water, which accelerates eutrophication and
oxygen depletion and harms fish and shellfish populations (see, for example, Ryther and
Dunstan 1971). Nitrogen dioxide (NO2), one of the major components of NOx also
directly affects human respiratory health.
For this last reason and environmental problems like eutrophication, NOx is itself
a criteria pollutant under the Clean Air Act. For the purposes of the NOx NAAQS, the
EPA uses NO2 as an indicator pollutant for the broader category (in atmospheric
chemistry NOx includes only NO2 and NO but in other disciplines also includes
compounds such as nitric acid (HNO 3) and N20). The EPA reviewed the NO2 NAAQS in
1993 but did not change the standards. In their "National Air Quality and Emissions
Trends Report, 2003 Special Studies Edition," the EPA found that all regions of the U.S.
were in attainment with the NO2 NAAQS of 0.053 ppm annual arithmetic mean, in fact
most areas of the U.S. had attained the standard by the early 1980s (U.S. EPA 2003a).
The fact that the entire U.S. is in compliance with the NOx NAAQS means that
the secondary pollutants like ozone and PM now drive the implementation of regulations
to reduce NOx emissions. A related issue is that the persistent problems like ozone and
PM depend on factors in addition to NOx emissions and, hence, solving these problems is
not as simple as requiring NOx reductions. For example, ozone formation depends on the
chemistry discussed above and reductions in NOx can sometimes worsen ozone.
Similarly, the formation of particulate nitrate depends on NOx emissions and other
factors like the availability of ammonia, moisture, and oxidizing agents. Some studies
have found relationships between levels of NOx and the formation of particulate nitrate
that are similar, and related, to those for ozone formation. For example, Pun and Seigneur
(2001) found that decreasing NOx emissions in the winter in the San Joaquin Valley,
California could increase the formation of particulate nitrate. Interestingly, in this case,
the increase in PM came from the decrease in ozone caused by the reduction in NOx.
Similarly, Blanchard and Tanenbaum (2003a) found that 5 of 16 areas of California had
opposite trends in NOx and particulate nitrate concentrations between 1980 and 2000
(two with increasing nitrate and decreasing NOx concentrations and three with increasing
NOx and decreasing nitrate concentrations). They also found that lower NOx emissions
on the weekends (the weekend effect) in southern California did not correspond to lower
particulate nitrate concentrations (Blanchard and Tanenbaum 2003b).
2.2.3. Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)
The category of VOC emissions includes a number of different compounds. For
example, it includes methane (CH 4), which is a greenhouse gas, other hydrocarbon
compounds, and aromatic compounds like benzene and xylene, which are thought to be
carcinogens. The hydrocarbon VOCs are those that contribute to the formation of
ozone." VOC emissions contribute to water quality issues as well as to indoor air
pollution. Products like paints, cleaning supplies, pesticides, and building materials emit
VOCs. And concentrations of VOCs are often ten times higher indoors than outside.' 12
For the purposes of outdoor air quality, VOCs primarily contribute to the ozone problem.
2.2.4. Summary
There are human health and environmental reasons to reduce ozone concentrations. There
are also other reasons to reduce NOx and VOC emissions other than ozone. But the
literature discussed in Section 2.1 suggested that if ozone concentrations are to be
reduced, regulations must focus on ozone formation chemistry. If this chemistry suggests
that NOx should not be reduced in some areas then tradeoffs between reducing ozone
concentrations and other goals should be assessed. However, as discussed later in Section
2.4.3, the statutory framework for air quality in the U.S. makes this a challenge.
" 40 CFR Part 51.100(s) defines these non-methane VOCs for policy purposes as "any compound of carbon excluding
carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, carbonic acid, metallic carbides or carbonates, and ammonium carbonate, which
participates in atmospheric photochemical reactions" except those that appear on a list of exempted compounds. These
exempted compounds have "negligible photochemical reactivity."
12 For a more complete summary see EPA, "An Introduction to Indoor Air Quality: Organic Gases (Volatile Organic
Compounds- VOCs)," at http://www.epa.gov/iaq/voc.html, retrieved January 24, 2007.
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2.3. Sources of and trends in ozone and precursor emissions
There are three major categories of emissions sources that contribute to
atmospheric concentrations of NOx and VOCs. These are mobile and stationary sources
(which are anthropogenic) and natural sources (which are also called biogenic). This
section discusses the contributions of each of these source categories to NOx and VOC
emissions in the Eastern United States. 13 It also summarizes available information on the
variation of each of these contributions in time and by location and on the recent trends in
emissions from the different source categories. Few data are available that describe the
variation of mobile source emissions in time and by location. This is one reason why it
may be easier to implement a differentiated regulation for stationary sources, for which
good data exist. This section also shows that the regulations in the U.S. have reduced
ozone precursors significantly and that ozone concentrations have also been reduced. A
differentiated regulation could help achieve the final reductions in ozone concentrations
required for all areas to meet the air quality. It could also help achieve the reductions that
would be required to meet more stringent future standards.
2.3.1. Nitrogen oxides (NOx)
The major natural sources of NOx are the burning of biomass (e.g. forest fires),
soil release, and lightening discharge (Bond et al. 2001 and Zhang et al. 2003). These
natural sources contribute about 14% of all annual NOx emissions in the United States
(Zhang et al. 2003). Although these sources do contribute to the formation of ground-
level ozone, they are difficult to control and are dwarfed by the NOx emissions from the
combustion of fossil fuels and other anthropogenic sources.
Mobile anthropogenic sources of NOx include on-road vehicles (like cars and
trucks) and non-road vehicles (like tractors, airport vehicles, airplanes and ships). In
13 The cited EPA documents report these data aggregated for Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and the
states east of these. These data are available disaggregated by county for years prior to 2002.
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2005, the EPA reported that mobile sources contributed 59% of total U.S. anthropogenic
NOx emissions in 2005 (on-road sources like cars and trucks contributed 38%).
Stationary anthropogenic sources of NOx include power plants, industrial boilers, and
other industrial facilities. Power plants and other large industrial sources contributed 22%
of the total 2005 NOx emissions in Eastern States (U.S. EPA 2006b), with about 97% of
this contribution from power plants. 14
The time and locational aspects of ozone chemistry suggest that studying annual
trends in NOx, VOCs, and ozone for the large area of the entire Eastern U.S. may not be
the most useful way to understand the problem. Unfortunately, very few detailed datasets
are available that would enable location-specific analyses of trends in NOx emissions for
daily or hourly periods. While the Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS)
provides detailed, hourly data on NOx emissions from power plants and other large
industrial sources, there are not similar data available for mobile sources.' 5 Likewise, the
CEMS data provide information on individual generating units and industrial sites, but
data for mobile sources from particular locations are not widely available. The difficulties
involved in directly monitoring emissions from mobile sources are likely the reason for
this dearth. EPA does publish estimated annual emissions data at the state and county
level for both mobile and stationary sources and for designated "statistical metropolitan
areas", but the most recent year of data that are easily queried is 2001 and the EPA has
only published data up through 2002.16
Figure 2-1 shows the trends in the shares of stationary and mobile source
emissions of the annual NOx emissions for selected Eastern States between 1999 and
14 This latter fact was calculated from EPA Continuous Emissions Monitoring data at http::/cfLipub.ea. gov/2dm/.
's The CEMS data are available at the EPA's "Clean Air Markets - Data and Maps" at http://cfpub.epa.gov/gdm/ under
"Emissions."
16 Data through 2001 are available at the EPA's "AirData" at http://www.epa.gov/air/datalindex.htmn. Data through
2002 are available at the EPA's "2002 National Emissions Inventory Data & Documentation" at
http://www.ena.gov/ttn/chief/net/2002inventorv.html.
2001.17 The figure suggests that the relative contributions of different sources to total
NOx vary geographically; stationary sources contributed between 5 and 45% of states'
total annual NOx emissions in this period. At the county level, the variation was greater.
On average, stationary sources contributed about 15% of county-level NOx emissions in
Eastern States in 2001. They contributed over 50% of NOx emissions in about 10% of
eastern counties and over 90% of NOx emissions in about 1% of counties. 18
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Figure 2-1 Stationary and mobile source shares (percent) of total, annual
NOx emissions in some Eastern States for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001.
Although the Figure 2-1 data are not yet publicly available for 2005, the EPA has
summarized these data in a report on the effectiveness of NOx regulations. They reported
that stationary sources contributed about 22% and mobile sources about 59% of NOx
emissions in all Eastern States in 2005 (U.S. EPA 2006b). In the same Eastern States in
2001, stationary sources contributed about 33% and mobile sources about 54% of total
NOx emissions. 19 This change in the relative contributions of stationary and mobile
17 Data are from the EPA's "AirData" at http://www.epa.gov/air/data/index.html.
18 County-level calculations were also performed with data from the EPA's "AirData" at
http://www.epa.gov/air/data/index.html.
19 The 2001 percentages were calculated from the EPA's "AirData" at httv://www.epa.goviair/dataiindex.html using theTier-i emission categories of fuel combustion for electricity generation and other industrial processes for stationary
source emissions and the Tier-I categories of on- and off-highway vehicles for mobile sources. In all cases, "Eastern
states" refers to Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and the states east of these.
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sources was partially a result of major control programs that the EPA and state regulators
implemented for NOx from stationary sources between 1999 and 2006 (see Chapter 4).
The stationary-source shares of NOx emissions also decreased between 1999 and
2005 because NOx emissions from mobile sources increased. The EPA's regulations
requiring mobile sources to reduce NOx emissions with both fuel and technology
standards have reduced emissions per mile from vehicles, but increases in the use of non-
road diesel engines and in vehicles miles traveled for both heavy-duty diesel and gasoline
trucks more than offset the emissions reductions from these programs in many parts of
the United States (U.S. EPA 2003a). The large decreases in emissions from stationary
sources like power plants have offset this increase and caused total annual NOx emissions
to decrease; the EPA estimates that total NOx emissions in the Eastern U.S. have fallen
from about 16 million tons annually in 1999 to about 12.5 million tons in 2005 (U.S.
EPA 2003a and 2006b).
In addition to the geographic dependence of relative contributions of mobile and
stationary sources to total NOx emissions, human activity patterns probably cause diurnal
and seasonal variations as well. For example, the contribution of power plants to NOx
total emissions in some populated areas is likely higher at night, when there is less traffic
than during the day. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find data on mobile source emissions
at the frequency needed to analyze these trends - although such information could
ultimately contribute to a more cost-effective approach to regulation if a careful
monitoring of these trends could help identify the areas and times that particular sources
contributed most to local and even regional, ozone formation.
2.3.2. Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)
In contrast to NOx emissions, natural sources of VOC emissions contribute
substantially to total VOC emissions in many parts of the United States. Examples of
biogenic VOC (BVOC) emissions are isoprene and terpenoid emissions from trees and
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other plants. Chameides et al. (1988) found that 60% of Atlanta's 11-county urban area
was wooded and that the daily emission rate of BVOCs in this area was greater than that
from anthropogenic sources (pg. 241, note 13). Pierce et al. (1998) confirmed findings
since 1988 that BVOC emissions equal or slightly exceed those from anthropogenic
sources in the Eastern United States; they back-calculated BVOC emissions for periods
when scientists had measured BVOCs. Later studies have also confirmed these findings
and studied how changing land-use patterns have caused BVOC emissions to shift across
the Eastern U.S. over time (Purves et al. 2004, Fiore et al. 2005).
Key to these estimates of BVOC emissions was the finding that the quantities of
some BVOCs emitted from plants are a function of sunlight or heat. Lamb et al. (1987)
found that a rise in ambient temperature from 25 to 35 degrees Celsius caused some
deciduous trees to increase their isoprene emission rate by a factor of four and some
conifers to increase their terpene emission rate by a factor of one and a half. In general,
studies have found that BVOC emission rates increase exponentially with the temperature
of trees' leaves up to about 40 degrees Celsius (Tingey et al. 1979 and 1980). Isoprene
emissions from some plant species are a by-product of photosynthesis and therefore
depend on the presence of sunlight; isoprene emission rates increase with increasing light
intensity (NRC 1991, pg. 263). The observation that trees and other plants emit more
BVOC emissions on hot, sunny days is important for policy as these days are also the
most conducive to the formation of ozone.
Biogenic VOC emissions, especially highly reactive isoprene, play an important
role in the formation of ground-level ozone in the Eastern United States and are relevant
to air quality policy (Trainer et al. 1987). Pierce et al. (1998) found that the addition of
biogenic VOCs to air chemistry models caused a substantial increase in predicted ozone
levels and that accounting for BVOC emissions categorized many areas of the Eastern
United States as NOx-limited, instead of VOC-limited. This meant that reductions in
NOx emissions were, and still are, more crucial for mitigating ozone formation than
reductions in anthropogenic VOC emissions in the Eastern United States (see, for
example, McKeen et al. 1991 and Sillman et al. 1990). High levels of isoprene emissions
can also reduce ozone when NOx emissions are low (Kang et al. 2003).
Sources of anthropogenic VOC (AVOC) emissions include combustion processes,
dry cleaning, and fumes from substances like solvents, fossil fuels, and paints. Solvents
contributed 27% and mobile sources 39% of AVOC emissions in the Eastern U.S. in
2005 (U.S. EPA 2006b). Solvents and paints emit AVOCs through evaporative
processes, as do gasoline and other petroleum products. Mobile sources like light-duty
and heavy-duty trucks and lawnmowers emit AVOCs when fuels permeate through hoses
and fittings and during start-up and operation.
Between 1990 and 2005, AVOC emissions decreased from about 16 million tons
to about 11 million tons per year in the Eastern United States (U.S. EPA 2006b).
Decreases in VOC emissions from the transportation sector caused the majority of this
reduction (U.S. EPA 2003a). There is little information on the diurnal and seasonal
patterns of AVOC emissions; in fact, uncertainties around VOC emissions are greater
than for NOx because large stationary sources are responsible for a large portion of NOx
emissions. Emissions from sources like power plants are easier to estimate or monitor,
estimation procedures for evaporative emissions and mobile source emissions, the latter
also affect NOx estimates, are more difficult (see for example, NRC 1991, pg. 252-4).
2.3.3. Ozone (03)
There are few direct anthropomorphic sources of ozone pollution, the only major
one being ozone from outside the North American boundary layer. The lifetime of ozone
is about one week, which is long enough for it to be transported between continents
(Fiore et. al 2002).20 Scientists and policymakers in the U.S. consider this contribution
part of the policy-relevant ozone background concentration. Fiore et al. (2002) found that
background ozone from outside the North American boundary layer contributed about
0.015 ppm in the Eastern United States during the stagnant, summertime conditions most
conducive to the formation of high ozone concentrations, and that it contributed more at
other times (Fiore et al. 2002).2 1
Ozone concentrations have decreased since the 1980s in the Eastern United
States, but the decreasing trend slowed after 1990. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
studies in the literature indicated that BVOC emissions caused NOx-limited conditions
for ozone formation in the Eastern United States, and regulators realized that they needed
to control NOx as well as VOC emissions (U.S. EPA 2006b). The EPA and the eastern
states implemented major regulations between 1996 and 2006 that controlled NOx
emissions from large stationary sources, mostly power plants (Chapter 4).
To measure general trends in ozone concentrations, the EPA calculates the
"seasonal average 8-hour ozone concentrations" (U.S. EPA 2006b). They average the
daily maximum 8-hour ozone concentrations from each monitor from May 1st through
September 30'h each year, while accounting for differences in meteorology between
years. In eastern states, the average reduction in ozone concentrations was between 6 and
21% from 1983 to 2002; the largest decrease occurred in the Northeast and the smallest
in the Midwest. With the exception of the northeastern states, little or none of this
reduction occurred between 1993 and 2002 (U.S. EPA 2003a). Between 2002 and 2004,
the average reduction was 8% in all eastern states and there was no reduction in average
ozone concentrations between 2004 and 2005 (U.S. EPA 2006b). In 2005 the EPA found
20 The lifetime of ozone over the Eastern United States in particular is shorter, usually about 2 days, because of shallow
mixing depth, interactions with biogenic VOCs, and other factors (Fiore et al. 2002).
21 The EPA found the policy-relevant background levels of ozone in the U.S. in general to be about 35 ppb, but noted
that they do vary in time and space (EPA 2006a, Chapter 3, pages 44-55).
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that the seasonal average 8-hour ozone concentration in the Eastern United States was
about 0.053 ppm (U.S. EPA 2006b). These changes, especially the recent ones, have
improved local air quality in many areas. The following sections of this chapter discuss
these changes in local air quality in more detail, as well as their relationship to the federal
air quality standards for ozone.
2.4. Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
The first part of this section briefly reviews the history of the federal air quality
standards for ozone. Section 2.4.2 then uses ozone monitoring data to illustrate the
difficulties that states in the Eastern U.S. have had attaining these standards. The
persistent non-attainment of the standards, despite the reductions in precursor emissions
just discussed in Section 2.3, provides motivation for the consideration of a differentiated
approach to the resolution of NOx to control ozone.
Section 2.4.3 builds of the history of the history of U.S. policy and discusses why
the statutory frameworks for air quality require a focus on achieving the air quality
standards rather than on balancing the costs and benefits of NOx emission reductions.
The air quality management approach mandated by the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to
set air quality standards based on science without reference to the cost of achieving them.
The EPA and state governments use regulations to achieve the standards through
reductions in precursor emissions. The formation chemistry of secondary pollutants like
ozone creates a challenge for this approach because straightforward reductions in
precursor emissions do not always cause decreases in the concentrations of the secondary
pollutants and reductions in precursor emissions can lead to tradeoffs. Differentiated
regulations working within the statutory framework may help mitigate this problem.
2.4.1. History of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
In large part due to its complicated chemistry, ground-level ozone pollution has
been a persistent environmental problem and a policy, technical, and scientific challenge
since urban air pollution caught the public's attention in the 1940s. Congress officially
recognized ground-level ozone and other photochemical oxidants as a widespread
problem in 1970 when it categorized them as one of six "criteria pollutants". 22 The Clean
Air Act of 1970 (CAA) mandates the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set two
science-based National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria pollutants. 23
It requires "primary" standards to protect public health with an "adequate margin of
safety" and "secondary standards" to protect against other welfare effects like those on
ecosystems and visibility.24 The CAA mandates the EPA to periodically review the
NAAQS.2 5 It also requires states to develop State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to regulate
various emission sources to levels that would ensure attainment of the NAAQS. 26
The EPA first set a standard for photochemical oxidants in 1971.27 Ozone is a
photochemical oxidant and typically makes up over 90% of all photochemical oxidant
pollution (see, for example, Bates 1983). The EPA reviewed the photochemical oxidant
standards between 1976 and January 1979. Based on a review of scientific studies of
exposure, health, and other environmental impacts of these pollutants, the EPA revised
the photochemical oxidant NAAQS by designating ozone (03) as the indicator for the
category of pollutants. This means that the EPA felt it was more appropriate to measure
and regulate only ozone concentrations, rather than doing so for all the pollutants in the
22 Congress, in CAA Sections 108 and 109, required the EPA to identify and list criteria pollutants: those that are
widespread problems and emitted by many industrial sectors, and that have a significant effect on public health and
welfare. The six criteria pollutants are NOx, ozone, sulfur dioxide, lead, carbon monoxide, and particulate matter.
23 CAA § 108(a)(2) states: "Air quality criteria for an air pollutant shall accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge
useful in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare which may be expected
from the presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in varying quantities."
24 This is true for all criteria pollutants under the Clean Air Act, Section 109(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
25 Section 109(d) of the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7409) mandates five-year reviews.
26 CAA Section 11 I(d).
27 The standard was that the daily maximum one-hour average could not exceed 0.08 ppm more than one day per year.
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category, as they found ozone to be the most important and representative of the broader
category. The 1979 ozone NAAQS required the daily maximum hourly average ozone
concentrations not to exceed 0.12 parts per million for more than three days over a four
year period.28 This standard is often called the "l-hour" standard. The EPA updated the
ozone standards in 1997.29 The 1997 ozone NAAQS is the current standard and it
requires the 3-year average of the fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average ozone
concentrations each year not to exceed 0.08 parts per million. This is typically referred to
as the "8-hour" standard. The EPA is currently reviewing the 8-hour standard and the
EPA staff scientists have recommended that the Administrator increase its stringency to
within the range of 0.06 to 0.08 ppm (U.S. EPA 2007b).
2.4.2. Areas and times of persistent non-attainment of the ozone NAAQS
Many counties of the Eastern U.S. are struggling to meet the 8-hour ozone
NAAQS and an increase in stringency of the standard would intensify this challenge. In
2004, the EPA used 2001 through 2003 data to designate 103 areas as nonattainment
areas for the 8-hour standard.30 In a 2006 report, however, the EPA found that, based on
2003 through 2005 data, only 31 of these areas were still in nonattainment (Figure 2-2,
U.S. EPA 2006b). About 81 million people live in these 31 remaining nonattainment
areas, which is roughly 40% of the total population in the Eastern United States. ' These
areas' high populations mean that it is important from a public health perspective for
them to attain the NAAQS for ozone.
28 The three days in four years part of this standard ensures that the annual "expected number" of exceedences will less
than one. If three or fewer exceedences occur in four years then the average number of exceedences over those four
years will be less than one. In this way the EPA approximated a long-term average, rather than penalizing states with
one or two "outlier" exceedences over four years.
29 Federal Register, Vol. 62, No. 138, Friday, July 18, 1997.
30 The EPA designated 126 areas in the entire U.S. as nonattainment areas at this time. See U.S. EPA, "Air Quality
Designations and Classification for the 8-Hour Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)" Federal
Register 71(93), May 15, 2006.
31 The EPA defines the "Eastern" states as Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and the states east of those
(see, for example, U.S. EPA 2006b). The U.S. Census Bureau estimated that the population in these states in July 2006
was about 197 million (calculated from U.S. Census Bureau, "National and State Population Estimates" at
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html).
KFigure 2-2 Nonattainment areas for the 8-hour ozone standard. Calculated
by the EPA with 2003 through 2005 data (Figure from U.S. EPA 2006b).
Data from the EPA's air quality monitoring database suggest that the ozone
concentrations in nonattainment areas only exceeded the 8-hour standards on a few days
each year. For example, in the Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states, counties in
nonattainment areas violated the 8-hour standard on about 4 days per year on average
between 2003 and 2005.32 The county with the most daily exceedances during this three-
year period was Ocean County, New Jersey. Ozone readings from this county's single
monitor exceeded the 8-hour standard on 30 days during the three-year period (9, 7, and
14 times in 2003 through 2005 respectively). The monitors in the broader Philadelphia-
Wilmin-Atlantic "moderate" nonattainment area, which includes Ocean County, recorded
an average of 3.6 days per year that exceeded the 8-hour standard. 33 The area's
32 Figures calculated from data retrieved from the EPA's AirData website (http://www.epa.gov/air/data/index.html).
Data for ozone air quality monitors in the states of EPA Regions 1, 2, and 3 (CT, DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY,
PA, PR, RI, VA, VI, VT, WV) was aggregated to the county-level by taking the average of the 4h highest 8-hour ozone
reading for all monitors in each county for the three years. Nonattainment counties were assumed to be those with
values greater than 0.08 ppm for this calculation. (It is worth noting that the averaging across monitors had little effect,
because the majority of counties only reported data from one monitor.) The query from the EPA's database also
returned the number of days in each year that each monitor exceeded the 8-hour standard. These data were summed
across all years for each monitor and then the total 3-year exceedances were averaged across monitors in each county.33 For more details on this nonattainment area and the counties it includes (and on other nonattainment areas), see the
EPA's "Greenbook" at http://www.epa.gov/oa-oaqps/greenbk/gnca.htnl. The data retrieved from the EPA's "AirData"
included those for 29 ozone air quality monitors in the counties in this nonattainment area; these reported 85 monitor-
years of data between 2003 and 2005 and 307 monitor-days that exceeded the standard.
population is over 7 million people and "moderate" is the worst level of nonattainment in
the Eastern U.S. currently, areas of California suffer "serious" or "severe" nonattainment.
The few number of days in which the worst nonattainment areas in the Eastern
U.S. suffer from ozone concentrations above the standard suggests that if additional un-
differentiated regulations are implemented to address this problem, the potential for
costly over-compliance is high. On many days of the summer, additional abatement is not
necessary. The role of this research is to determine the feasibility of linking forecasts of
the critical days to market-based incentives for NOx abatement from sources that impact
ozone concentrations in these targeted areas.
2.4.3. Choosing acceptable ozone concentrations
In a report on the ozone problem, the National Research Council referred to the
NAAQS approach - setting ambient air quality standards and then designing regulations
that reduce emissions until the ambient standards are met - as the "air quality
management approach" to environmental regulation (NRC 1991, pg. 251). They noted
that this strategy can be effectively implemented for primary pollutants; for example,
carbon monoxide (CO) emissions lead directly to elevated ambient concentrations of CO
that harm human health and, thus, reducing CO emissions solves the problem. But they
also discuss why what they call the "air quality management approach" is difficult to
apply successfully to secondary pollutants: There is not a direct linear, casual relationship
precursor emissions and the formation of most secondary pollutant, like ozone and
particulate matter, so reducing those precursor emissions is not a guaranteed strategy to
mitigate the air quality problem.
Both ozone and particulate matter (PM) pollution provide an example of this
challenge. Reductions in NOx emissions do not always lead to decreases in ozone and
PM. In some cases, like those discussed in Section 2.2.2, the same reduction of NOx can
lead to decreases in one pollutant and increases in the other. This tradeoff illustrates a
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major challenge for what the NRC calls the "air quality management approach" under the
statutory framework of the Clean Air Act (CAA). Ideally tradeoffs like this would be
resolved by comparing the costs of incremental reductions in emissions to the total
marginal benefit of further reductions in emissions. Then if NOx reductions were
worthwhile, given the tradeoffs, they could be undertaken.
This presents problem because the EPA is not legally able to consider the costs of
setting the NAAQS; their goal must only be to protect the public health with an
"adequate margin of safety." 34 The literature discusses the problems associated with the
EPA's inability to consider costs while setting the NAAQS: its inability to consider cost
prevents the EPA from using one of the tools available to determine the level of
acceptable risk. Ozone, for example, is not a "threshold" pollutant. 35 This means that
science, as of yet, has not established levels below which exposure to ozone is safe so the
EPA must choose a standard that is based on the available science. Once this air quality
standard is established it must be met, even if the emission reductions required to meet it
cause increases in other harmful pollutants.36 Coglianese and Marchant (2004) argued
that the EPA's inability to consider costs has allowed them to avoid providing internally
consistent and transparently reasoned justifications for the NAAQS decisions (pg. 1292).
They suggest the EPA could more effectively protect the public health by focusing
resources on reducing particulate matter pollution rather than ozone.37 They argue more
34 This is true for all criteria pollutants under the Clean Air Act, Section 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). In Whitman
v. American Trucking Associations, the Supreme Court found that "The text of § 109(b), interpreted in its statutory and
historical context and with appreciation for its importance to the CAA as a whole, unambiguously bars cost
considerations from the NAAQS-setting process..." 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
3s Limitations of epidemiological research and the lack of available data at low exposure levels make it difficult to
detect a this type of threshold and, at this stage, there is not conclusive evidence as to whether or not one exists for
ozone (EPA 2006a, Chapter 7, pgs. 154-9). The literature often models the damage function of ozone as linear or log-
linear based on a linear or log-linear concentration-response function without a threshold below which exposure is safe
(see, for example, Tong et. al. 2006 using the concentration-response function estimated in Bell et. al. 2004).
36 Another problem is that as science continues to improve and scientists are able to identify the effects of pollutants on
human health at lower and lower concentrations, the EPA will not be able to eliminate all risks associated with
exposure to very low concentrations without imposing extremely high costs on society.36 The EPA has recognized that
zero-risk standards are not necessary or desirable.36
37 "In refusing a more stringent alternative for the PM standard, EPA rejected an option that would have achieved a
much greater gain in health benefits than the gain EPA anticipated from its revision of the ozone standard. If protecting
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generally that by comparing the costs and benefits of achieving various levels of ambient
standards for each criteria pollutant, the EPA could evaluate whether it was more cost
effective to concentrate on reducing ozone or other pollutants like particulate matter
(Coglianese and Marchant 2004, pgs. 1334-5).
The use of differentiated regulations to address secondary pollutants with
important spatial and temporal relationships could mitigate the challenge of accounting
for tradeoffs between environmental problems while not considering costs and benefits.
A differentiated approach for both ozone and PM, for example, would at least enable
regulators to explicitly address the tradeoff involved with reductions in NOx even if they
could not balance the costs and benefits of reducing ozone compared to PM (many areas
unable to attain the ozone standard also cannot attain the PM standard). Differentiation
could enable regulators to move away from their current strategy of simply requiring
reductions in precursor emissions.
A possible extension of the research in this dissertation, and of the broader
research program into which it fits, is to estimate the marginal costs and benefits of
reducing ozone concentrations (and even PM concentrations) in the Eastern U.S. through
NOx reductions and thus to eventually inform policy decisions about efficient levels of
ambient concentrations of ozone and other pollutants. For now, however, this research
takes as given the goal of achieving the ozone NAAQS. Studying how remaining ozone
nonattainment areas might achieve compliance cost-effectively is not at odds with the
goal of understanding the marginal costs and benefits of reducing NOx and ozone. The
remaining nonattainment areas are highly populated and, thus, hold the greatest potential
for human health benefits from improved air quality. Also, this dissertation seeks to
understand one of the potential inputs to a full benefit-cost analysis: could power plant
the public health with an adequate margin of safety did not require the Agency to lower the PM standard still further,
then it is far from clear why the Agency was justified in revising its ozone standard at all," (Coglianese and Marchant
2004, pgs. 1321-22).
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dispatch provide flexible NOx abatement options that could be targeted to reduce the
probability of high ozone concentrations in populated areas? 38
2.5. The regulation of ozone precursor emissions
While the CAA and its required State Implementation Plans (SIPs) mean that
states are largely responsible for developing and implementing their own regulations to
meet the ozone NAAQS, the EPA has driven most of the major initiatives to reduce the
emissions of ozone precursors. The EPA has aimed some of these actions at helping
states achieve the ozone air quality standard, and others at different problems like acid
rain and particulate matter. This section discusses federal mobile and stationary source
regulations for NOx and VOCs. The history of federal regulations shows that the
regulations have evolved to some extent with the scientific understanding of the
relationships between precursor emissions and ozone concentrations. But even with the
planned reductions in NOx emissions under the most recent regulations, the EPA does
not expect all areas of the Eastern U.S. to attain the ozone air quality standards. This
suggests that more attention to the science of ozone formation is needed.
2.5.1. Mobile source regulations
The history of mobile source regulations in the U.S. reaches back to the 1950s
when California researchers first recognized the connection between vehicle emissions
and the formation of photochemical smog, which consists of both ozone and particulate
matter (NRC 2004). California led the country in its adoption of emission standards for
new vehicles starting with the 1966 model year; the federal government followed suit
with the Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Act that implemented national vehicle emission
3s Further related research questions are: Could other sources such as vehicles generate targeted NOx reductions at a
lower cost? (Chapter 6 briefly discusses this.) Would targeted actions be more cost-effective than blunt actions like
further decreases in summertime emissions caps? Given the costs of these options to reduce NOx and the reductions in
ozone they are expected to cause, what would be the benefits of implementing them? (Section 3.2.4 reviews studies that
have estimated the costs and benefits of NOx reductions.)
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standards starting in the 1968 model year. 39 Since this time, regulators have used four
mechanisms to limit emissions from mobile sources: emission standards (in grams per
mile) for new vehicles and motors, fuel property specifications, in-use vehicle inspection
and maintenance programs, and incentives for behavioral changes (e.g. transportation
management programs). Regulations based on these mechanisms have achieved mixed
success.
The success of each of these four mechanisms is limited, at least to some degree,
by whether the others are implemented. For example, political challenges have
constrained the use of incentives to reduce driving, especially in metropolitan
nonattainment areas. 40 Vehicle miles traveled (VMT) increased by about 150% between
1970 and 2003 (U.S. EPA 2003a). Thus, although new vehicle emission standards have
encouraged the development of technologies to drastically reduce vehicle tailpipe
emissions (Table 2-1), the increases in VMT and inability of regulators to influence
driving behavior have offset at least some of the progress made in reducing emissions-
per-mile. In fact, prior to 1994 aggregate NOx emissions from light-duty gasoline cars
and trucks increased (U.S. EPA 2003a, pg. 19). In addition, a disproportionately large
fraction of emissions come from a small number of older vehicles and vehicles with
dysfunctional emissions control equipment.41 Inspection and maintenance programs have
not been able to eliminate this problem, again limiting the ability of new vehicle
standards to reduce aggregate emissions (NRC 2001).
39 California's mobile source standards have typically led those adopted by the federal government by about two years.
The CAA does not allow states other than California to independently set mobile sources standards. Other states can,
however, adopt the California standards. For further discussion of this issue see, for example, NRC 2004, pg. 136.
40 The 1970 Clean Air Act gave the EPA the authority to encourage states to develop transportation control plants
(TCPs) in nonattainment areas as part of their SIPs. TCPs might include policies like taxes o surcharges on parking
downtown in metropolitan areas or access restrictions or congestion charges in downtown or polluted areas. The
CAAA of 1977 and 1990 also gave states the option to use these mechanisms but the states have not chooses to adopt
them. An example the political infeasibility of using these controls is the EPA's promulgation of TCPs for 19
metropolitan nonattainment areas in 1973. The states resisted these policies and Congress subsequently restricted the
EPA's ability to use price incentives or to restrict parking in this way. See NRC 2004, Chapter 4 for further discussion
of these issues.
41 NRC 2001 summarizes studies that found, for example, that 5% of California passenger vehicles contributed about
85% of NOx emissions in 1999 (pg. 35).
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Table 2-1 U.S. federal emission standards for NOx and VOC emissions from light-duty and heavy-duty
vehicles between 1968 and 2009. Sources: NRC 2004, 2006, U.S. EPA 2000a and 2000b.
Federal Passenger Vehicles Heavy-duty Diesel
Standards (Light-duty Vehicles) Engines (>8500 Ib)
Model Year VOCs NOx VOCs NOx
Uncontrolled 8.7 3.4
1968 4.1 3.4
1972 3.0 3.4
1975 1.5 3.1
1977 1.5 2.0
1980 0.41 2.0
1981 1.0
1993 5.0
1994 1.3
1995
1996
1997 4.0
1998
1999
2000
2001 0.075* 0.2-0.4** 2.0
2002
2003
2004 0.3 2.4 ^
2005
2006
2007 0.07* 0.14 0.2
2008
2009 0.015 0.07*A
9/m g/bhp-hr
* Fleet average, passenger cars and light-duty trucks
** Emissions standard varies depending on certification level
A Combined nonmethane VOC + NOx standard
*A Fleet average, includes medium-duty vehicles (e.g. SUVs)
Regulators have been better able to manage the interdependence between fuel
composition and the technologies required to meet new vehicle tailpipe standards. Some
substances in fuel - especially tetraethyl lead and sulfur - damage catalytic converters,
which is a primary technology used to reduce NOx tailpipe emissions from both light-
duty gasoline vehicles and trucks (NRC 2004, pg. 155). Regulations in 1973 required the
phase-out of leaded gasoline thereby mitigating exposure to airborne lead oxides and
enabling the use of catalytic converters to reduce NOx and PM.42 The EPA banned leaded
42 38 Federal Register 1255, Jan. 10, 1973, as amended at 38 Federal Register 33741, Dec. 6, 1973
fuels in 1996.43 The "Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards and Gasoline Sulfur
Control Requirements" reduced the level of sulfur allowed in gasoline starting in 2004 in
order to improve the effectiveness of catalytic converters and to prevent the degradation
of these technologies over time. 44 The latter is especially important given the limited
effectiveness of inspection and maintenance programs.
However, gasoline composition regulations have not been altogether free of
problems. For example, refiners replaced the octane enhancing qualities of tetraethyl lead
in gasoline by blending higher amounts of light hydrocarbons and aromatics like benzene
into the fuel.45 This increased evaporative VOC emissions and air toxic emissions from
gasoline. In the early 1970s California imposed limits on the volatility of gasoline (via
the measure of Reid vapor pressure or "RVP") to reduce evaporative VOC emissions
from vehicles, storage tanks and distribution facilities. In 1989 the federal government
also imposed RVP limits. Then, in the 1990 CAAA Congress required the use of
reformulated gasoline during the summer in nine metropolitan, ozone nonattainment
areas.46 Reformulated gasoline generally contains fewer aromatics (like benzene), less
sulfur, and has a lower RVP. It also has additional oxygen content compared to regular
gasoline, which reduces CO emissions from combustion. 47 The two additives most used
to meet the oxygen-content requirements are MTBE4 8 and ethanol; both of these additives
cause ancillary problems. MTBE contaminates groundwater. Both may cause increases in
NOx emissions (NRC 1999). Ethanol also increases the RVP of gasoline, thereby
43 61 Federal Register 3832 (February 2, 1996).
44 See page 6702 in 65 Federal Register 6698 (February 10, 2000).
45 See NRC 2004, pg. 155. Octane helps gasoline resist knocking while burning in the combustion chamber, for more
details see Chevron 2007, Chapter 2.
46 As of 2004, the EPA required RFG in 10 metropolitan areas in the summer: Los Angeles, San Diego, Baltimore-
Washington, Hartford, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Milwaukee, and Houston, and Sacramento. They added
Sacramento in 1995 when it was reclassified as a severe nonattainment area. Fourteen metropolitan areas or states
?articipate voluntarily or have their own RFG programs (NRC 2004, pg. 160).
See NRC 2004, pgs. 155-157. The incomplete combustion of carbon in fuel results in carbon monoxide emissions
and higher oxygen content helps mitigate this problem, see Chevron 2007, Chapter 2.
48 MTBE is Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether.
increasing evaporative VOC emissions or canceling the other measures taken to reduce
the RVP of reformulated gasoline.49
The popularity of medium-duty passenger vehicles (e.g. SUVs) that have been
exempt from the emissions standards placed on light-duty passenger vehicles and trucks,
increases in the use of nonroad diesel engines, and increases in the VMT of heavy-duty
diesel trucks have all contributed to the increases in NOx emissions from mobile sources
since the 1970s (U.S. EPA 2003a). These trends have caused regulators to shift their
focus from light-duty passenger vehicles to medium-duty passenger vehicles and nonroad
and heavy-duty diesel trucks and motors. For example, the Tier 2 standards for passenger
vehicles, which will be fully implemented by 2009, now, for the first time, include
medium-duty vehicles like SUVs and vans (U.S. EPA 2000a). The EPA has also
established categories of nonroad engines and emission standards for each category that
have been phased-in starting in 2000.50
The EPA has also increased the stringency of emission standards for heavy-duty
diesel trucks in recent years (Table 2-1); these new standards will require significant
changes in compliance strategies for diesel truck and engine manufacturers and will be
phased-in between 2007 and 2010. These NOx standards will likely require heavy-duty
diesel trucks to adopt technologies like selective catalytic reduction (SCR) with ammonia
or NOx absorber catalysts (NRC 2006, pg. 129). Until now, trucks have been able to
meet the NOx emission standards through engine modifications.51 In addition to the
49 Many have discussed the controversy over whether political goals to create a subsidy for corn farmers was the major
motivation for the oxygenate requirements, rather than air quality. For a further discussion of this issue and of the
impact of the use of MTBE and ethanol on VOC and NOx emissions, see U.S. EPA 1999 and NRC 1999, 2004.
50 See 63 Federal Register 56968 (October 23, 1998) and for a summary see EPA 2003b and DieselNet, "Nonraod
Diesel Engines," at http://www.dieselnet.com/standards/us/offroad.html. Also see 67 Federal Register 68241
(November 8, 2002) and 68 Federal Register 28327 (May 23, 2003).
51 In fact, because of difficulties in monitoring or testing emissions from trucks under typical driving conditions, the
standards have applied to engines only, which were tested in laboratories (thus the units of grams per horsepower-hour
rather than grams per mile, as for vehicles). This allowed engine manufacturers to subvert the standards by using
software programs in trucks that reverted to operating with better fuel economy and higher NOx emissions at cruising
speeds. This issue was resolved in 1998 (see, for example, NRC 2006 pg. 234).
46
heavy-duty diesel standards, the EPA has also required a reduction in the sulfur-content
of diesel fuels to improve the functioning of NOx control equipment for diesel engines;
sulfur can damage the control technologies needed that reduce NOx emissions.52
One aspect of the history of mobile source regulations that is relevant to this
research is the difficulties that regulators have faced when trying to use incentives to alter
personal behavior. Short-term, targeted reductions of NOx emissions in nonattainment
areas could be achieved by limiting driving during hours when NOx reductions are most
critical for mitigating ozone formation in highly populated areas. Regulators
implemented a program in London that charges fees for driving into central parts of the
city. Notably, however, the fees in London are close to those already paid, for example,
to cross the Hudson River into New York City; this suggests that much higher fees might
be necessary to deter driving in U.S. cities (NRC 2004, pg. 163).
These types of programs may prove more feasible for diesel trucks than for
passenger vehicles. Regulators could use price disincentives to limit driving on critical
days or during critical times for diesel trucks, or they could mandate the use of controls
for the most critical days or hours and relax that mandate during other times. The
selective catalytic converters and absorbers used to limit NOx emissions from heavy-duty
diesel trucks have high variable costs. So cost savings from not requiring the constant use
of these technologies could be significant and could also extend the life of the control
equipment.
2.5.2. Federal stationary source regulations
As the previous section discussed, the EPA's approach to reducing ozone
concentrations first focused on VOC emissions, mostly from mobile sources. Then as the
deceasing trends in ozone concentrations slowed and science stressed the importance of
52 EPA published the low-sulfur diesel rule in 71 Federal Register 25706 (May 1, 2006). They published the diesel
emission standards in 65 Federal Register 59896 (October 6, 2000).
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NOx reductions, especially in the Eastern U.S., the EPA's focus shifted to controlling
NOx emissions from stationary sources (U.S. EPA 2005). Prior to the 1990 CAAA, the
federal government placed very few constraints on NOx and VOC emissions from
stationary sources. The 1990 CAAA initiated a cascade of regulations.
Prior to 1990, emission limits for stationary sources applied only to new sources
and those undergoing substantial modification. Title I of the 1970 CAAA required the
EPA to promulgate New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for stationary sources.
NSPS are emission standards (in units of emissions per heat input, e.g. lbs/mmBTU) that
are based on what sources' emission rates would be if they installed the Best Available
Control Technology (BACT). 3 The provisions required new sources to undergo a
permitting process showing that they would achieve these emission rates and required
existing sources to undergo this process when they undertook significant modifications.
The CAAA of 1977 then required the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
(PSD) in NAAQS attainment areas and the New Source Review (NSR) in nonattainment
areas. The goal of the PSD provisions was to ensure that the air quality in attainment
areas did not degrade. These provisions did not require offsets, but did require sources to
employ the BACT for the appropriate source category and class. The goal of the NSR
was to ensure that the net emissions from sources in nonattainment areas did not
substantially increase; thus, the provisions only allowed the construction or modification
of sources if the facilities used the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) and offset
emissions from other existing sources.54 The 1977 CAAA also required all major sources
53 The EPA, on a case-by-base basis determines the appropriate emissions rate for a source, or source class or category,
that achieves the level of "best available control technology" and they are to take into account energy, environmental
and economic impacts, and other costs. See Section 169(3) of the CAA and NRC 2004 and Burtraw and Evans 2004.
54 The "Lowest Achievable Emission Rate" technology is the most stringent emission limitation possible and the EPA
is to determine what this rate is for a source by choosing either (1) the most stringent limitation in any State
Implementation Plan or (2) the most stringent limitation achieved in practice for a source in the relevant class and
category. See Section 171(3) of the CAA.
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in nonattainment areas to install Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT).
These provisions that mainly focused on new and modified sources created a number of
problems and distortions, one of which was the extension of the lives of industrial plants
and electric generating units beyond their normal lives. For a more detailed discussion of
these provisions, their effects, and recent changes to them see NRC 2004, Chapter 5.
The CAAA of 1990 contained a number of provisions that directly limited NOx
and VOC emissions and that empowered the EPA to take further action. Title I of the
1990 CAAA contained provisions that aimed to help all regions of the U.S. attain the
ozone NAAQS. These provisions are called the "15% rate of progress plan" and they
required that states improve the NOx and VOC emission rates of their sources in
nonattainment areas by 15% from 1990 levels by 1996. States were to achieve this goal
by requiring that sources in nonattainment areas use RACT. Title I then mandated a
schedule for continued progress that started in 1997. The nonattainment regions must
reduce NOx emissions, VOC emissions, or a combination of both by at least 3% every
three years. Some regions have obtained waivers exempting them from this provision, or
altering its requirements, when atmospheric modeling showed that NOx reductions -
which were more economically feasible than VOC reductions - would not improve ozone
air quality (see Burtraw and Evans 2004 for a more detailed discussion).
The 1990 CAAA also required the EPA to set emission standards for sources that
emit more than 10 tons per year of a hazardous air pollutant (HAP). The EPA required
Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards for Synthetic Organic
Chemicals that affected VOC emissions from industrial processes in 1994, 1995, 1997
ss The EPA determines the RACT for source categories and they take cost and other factors into account in this
process. They have done this for over 60 such categories (NRC 2004, pg. 186).
and 1999. They implemented various Solvent and Coating Controls in between 1993 and
1996, and in 1998 (U.S. EPA 2005).56
The most well known provisions of the 1990 CAAA, Title IV, created the Acid
Rain Program. Title IV created a cap-and-trade program to reduce SO 2 emissions from
coal-fired electric generating units. It also specified two phases of NOx emission-rate
standards for existing electric generating units. Phase I targeted 265 older coal-fired
generating units. Congress intended Phase I to commence in 1995, but litigation delayed
its implementation for one year. Phase II commenced in 2000 and required further
reductions from Phase I units and reductions from other coal-fired generating units.57
The 1990 CAAA also created the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC). Congress
recognized that the interstate transport of ozone and its precursors was a problem in the
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic States and created the OTC, a multi-state organization, to
help address this.58 The OTC states agreed that all large stationary sources of NOx in the
region, regardless of ozone NAAQS attainment status, would adopt the "reasonably
available control technology" requirements of Title IV of the CAA in 1995. They also
adopted a seasonal cap-and-trade program for NOx from power plants and industrial
boilers called the OTC NOx Budget Program, which commenced in 1999.59 The
program, which the EPA helped implement, capped emissions from affected sources
between May 1st and September 3 0 th each year; this period is called the "ozone season"
because ozone formation is the biggest problem during this time of year in these states.
(Chapter 4 discusses these programs in more detail.)
56 See U.S. EPA 2005 and the EPA's, "Taking Toxics Out of the Air," at
http://www.epa.gcov/air/toxicair/takingtoxics/p2.htmfl.
57 Phase I required tangentially-fired coal boilers to reduce their emissions rate below 0.45 lbs/mmBTU and dry bottom
wall-fired units to reduce theirs below 0.5 lbs/mmBTU. Phase II required boilers to reduce their NOx emission rates to
between 0.4 and 0.86 lbs/mmBTU, depending on type. It applied to units with capacities greater than 25 MW.
58 The OTC consists of representatives from Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington D.C., see
Sections 176(A) and 184 of the 1990 CAAA.
59 All states in the OTC except Maine, Vermont, and Virginia participated.
In light of the updated 1997 ozone NAAQS and the expectation that interstate
transport would continue to contribute to ozone nonattainment in Eastern States, the EPA
used its authority under the CAA to call for revision of the NOx State Implementation
Plans (SIPs) in Eastern States, in 1998.60 States could choose to comply with the SIP Call
by participating in the SIP Call NOx Budget Program (NBP), a cap-and-trade program
for stationary sources, or by submitting a plan for source-specific NOx emission rate
limits. While the contribution from power plants and other large stationary sources to
total anthropogenic NOx emissions is small relative to that from mobile sources (Section
2.3.1), the EPA focused this regulation on stationary sources for two reasons. The first
reason was because the plumes of emissions from high stacks are more prone to interstate
transport and the second, because they believed that reductions in NOx from stationary
sources to be the most cost-effective option. For example, in its rulemaking to implement
the 1998 NOx SIP Call, the EPA gave states the option to achieve the required NOx
reductions from any sources (U.S. EPA 1998a, pg. 57378). But the EPA stressed that
reductions from stationary source emissions - specifically power plants and other large
industrial boilers - through the SIP Call NOx Budget Program were the most cost
effective option compared to reductions from other stationary sources or mobile sources
(U.S. EPA 1998a, pg. 57402). All states opted to reduce emissions by participating in the
NOx Budget Program (U.S. EPA 2006b, pg. 3). The program became fully effective May
31st of 2004 after delays from lawsuits. The SIP Call NBP, like the OTC NBP, is a
seasonal cap-and-trade program, which caps emissions from May 1st through September
30th from large stationary sources.
60 The EPA's authority to promulgate the SIP Call stemmed from CAA § 10 I(a)(2)(D). The SIP Call required 22 states
and the DC to submit revised SIPs to "prohibit specified amounts of emissions of NOx - one of the precursors to ozone
(smog) pollution - for the purpose of reducing NOx and ozone transport across State boundaries in the eastern half of
the United States," 63 Federal Register 57356 (October 27, 1998). The additional participating states, compared to the
OTC program, are: AL, IL, IN, KY, MI, NC, OH, SC, TN, VA, WV. Parts of GA and MO will be included in 2007.
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In 2005, the EPA used its authority under the CAA §110(a)(2)(D) to issue a
broader set of programs that require NOx and SO2 reductions in the Eastern U.S. called
the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR).6' This section of the CAA contains a "good
neighbor" provision that requires states to ensure, through their SIPs, that sources'
emissions do not significantly contribute to the nonattainment of downwind states or to
those states' abilities to maintain the NAAQS. The EPA first used this provision to
implement the NOx SIP Call. The EPA's experience with this action, including the fact
that the SIP Call withstood substantial litigation, helped them develop and promulgate
CAIR.
CAIR calls for SIPs from upwind states whose emissions of the precursors SO2
and NOx significantly contribute to the nonattainment of the ozone NAAQS or fine
particulate matter (PM2.5) NAAQS in downwind states. Upwind states must make
specific reductions in SO2 and NOx emissions if they contribute to PM2.5 nonattainment
and must make reductions in summertime NOx emissions if they contribute to ozone
nonattainment. In promulgating CAIR, the EPA used air quality modeling and
monitoring to determine the amount of upwind states' emissions that "contribute
significantly to downwind nonattainment, or interfere with downwind maintenance" and
then required those states to eliminate that quantity of emissions.62 As, in the NOx SIP
Call, CAIR does not require states to make these reductions in a particular manner or
from certain sources. The EPA did, however, develop a model cap-and-trade program
that states could adopt if they chose. The rule also encourages states to use an emissions
cap approach, even if they do not adopt the model rule, to help give certainty to the
amount of reductions over time. Although CAIR will achieve reductions in NOx of over
61 CAIR applies to 28 eastern states and D.C., see 70 Federal Register 25162 (May 12, 2005).
62 See 70 Federal Register 25162 (May 12, 2005).
60 percent from 2003 levels,63 it is not expected bring all the Northeastern states into full
compliance (U.S. EPA 2006b, NESCAUM 2006).
2.6. Summary
This chapter first reviewed ozone formation chemistry and the atmospheric
chemistry literature that stresses the importance incorporating the impacts of the timing
and location of NOx emissions into regulations aimed to reduce ozone. Section 2.2
discussed the sources of NOx, VOC, and ozone emissions. The high concentrations of
biogenic VOC emissions in the Eastern U.S. make NOx reductions important for
controlling ozone pollution. Few data are available that describe the geographic and
temporal variations in the NOx from mobile sources. Although mobile sources contribute
about 60% of anthropogenic NOx emissions, the lack of data for mobile source emissions
and the monitoring difficulties this reflects makes NOx from stationary sources an easier
target for regulation - especially for differentiated regulation. (Section 6.4.2 discusses
how future research on differentiation could address the contribution of mobile source to
ozone formation and that this may be worthwhile on the basis of cost-effectiveness).
The trends in ozone concentrations and precursor emissions show that efforts to
reduce precursor emission have succeeded and have improved air quality. But there is
still a mismatch between the science of ozone formation and the regulation of precursor
emissions. The most recent regulations of NOx in the Eastern U.S. will further reduce the
aggregate cap on summertime NOx emissions from stationary sources. The fact that these
reductions are not expected to fully solve the ozone air quality problem provides a
motivation to consider whether a cap-and-trade program that differentiated between NOx
63 CAIR caps annual NOx emissions from affected sources at 1.5 million tons in 2010 and at 1.3 million tons in 2015.
The program caps seasonal NOx emissions (for the ozone season) at 0.58 and 0.48 million tons in 2010 and 2015
respectively. CAIR will also require reductions in SO2 of over 70 percent from 2003 levels.
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emissions at different times and locations could be implemented, as the literature
studying the science of ozone formation recommends.
The Clean Air Act prohibits the EPA from balancing the costs and benefits of
reducing concentrations of different secondary pollutions. Differentiation could be a
useful regulatory tool within this statutory framework because it could help resolve
tradeoffs that occur when reductions in a precursor emission like NOx cause
concentrations of one secondary pollutant (like ozone) to decrease but cause increases in
another (like particulate matter). This research focuses on whether differentiated
regulations could help areas achieve the ozone air quality standards but it could be
extended to assess costs and benefits or applied to other secondary pollutants.
Chapter 3 - Differentiated Regulations in Theory and
Practice
The previous chapter discussed two related reasons to consider a differentiated
cap-and-trade program for NOx emissions. First the time and location of NOx emissions
determine their impact on ozone formation. Second, policies that have motivated large
reductions in NOx emissions without specific attention to the timing and location of these
reductions have not been able to helping all areas of the Eastern U.S. attain the ozone air
quality standards. The environmental economics literature provides another reason to
consider differentiated cap-and-trade programs. It suggests that in order to be cost
effective, regulations must acknowledge all variables that influence the contributions of
emissions to environmental problems. These variables include location, timing, and
chemical composition. Theoretically it is possible to design cap-and-trade programs that
account for these variables, but history reveals little practical experience with the
implementation of regulations that differentiate emissions by characteristics other than
their chemical properties. This chapter reviews the environmental economics literature
that explains the potential efficiencies associated with using differentiated permit trading
programs and the theoretical reasons that these programs can be cost-effective. These
concepts could be applied to the case of NOx emissions and ozone pollution (Section
3.1.1).
This chapter also reviews the challenges to the implementation of differentiated
permit trading programs discussed in the literature (3.1.2). These implementation
challenges help explain why differentiated regulations have not been used to address the
ozone problem. The relevant implementation challenges fall into three categories: 1)
technical (modeling and potential emission reductions), 2) economic and technical
(transaction costs), and 3) political, legal, and economic (distributional effects). The
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literature suggests that simplified, second-best, differentiated regulations could address
these challenges. However, major permit trading programs have been implemented
without differentiation (e.g. the Acid Rain and NOx Budget Trading Programs). The
typical justification for this is that the inefficiencies from the lack of differentiation are
small in comparison to the transaction costs from the modeling requirements to support a
differentiated program.
Sections 3.2 through 3.2.4 review studies that have evaluated the un-differentiated
NOx cap-and-trade programs. Largely due to simplifications in their estimates of the
costs and benefits of these NOx cap-and-trade programs, these studies offer little
guidance on the potential benefits of differentiation. The studies do suggest that although
the NOx cap-and-trade programs have been very successful in achieving targeted NOx
reductions at least cost, the benefits of the regulations would not outweigh their costs
were it not for the fact that they caused reductions in particulate matter in addition to
some reductions in ozone. This and the discussion in Chapter 2 about tradeoffs between
ozone and particulate matter reductions suggests that a better approach is needed to
address peak ozone concentrations in the Eastern United States.
Section 3.3 discusses implementation challenges associated with the specific case
of a differentiated NOx cap-and-trade program for stationary sources in the Eastern
United States. Chapter 2 suggested that modeling capabilities for predicting ozone
concentrations have improved and also that the lack of differentiation may be a detriment
to the effectiveness of the cap-and-trade programs now in place. This section first
extends the discussion on how advances in air quality forecasting and modeling may now
lessen some of the challenges associated with implementing a differentiated cap-and-
trade program for NOx emissions from stationary sources. Technical improvements could
also reduce the administrative and transaction costs associated with a differentiated cap-
and-trade program, especially if it was applied to electric power plants (Section 3.3.2).
The distributional effects of a differentiated regulation could motivate and/or enable legal
challenges that could lessen such a program's effectiveness. Section 3.3.3 uses examples
from the legal challenges to past air quality regulations to illustrate the potential
challenges associated with the distributional effects of a differentiated cap-and-trade
program and the legal mechanisms through which affected parties could challenge and
influence it. Finally, this chapter summarizes one conception of a differentiated NOx cap-
and-trade program that could be implemented in the Eastern United States.
3.1. Differentiated permit trading programs in theory
Early work on differentiated permit trading programs focused four topics: 1) the
efficiency argument for spatial differentiation, 2) the theoretical ability of spatially
differentiated permit trading to produce the least-cost solution to air quality problems 3)
the practical difficulties associated with implementation, and 4) potential second-best
solutions. The empirical work that this section reviews examined the effectiveness of
regulations that utilized second-best solutions and found, generally, that the regulations
did not closely approximate the least-cost, differentiated solution.
Dales (1968) and Crocker (1966) independently suggested using emission
licenses, or permits, as a means to address environmental externalities. 64 Following this,
Montgomery (1972) formalized the concept by proving the existence of equilibriums in
markets for two types of emission permits that can theoretically achieve targeted
aggregate emission reductions at the least possible cost. One type of permit-trading
program created a market for "emissions licenses," where each license conferred the right
to emit up to a certain amount. The second type of program created "pollution licenses,"
which conferred the right to emit until the emissions had a given level of impact on a set
of air pollution monitors. In his treatment of these programs Montgomery (1972) showed
64 This is typically attributed to John Dales (1968) but Thomas Crocker (1966) developed similar ideas independently.
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that, at least in theory, a permit trading mechanism could deal with the spatial dimensions
of pollution problems: a regulatory system that creates a market for each air quality
receptor could be a least-cost solution. He also suggested that the market for pollution
licenses would be more applicable than that for emissions licenses because the locations
and other attributes of emissions sources typically cause their air quality impacts to
vary.6 5
Mendelsohn (1986) showed that treating emissions with dissimilar impacts as
homogeneous goods causes welfare losses that are directly related to variations in
population density and the extent to which the impacts of the emissions differ. Treating
dissimilar emissions alike creates a need for costly over-control, regardless of the reasons
that the impacts of two unit-quantities of emissions differ (e.g. location, timing, or
chemical composition). Even if the impacts of emissions do differ, a unified market for
the emissions (i.e. a un-differentiated cap-and-trade program) will equalize marginal
abatement costs among sources without regard to the varying impact they have on the
environmental problem. Thus too little is spent to control the most harmful emissions and
too much to control those that are least harmful. In the un-differentiated case, sources that
impact air quality the most in a given target area, like an ozone NAAQS nonattainment
area, only reduce emissions if their marginal abatement costs are less than those at all
other sources, including those that have little effect on the air quality in a targeted area.
The regulator's only control mechanism in this case is the overall cap on emissions; to
meet air quality goals in stubborn areas, the regulator must lower the overall cap on
emissions until the air quality is acceptable at all locations. This causes two costly
problems: over-control at sources emitting emissions with little impact on the area and
the necessity of larger aggregate reductions.
65 In fact, he stated, "...the market in pollution licenses will be more widely applicable than the market in emission
licenses ... The development of a decentralized system for achieving environmental goals at a number of different
locations is the most important contribution of this article," (pg. 396).
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Tietenburg (1995) found empirical evidence of these problems by reviewing eight
studies that compared the costs of permit trading programs to traditional prescriptive
alternatives and a theoretical least-cost program. The evidence from these studies
suggested that local situations sometimes cause the costs of un-differentiated permit
trading programs to be higher than traditional prescriptive regulation, in addition to the
least-cost theoretical program. He separated the costs of different regulatory options into
their "equal-marginal-cost" and "degree-of-required-control" components for each study
(pg. 99). While permit-trading programs prevailed over prescriptive regulations in their
ability to reduce costs by equalizing marginal control costs across sources, he found that
they sometimes required a higher degree of control to achieve the same improvements in
air quality. In some cases, depending on the importance of spatial considerations, the un-
differentiated permit-trading programs required larger aggregate reductions to such an
extent that the additional costs outweighed the cost-savings from equalizing marginal
control costs across sources.
3.1.1. Applicability of theory to NOx emissions and ozone formation
Nitrogen oxide emissions, in their relationship with ozone formation, fit the
characteristics of emissions that should be treated as heterogeneous goods. Mendelsohn
(1986) suggests that the primary factors that cause one unit-quantity of emissions to
differ from another include chemical composition and the time and location of their
release. In the case of NOx, the latter two forms of differentiation are the most important.
Although the category of nitrogen oxide emissions does include different compounds,
like NO and NO2, both stationary and mobile sources predominantly emit NO emissions
and these are converted to NO2 after release (Army Corp 1988). The dependence of
ozone formation on meteorology makes the timing of emissions important. NOx
emissions at night in cool, calm weather may cause little ozone formation either locally
or downwind; but, NOx emissions on a hot, sunny day can cause a large amount of local
ozone formation, as can NOx emitted either at night or during the day in windy
conditions carries downwind to areas conducive to ozone formation. Meteorology or
atmospheric chemistry may mean that distant sources contribute most to ozone formation
in densely populated areas, but research shows that some sources of NOx have a larger
impact than others (e.g. Mauzerall et al. 2005 and Tong et al. 2006).
Very recent experience with the seasonal NOx cap-and-trade programs in the
Eastern U.S. suggests that the locational and temporal impacts of NOx emissions are
beginning to diminish the cost-effectiveness of the largely un-differentiated cap-and-trade
programs. The OTC and SIP NOx Budget Programs have successfully reduced aggregate
emissions and helped improve air quality in many areas of the Eastern United States
(Section 2.4). The 31 highly populated non-attainment areas that remain, however, are
driving regulators to further reduce the aggregate emission caps, with the Clean Air
Interstate Rule (CAIR), for example, even though modeling predicts that the lower caps
will not ensure attainment of the ozone NAAQS in all locations (U.S. EPA 2006b,
NESCAUM 2006).66 In this case, the un-differentiated cap-and-trade programs have
worked well to reduce ozone concentrations generally across the Eastern United States.
Theory warns, however, of the potential for over control in many areas if regulators
address the remaining nonattainment areas with further reductions in the aggregate cap.
3.1.2. Overview of implementation challenges from the literature
Despite recognition of the potential efficiencies associated with differentiated
regulations, practical challenges have limited the feasibility of their implementation. The
early literature focused on the technical and economics barrier associated with the high
costs and uncertainties involved in modeling source-receptor relationships and how they
66 Although CAIR also aims to reduce particulate matter pollution, to which NOx emissions contribute, it contains
provisions that directly address ozone nonattainment by mandating summertime caps on NOx emissions from
stationary sources. It is the actions taken specifically to reduce ozone, which are above and beyond those aiming to
reduce PM, with which we are concerned.
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change in time, which are especially challenging for systems of many sources and
receptors (e.g. Atkinson and Tietenberg 1982, Krupnick et al. 1983, Mendelson 1986,
Tietenberg 1995). Section 3.3.1 discusses how advances in weather and air quality
forecasting may now mitigate these challenges.
There are also political and legal barriers to the implementation of differentiated
regulations. Political and legal disputes are likely to arise over the definitions of
boundaries and rules for permit exchange in a differentiated program. Industry and state
governments should be expected to dispute these definitions because small changes could
yield large benefits (e.g. Mendelson 1986, pg. 309). Regulated industries could base these
disputes on claims of fairness (e.g. Atkinson and Tietenberg 1982, Mendelson 1986).
Industries and state governments could also contest boundary definitions using arguments
over uncertainties in air quality models. Section 3.3.3 reviews experience with the
implementation of recent cap-and-trade programs, which suggests the latter as a likely
outcome.
Another technical implementation challenge is whether sources can reduce
emissions in response to incentives that vary in time and by location. For example, could
incentives change driving patterns in cities? Or could the operators of power plants
reduce emissions in the short run by changing which power plants supply power in
particular hours and locations? Chapter 5 presents estimates of how much flexibility
power plants have to provide short-term NOx emission reductions during periods when
ozone formation is likely to be a problem.
3.1.3. Second-best alternatives to full differentiation
In the face of these practical challenges, there are second-best alternatives to full
differentiation. Desirable qualities for second-best regulations include: costs that
approach the least-cost theoretical program, cost-effectiveness independent of the initial
allocation of permits, minimal information needs for regulators, low transaction costs,
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and no unnecessary restrictions on the trade of permits. Air quality should also improve
to meet the standards in areas where it is poor and it should not significantly degrade in
other areas. A number of papers have proposed systems with the theoretical potential to
meet these requirements. Regulators have implemented programs with some of these
characteristics, but have most frequently implemented un-differentiated permit trading
programs, themselves a second-best alternative.
For problems in which spatial differentiation is a concern, one type of second-best
alternative limits the geographic size of permit markets and another type limits the
transactions allowed within a broader market. Programs that limit the geographic size of
markets might use air quality modeling to define a number of"zones" in which emissions
would be treated alike and exchange rates at which sources in different zones could trade
permits. If regulators had sufficient information to correctly define these zones and
exchange rates, their use could theoretically improve cost-effectiveness compared un-
differentiated regulations (Tietenburg 1995). In addition, significant increases in cost-
effectiveness could come from the designation of just a few zones. For example, Roach et
al. 1981 found that airshed-level zones for SO2 permit trading in the Southeastern U.S.
reduced the cost penalty from over control by a factor of three to four compared to a state
or regional program. McGarland (1984) found that dividing the airshed in the area of
Baltimore, MD into three zones for PM pollution cut the over-control cost penalty in half
(cited in Tietenburg 1995).
A potential problem with a zonal system is that small zones limit trading
opportunities, especially if trading between zones is not allowed; this could increase costs
and create potential for market power (Atkinson and Tietenberg 1982, Krupnick et al.
1983). These are not necessarily problems if regulators can correctly designate the zones.
Tietenburg (1995), citing ICF (1989), noted that even if regulators must define small
zones to achieve local air quality, the option of trading may still be desirable because
even trading between generating units in a single power plant can generate cost-savings
compared to the case of no trading.67 In the realistic limited-information case, however,
when regulators cannot be expected to correctly designate zones or when the dispersion
characteristics of sources within the zones vary, the zonal approach creates the potential
for unnecessarily limiting trading and thus for increased costs (Atkinson and Tietenberg
1982, Krupnick et al. 1983, McGartland 1984).
Another problem with the zonal approach is that some of its administrative
practicality comes from the assumption that regulators could define stable, predefined
zones. In fact, because populations, activity patterns, sources, and meteorology change in
time, so will the proper zone definitions and exchange rates. In addition, in order for the
regulators to efficiently allocate permits to the zones initially, they must know the
abatement-cost characteristics of the sources in each zone and how they change over time
(Atkinson and Tietenberg 1982). This system places a large burden on the regulators to
correctly determine, and update, the initial allocation of permits to the zones (Atkinson
and Tietenberg 1982, Krupnick et al. 1983).
Rather than narrowing or dividing the market to deal with locational problems,
another second-best option is to limit transactions within a broadly defined market. The
literature has proposed three types of programs: the nondegradation offset (Atkinson and
Tietenberg 1982), the pollution offset (Krupnick et al. 1983), and the modified pollution
offset (McGartland and Oates 1985). The authors developed these programs because the
zonal approach places a high burden on regulators to correctly determine boundaries and
exchange rates, and because of transaction cost and other problems with Montgomery's
systems of pollution and emission licenses.
67 Also see Ellerman (2000) for a discussion of autarkic compliance with Phase I of the Acid Rain Program cap-and-
trade for SO2. While not the most efficient option compared to wider, market-based trading, within-utility trading did
generate cost saving.
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Montgomery's system of pollution licenses creates high transaction costs for
industry because it requires firms to hold and trade permits in a market for each receptor
that their emissions affect (Atkinson and Tietenberg 1982, Krupnick et al. 1983). The
system of pollution licenses does have the politically helpful attribute that the initial
allocation of pollution permits to sources does not affect the outcome; trading in an
efficient market could achieve the least-cost attainment of air quality goals. The
flexibility in initial allocation is an important characteristic for permit-trading programs
because it increases political feasibility (e.g. Krupnick et al. 1983).
Montgomery's alternative system of emission licenses reverses these problems: it
has lower transaction costs because sources could simply trade emission permits in a
single market, but it requires regulators to determine an initial allocation of permits with
certain characteristics. In his emission licenses system, Montgomery requires that trades
do not result in diminished air quality at any receptor (a "nondegradation condition") so
that its air quality outcome corresponds to that of the system of pollution licenses. For the
equilibrium in this market to both satisfy the nondegradation condition and achieve air
quality goals at least cost, the regulators are required to determine an initial allocation of
permits such that if all permits were used, the air quality would just bind at each
receptor.68 There are two reasons for this. First, if the allocation allowed too much
pollution at a receptor, the program might not achieve the air quality goals. Second, if it
restricted emissions too much at a receptor the "nondegradation condition" would not
allow the emissions to increase and the program would result in over control, not the
least-cost solution (Krupnick et al. 1983). In order for the regulator to determine the
proper initial allocation, they would need to know the source's abatement-cost
characteristics and the source-receptor transfer coefficients and use them to solve for the
68 For further discussion of the "nondegradation condition" and the burden it would place on regulators see McGartland
and Oates 1985 and Krupnick et al. 1983, who also discuss why this condition is overly stringent.
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efficient level of emissions at each source. This is clearly not feasible, and if it were,
regulators would no longer need a market-based system.
Krupnick et al. (1983) and McGartland and Oates (1985) show, however, that
Montgomery's "nondegradation condition" is overly restrictive. Krupnick et al. proposed
a system in which sources trade emission permits as in Montgomery's system, but with
the requirement that air quality not exceed a desirable standard at each receptor (which
might vary by receptor in accordance with population density). This, in practice, could
simply mean that a new source or a source wanting to increase emissions would have to
purchase offsets for the added emissions from other sources such that the air quality at
the relevant receptors did not degrade. They call this a system of pollution-offsets and
show that its ability to achieve the air quality goals at least-cost does not depend on the
initial allocation of permits.
Environmentalists criticized the system envisioned by Krupnick et al. (1983)
because it could lead to the degradation of air quality at locations with initial air quality
below the standard. McGartland and Oates (1985) proposed a system of pollution-offsets
that slightly altered the one conceived by Krupnick et al. (1983). They strengthened the
requirement that air quality not exceed the standard at any location by requiring that air
quality neither exceed the standard nor degrade at any receptor. In other words, they
replaced the air quality standard at attainment receptors with a new standard equal to the
current level of air quality. They showed that this system could achieve the least-cost
solution independent of the initial allocation of emission permits.
The CAA applied this concept using "bubble" provisions that allowed sources to
forego required emission reductions if they secured equal reductions at a nearby source
(e.g. Tientenburg 1990). The "offset" provisions allowed new sources to enter a
nonattainment area only if they secured more than enough offsetting emission reductions
from existing sources in that area, as this was believed to guarantee improved air quality
in the nonattainment area.69
The final, most frequently used, second-best alternative is to ignore the need for
differentiation entirely. Regulators have most often chosen this option, for example with
the Acid Rain Program and the NOx Budget Programs. Because policy makers have
chosen to implement un-differentiated programs, the more recent literature has focused
on determining whether the lack of differentiation has lessened the effectiveness of the
currently operating cap-and-trade programs.
3.2. Effectiveness of un-differentiated NOx programs
Modeling requirements have made it difficult for regulators to implement even
second-best, differentiated regulations. The major federal cap-and-trade regulations in the
U.S. - the Acid Rain Program, SIP Call NOx Budget Program, and CAIR - all but ignore
the spatial, and temporal, aspects of the air quality problems they target. The SIP Call
NOx Budget Program, like the OTC program before it, does differentiate between the
"ozone season" when ozone formation is a problem and the rest of the year. This section
reviews analyses of the un-differentiated cap-and-trade programs that have been
implemented to reduce NOx emissions. Some studies have estimated the costs and
benefits of these regulations. However, few studies address whether differentiation could
improve the performance of these regulations and the simplifications of the studies that
do mean they offer little guidance on the potential costs of the un-differentiated nature of
the regulations or on the benefits of differentiation.
69 See 44 Federal Register 71780 (11 December 1979) and 40 CFR 51 Appendix S, originally presented in 44 Federal
Register 3274 (16 January 1979) and also see 51 Federal Register 43814, "Emissions Trading Policy Statement."
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3.2.1. Geographical "hotspots" and implications for differentiation
While the earlier literature focused on potential efficiency gains from addressing
the locations of emissions, more recent evaluations of the trading programs that have
been implemented ask whether the lack of spatial differentiation has lead to problems
such as "hotspots" (e.g. Swift 2004, Burtraw et al. 2005). Hotspots in an emissions
trading program are areas (or times) in which the majority of sources bought permits to
cover their emissions, rather than made reductions. Swift (2004) found that hotspots did
not occur in the Acid Rain Program's SO2 cap-and-trade program. Reviews of the OTC
and SIP Call NOx Budget Trading Programs found "very little" state-level shifting of
emissions to concentrated areas (Swift 2004 and Farrell 2003). Farrell (2003) found that
the OTC NOx Budget lowered average and peak emissions in equal proportions between
1998 and 2000. An EPA and OTC analysis shows that under the OTC NOx Budget both
daily total emissions and daily peak emissions declined since 1997 (OTC 2003 pg. 8).
Swift (2004) found, in addition, that the largest NOx emission sources abated the most
under the OTC program.70
These studies do not, however, directly address the complexity that the lack of
NOx emission hotspots, especially at a state-level of aggregation, does not mean that all
the NOx reductions were made at the most effective locations or times. For ozone, large
emission reductions from the largest sources are not necessarily the most damaging in
terms of ozone formation and transport in emission plumes from power plants (Ryerson
2001, Mauzerall et al. 2005). Ozone formation chemistry is sufficiently complicated that,
despite the absence of emissions hot spots and the programs' effectiveness in many less-
populated areas of the Eastern U.S. thus far, the lack of differentiation in seasonal NOx
70 Ellerman (2004) offers an explanation of similar findings for the Acid Rain Program: the largest sources are the least
expensive sources of abatement, on a per-ton basis, when there are large capital costs associated with installing
emission control technologies (pg. 86).
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cap-and-trade programs limits their potential to completely solve the ozone air quality
problem in all locations.
Research rooted more in the field of atmospheric chemistry than in economics has
begun to examine the effects of particular NOx sources on the formation of ozone and the
potential benefits of reducing NOx at these sources and others similar to them. For
example, Mauzerall et al. (2005) examined the health impacts of emissions from
particular point sources. They found that the time and location of NOx emissions caused
the amount of ozone formation to differ by up to a factor of five. This suggests that
locational and temporal details are extremely important for ozone. These studies suggest
that NOx cap-and-trade programs in the Eastern U.S. fit the predictions of the early
theoretical literature: un-differentiated regulations may be leading to significant over-
compliance costs at sources distant from the remaining areas of poor air quality while not
requiring reductions at the sources contributing most to nonattainment.
The transaction costs from differentiation and the excess abatement costs from a
lack of it create a tradeoff (Krupnick et al. 1983). As the problem's spatial (or
differentiating qualities) become more important, the excess abatement costs from not
differentiating can overwhelm the transaction costs. This may be the case for both PM
and NOx, and the transaction costs of a differentiated program may be decreasing
because of improvements in modeling capabilities (Krupnick et al. 1983, Mauzerall et al.
2005, Tong et al. 2006).
The modeling requirements extend beyond the analysis necessary to implement a
differentiated regulation. Detailed modeling is also required in order to determine the
benefits of NOx reductions made under alternative reguations. It is difficult to say that
the inefficiencies from the lack of differentiation are small based on studies that may
overestimate the benefits of nondifferentiated cap-and-trade programs because they do
not accurately model the effects of the nondifferentiated NOx reductions on air quality.
The next two subsections examine how simplifying assumptions may mask
inefficiencies caused by the lack of differentiation. Furthermore, none of the benefit and
cost analyses of NOx regulations to reduce ozone in the Eastern U.S. account for the
actual compliance behaviors taken by sources in response to the regulations because none
were ex post analyses.
3.2.2. Costs and benefits of the OTC NOx Budget Trading Program71
There are no studies that have performed ex post estimates of the costs or benefits
of the OTC NOx Budget Program. Farrell et al. (1999) estimated the costs of the OTC
NOx Budget cap-and-trade program before it was implemented and found the cap-and-
trade approach would be more cost-effective than an alternative command-and-control
regulation.72 They predicted an annual average cost of $161 million (2000$) for the cap-
and-trade system and of $302 million for the traditional command-and-control approach.
Although Farrell et al. (1999) modeled a range of control technologies including
post-combustion and combustion controls, their model did not account for possible
changes in the utilization or operation of power plants (pg. 114). Historical evidence
shows that power plants have used small combustion controls and changes in utilization
in response to the price on NOx emissions created by the OTC cap-and-trade program.
This omission likely caused the Farrell et al. estimates of the costs of the program to be
slightly high.73 They also predicted marginal control costs under the OTC NOx Budget
Program to be $1461/ton in 1999 and $1887/ton in 2002 (2000$). The price of NOx
allowances fell below $1000/ton by the end of 1999 after the market settled and remained
71 All dollar values in this section and the next two have been adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index
(CPI) and are reported in year 2000 dollars.
72 Farrell et al. (1999) also note that their models did not consider the temporal effects of NOx on ozone formation and
whether or not a NOx cap-and-trade program would address the episodic nature of ozone formation (pg. 122).73 Industry publications that expected power plant dispatch to be a short-term compliance option (such as C. Seiple and
R. LaCount, "NOx Emissions Trading: Changing Generator Behavior?" Public Utilities Fortnightly, July 15, 1999.)
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between about $500 and $1700/ton - but mostly below $1000/ton - through 2002, again
suggesting that the Farrell et al. cost estimates were slightly high.74
3.2.3. The costs and benefits of the SIP Call NOx Budget Program
Three studies have estimated the projected costs of the SIP NOx Budget Program
(U.S. EPA 1998b, Burtraw et al. 2001, and Krupnick et al. 2000). Krupnick et al. (2000)
studied both the costs and benefits of reducing NOx emissions for a 12-state region that
they felt represented the 22-state region the EPA was considering for the SIP Call NOx
Budget Program. Their benefit-cost analysis suggested that the EPA's target reductions
for the NOx SIP Call were reasonably close to the optimal reductions, if the mortality
risks from both ozone and particulate matter were included in the calculation of the
benefits from reducing NOx emissions (pg. 24).
Krupnick et al. (2000) also compared the costs of controlling emissions with a
cap-and-trade program to a command-and-control approach and to a spatially
differentiated cap-and-trade program based on ozone exposures. They found that the
costs associated with a cap-and-trade program would be about 50% lower than under a
command-and-control scenario that required a similar level of abatement. 75 They found
that, to achieve the same reduction in population-weighted ozone concentrations, a
program in which sources traded population-weighted ozone exposures instead of NOx
emissions would have slightly lower costs than the un-differentiated NOx emissions
trading program.
Although some have taken the Krupnick et al. (2000) results as evidence that a
more spatially differentiated cap-and-trade program for NOx would not create efficiency
74 For a more complete discussion of NOx allowances prices, see, for example, Environmental Finance's "Success in
the US" at http://ww w.environmental-finance.com/2004/04 10oct/emission.htm and (OTC 2003).
75 The command-and-control approach that they modeled required electric utilities to reduce NOx emissions to either
0.15 lbs/mmBTU or an 85% reduction, whichever was lower; other sources were required to meet the lower of 0.15
lbs/mmBTU or a 70% reduction.
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gains (Burtraw et al. 2005), omission of details about compliance possibilities and source
locations in Krupnick et al. (2000) make this inconclusive, especially given the
complicated chemistry of ozone formation. The models that Krupnick et al. (2000)
employed only crudely linked the emissions of NOx at particular locations to the
formation of ozone at others. They developed source-receptor coefficients76 for a small
number of regions that were separated by wind patterns and large geographical
formations (like the Appalachian Mountains), but that largely followed state lines (pg. 7).
They did not consider control strategies like fuel switching and decreased utilization and
note that the inclusion of these options may have further reduced the costs of the ozone-
exposure trading program compared to the NOx emissions trading program (pg. 24).
Burtraw et al. (2001) and U.S. EPA (1998b and 1998c) estimated ex ante costs
and benefits for the SIP Call NOx Budget Program. Burtraw et al. (2001) used methods
very similar to those used by Krupnick et al. (2000) and therefore are also subject to the
criticism that they did not model details of actual sources and their locations. Burtraw et
al. (2001) considered a 19-state (plus DC) region similar to the EPA's 22-state (plus DC)
NOx SIP Call region, but did not explicitly estimate the ozone-related health benefits
associated with reductions NOx emissions.
Despite differences in some assumptions, the three studies' estimates of average
costs and benefits were reasonably close for reductions in the ozone season (in 2000$).
The EPA estimated average costs of NOx reductions under the program to be $1,984 per
ton; Krupnick et al. (2000) found average costs of $1,987 per ton; and Burtraw et al.
(2001) found average costs of $2,321 per ton.7 The estimates in Burtraw et al. (2001) are
76 Their source-receptor coefficients describe how much NOx emissions from one area contribute to population-
weighted ozone formation in another (Krupnick et al. 2000, pg. 7).77 The EPA did not model marginal costs. Burtraw et al. (2001) and Krupnick et al. (2000) found these to be $3,649 per
ton and $4,250 per ton respectively (2000$). The Krupnick et al. marginal costs are likely higher because they did not
model compliance options like changes in output and changes in operations, although neither study included the
possible use of combustion controls like low-NOx-burners.
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higher because they do not model the possibility of combustion controls and also model a
slightly larger reduction in emissions.
Burtraw et al. (2001) also found that extending the cap-and-trade system
annually, instead of just for the summer months, would increase its net benefits and cost-
effectiveness. The benefits associated with reductions in PM created the benefits outside
the ozone season, as well as substantial benefits within the ozone season. Similarly to
Krupnick et al., Burtraw et al. (2001) found that neither the PM nor the ozone-related
benefits alone caused the net benefits from the modeled seasonal NOx cap-and-trade
programs in the SIP Call region to be positive, although the combination did.
Burtraw et al. (2003) analyzed 18 scenarios and found that, in all cases, the net
benefits of an annual cap-and-trade program to be at least those from a seasonal program
because NOx reductions moderated particulate matter concentrations outside the ozone
season. They evaluated 18 scenarios in order to address the large uncertainties
surrounding some of the model parameter values in previous studies (including Burtraw
et al. 2001). In their scenarios, they address three issues: assumptions about future
deregulation in electricity markets, epidemiological uncertainty regarding premature
mortality, and uncertainties surrounding economic valuation of mortality risk (Burtraw et
al. 2003, pg. 383). They again, however, neither modeled the possibility that power
plants could use combustion controls to reduce NOx nor the ozone-related health benefits
that could result from NOx reductions. They found that the omitted benefits, under
midpoint assumptions, would need to be at least $1,288 per ton of NOx reduced in the
SIP Call region seasonal cap-and-trade scenario for the policy's net benefits to be
positive (2000$, pg 397). Mauzerall et al. (2005) estimated mortality impacts of between
$12,090 and $59,660 per ton of NOx emitted, depending on the location and timing of the
NOx emissions and their subsequent impact on ozone formation. They estimated the
morbidity effects to be between $72 and $356 per ton (2000$, pgs. 2861-3).
Although Burtraw et al. (2001 and 2003) focused only on their point that the
annual cap-and-trade program for NOx has higher net benefits than the seasonal
regulation, another important point can be derived from their analysis. If the seasonal
cap-and-trade program does not provide positive net benefits from the reduction of PM
alone, then the seasonal cap-and-trade program must reduce ozone concentrations for its
net benefits to be positive. That is, if the seasonal cap-and-trade program is not effective
because it does not account for the time and locational variation in the impact of NOx on
ozone formation, the ancillary benefits from PM reduction are not enough to make it
efficient - so it is important that the program actually achieve its intended ozone
concentration reductions. It should be noted again, however, that Burtraw et al. (2001 and
2003) may overestimate the costs of the program because the do not consider combustion
controls as an option that sources can use to reduce NOx emissions.
3.2.4. Efficient levels of NOx emissions
Banzhaf et al. (2004) modeled both marginal benefit and cost curves for the
reduction of NOx and SO2 from power plants in the U.S. in order to estimate efficient
levels of these pollutants, under a cost-effective regulation like a tax or cap-and-trade
program in the United States. The Banzhaf et al. (2004) study is important because few
studies have tried to estimate the most efficient level of emission caps, although
policymakers have often set these caps. They found the efficient level of a national,
annual cap on NOx emissions was about 1.4 million tons (between 1.0 and 2.8 million
tons) in 2010. The EPA expects that national, annual NOx emissions after the
implementation of the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) will be about 2.4 million tons.78
Three problems with this study are that 1) it did not consider the benefits of
reducing ozone through reduced NOx emissions, 2) it did not incorporate detailed
78 U.S. EPA, "Projected Annual NOx Emissions from Power Plants with the Final Clean Air Interstate Rule," March
2005, at http://www.epa.gov/interstateairqualitv/charts files/cair emissions costs.pdf.
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information on the locations and emissions characteristic of actual power plants,79 and 3)
it did not consider combustion controls like low-NOx-burners as an option for the control
of NOx emissions (pg. 7). This study only considered the damages that NOx emissions
caused through NO2 and the formation of particulate matter; they did not consider ozone-
related damages. Their models only allowed plants to install post-combustion controls
(selective catalytic reduction and selective non-catalytic reduction) or to decrease
utilization in response to power and emission prices. The combustion controls are a
lower-cost option for compliance than the post-combustion controls; hence, the inclusion
of the former would probably have increased the amount of NOx abatement that they
would have found as efficient.80 Due to the omission of important details, this study and
those discussed in the previous two sections offer little guidance on whether
differentiation for NOx emissions may be worthwhile. For this reason, persistent non-
attainment of the ozone air quality standards and potential efficiency benefits are still the
primary motivation for considering a differentiated regulation.
3.3. Differentiated permit trading programs in practice
Although it is theoretically possible and potentially worthwhile to design a
differentiated permit trading mechanism that addresses the time and locational impacts of
emissions, there are technical, organizational and political challenges associated with
implementation. Challenges that have limited the use of highly differentiated permit
trading programs are: 1) technical challenges associated with atmospheric chemistry
modeling; 2) technical challenges associated with the potential response of emission
79 They used an electricity sector equilibrium model (Haiku) to create a representative power plant for each of the 13
NERC subregions in the United States. They then aggregated the emission data from these representative plants to the
state level and input them into the Tracking and Analysis Framework (TAF). TAF then estimated the resulting pollutant
transport, deposition, the formation of secondary particulate matter (but not ozone formation), the resulting human
health effects and their monetary value at the state level (Banzhaf et al. 2004, pgs. 6-9).
80 The addition of combustion controls in the power sector model would have altered the marginal cost curve that they
estimated, presumably making it increase less steeply and thus intersect with the marginal benefits curve at a higher
level of abatement (see Banzhaf et al. 2004, pg. 23 for a figure of their marginal benefit and cost curves).
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sources to differentiated incentives; 3) the administrative and transaction costs of
implementation; and 4) political and legal arguments about fairness and scientific
uncertainty motivated by distributional affects.
This section discusses the first, third, and forth of these challenges and leaves
more detailed analysis of the second to Chapter 5. Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 discuss how
advances in air quality modeling and forecasting and experience with cap-and-trade
programs may now mitigate the first and third of these problems. The analysis presented
in Chapter 5 suggests that it is possible for power plants to respond to differentiated
incentives with short-term emission reductions. Section 3.2.3 discusses how the
responses of industry and state governments to the 1998 NOx SIP Call and to CAIR
suggest that legal arguments motivated by distributional effects would occur during the
implementation of a differentiated cap-and-trade program. These disputes could constrain
the effectiveness of the differentiated regulation if they altered the definitions of when
and where NOx reductions were needed.
3.3.1. Weather and Air Quality Forecasting
Developments in weather and air quality forecasting have lessened the challenge
of determining the impacts of individual sources on the air quality problems in
nonattainment areas. State-of-the-science air quality models like the EPA-contracted
Community Modeling and Analysis Quality (CMAQ) modeling system have achieved
major improvements compared to the urban airshed models used for policy in the 1970s
and the regional models using in the 1980s (like the Regional Acid Deposition Model
used in the preparation of the 1990 CAAA). A "multiscale" model incorporates a
mesoscale model of meteorology and a detailed model of emissions from individual
sources including the unique characteristics of each plume. This enables detailed analysis
of the transport, chemical transformation, and deposition of pollutants and the
reproduction of historical conditions, including ozone episodes at detailed scales both
spatially and temporally (e.g. O'Neill et al. 2006, Tong et al. 2006, Eder and Yu 2006).
The EPA and NOAA have also developed the National Air Quality Forecasting
Capability. This system combines NOAA's weather forecasting ability and the air quality
modeling capabilities like CMAQ to forecast hourly air quality so that people can take
action to limit their exposure to poor air quality (e.g. Davidson et al. 2004). An
evaluation of the air quality forecasting system for New England revealed that the
forecasts preformed well, but with room for improvement (Kang et al. 2005). The study
evaluated three different models that incorporated weather forecasts and atmospheric
chemistry information. They found that each overpredicted ozone concentrations. Each
model did achieve accuracy of greater than 90% when predicting whether or not the
ozone concentration in an hour would exceed or not exceed the 1-hour ozone standard,
and between 76 and 90% for the 8-hour standard. However, the general accuracy metric
does not give a complete picture of the potential role of the forecasting in air quality
policy. For policy purposes, it is important to predict infrequent exeedances of ozone air
quality standards and the large number of nonexceedance-hours influences the general
accuracy metric. The models correctly forecast between 6 and 36% of exeedances and
correctly forecast 64 to 87% of the nonexceedances (pgs. 1790-91).81
3.3.2. Administrative and transaction costs
A number of technical improvements could now make the administrative and
transaction costs of a differentiated cap-and-trade program tractable. Examples are the
continuous emissions monitoring systems that track emissions from stationary sources,
and electronic toll systems that could be used to create differentiate incentives for driving
in time and space. Experience with cap-and-trade programs and with bid-based dispatch
s" Researchers at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT are currently performing further
research into the ability of air quality modeling and weather forecasting to correctly predict ozone episodes in the
Eastern U.S., this research is out of the scope of this dissertation.
76
and day-ahead and real-time markets for wholesale electricity could also help enable a
differentiated cap-and-trade program. The operators of power plants, in particular, use
sophisticated weather forecasting and information on fuel prices that can fluctuate in time
to make daily decisions to bid generation into power pools. An exchange rate for
emissions permits that was announced 48 hours in advance would not greatly change this
process, but would rather be another addition factor for consideration in formulating bids.
3.3.3. Legal disputes over distributional effects
Recent experience with CAIR suggests that the third problem - the legal fights
over distributional effects - deserves attention. In their legal basis for CAIR the EPA was
required to use air quality modeling to determine that certain areas' sources contributed
significantly to the nonattainment of the ozone (and PM) NAAQS in particular areas of
the Eastern United States. The literature predicts such a process could be contentious (e.g.
Atkinson and Tietenberg 1982, Mendelson 1986, Joskow and Schmalensee 1998).82
States had a stake in the determination of "significant contribution" because the EPA
required states to make reductions of the amount that their emissions contributed
significantly to downwind non-attainment or "interfer[ed] with downwind
maintenance."83
Indeed, with CAIR, the process of determining whether states' sources
contributed significantly to other state's air quality problems was contentious and the
disputes focused around boundaries and the modeling that supported them.84 The disputes
82 Joskow and Schmalensee (1998) examined the political economy of the allocation of allowances for the Acid Rain
Program's SO2 trading provisions and found the process to be both contentious and complicated. They summarized the
underlying issue nicely: "Because emissions permits are valuable and decisions about their distribution are made by
political institutions, these decisions are likely to be highly politicized, reflecting rent seeking behavior and interest
group politics. ... In particular, little attention has been devoted to how interest group politics and associated rent-
seeking behavior affect the allocation of permits in a tradable permit system. This is a serious gap in the literature. The
political acceptability of market-based mechanisms for internalizing environmental externalities will depend heavily on
their distributional implications," (pg. 4).
83 EPA, "Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particular Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule)," 70
Federal Register 91, pg. 25162.
84 See the petitions the EPA received to reconsider their findings at http://www.epa.gov/cleanairinterstaterule/rule.html.
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caused the EPA to feel obliged to supplement their initial modeling that used the
"Regional Model for Simulating Aerosols and Deposition" (REMSAD).8 Although the
EPA stated that it did not agree with criticisms about the REMSAD modeling, it used
another model as a response, the CMAQ discussed in Section 3.3.1. This model is
publicly available, peer-reviewed, and considered "state-of-the-science", which helped
lend credibility to the EPA's designations of significant contribution.
In the case of a differentiated cap-and-trade program, small changes in the
definitions of trading ratios or boundaries could have large impacts on particular
companies or states. Even with the improvements in modeling, uncertainties still persist.
As occurred in the case of CAIR, companies would dispute the EPA's modeling and the
resulting definitions of trading ratios by offering their own modeling results that showed
a lesser responsibility for the air quality problems. Legal disputes could then delay the
program or could lead to changes in the definitions of the program that could hinder its
effectiveness. Similar disputes over distributional affects occurred with the allocation of
emission permits for the Acid Rain Program and the NOx Budget Trading Programs
(Joskow and Schmalensee 1998). In these cases the resulting allocation has had little, if
any, impact on effectiveness of these programs since sources have met the emission caps
at low cost. But, the definitions of exchange ratios and boundaries could impact the
success of a differentiated regulation. The concept relies on such definitions to more
accurately address the environmental problem, beyond just reducing emissions to below
and annual or seasonal cap.
85 It is a photochemical grid model that uses atmospheric specie mass continuity equations. Details on this model are
available in "Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Air Quality Modeling Technical Support Document", see EPA, "Rule to
Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particular Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule)," 70 Federal Register 91,
pg. 25162.
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3.3.4. A time- and location-differentiated cap-and-trade program for NOx
This dissertation contributes to a broader research effort that is seeking to
determine whether it would be more cost-effective to directly address the temporal and
locational impacts of NOx emissions from power plants rather than to further reduce the
aggregate cap. 86 Weather forecasting models would initiate the regulatory system; they
would provide advance warning of the times the formation of high ozone concentrations
in critical receptor areas (for instance, those in non-attainment) was likely. The models
would also predict the locations of the precursor NOx emissions with the largest impact
on ozone formation during the critical times at the critical receptor areas. Power plant
operators would then be notified of the times and locations when a pre-set allowance
surrender ratio greater than one-to-one would be imposed on NOx emissions. Generators
could then modify their bids in the day-ahead and real-time wholesale power markets in
response to the higher cost of NOx emissions. The day-ahead and real time markets
would then lead to patterns of locational prices that reflected the prevailing NOx
emissions permit exchange rates and result in an altered generator dispatch, compared to
that without NOx prices, and NOx abatement.
The effectiveness of the system rests on four necessary conditions. The first is that
weather and atmospheric chemistry forecasting can predict the conditions conducive to
ozone formation with sufficient accuracy and lead-time (at least 48 hours) to influence
electricity markets. The second is that the spatial zones and time intervals in which the
surrender ratio for the NOx emissions permits would be varied can be identified with
sufficient regularity that a reasonably simple and stable system of differentiated permit
exchange rates triggered by reliable and transparent indicators of weather and
atmospheric chemistry can be implemented. The third is that there exists sufficient
86 The research is a project of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT. See also: Martin,
K.C., P.L. Joskow, and A.D. Ellerman (2007), "Time and Location Differentiated NOx Control in Competitive
Electricity Markets Using Cap-and-Trade Mechanisms," Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research
Working Paper.
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flexibility in the redispatch of generating units of differing NOx emissions rates and in
NOx emissions control that significant NOx reductions can be accomplished on relatively
short notice and without violating transmission network and supply/demand balance
constraints. The fourth condition is then that the magnitudes of NOx reductions that could
be effected in the specified areas and times in response to differentiated permit exchange
rates would reduce the likelihood of high ozone levels in areas that would not otherwise
be in attainment with ambient air quality standards and where the associated incremental
damages to human health and welfare are relatively high.
The literature suggests that the first two of these conditions are feasible. The
broader research for this project, which is out of the scope of this dissertation, will
eventually use weather and atmospheric chemistry modeling to address these two
conditions and the last in detail. This dissertation considers the third condition - that
there is sufficient short-term flexibility to reduce NOx emissions appreciably given
realistic assumptions about the electricity markets and physical network in which they
operate (Chapter 5).
3.4. Summary
This chapter reviewed the environmental economics literature to show that it is
theoretically possible for a differentiated cap-and-trade program to efficiently address the
time and locational impacts of environmental problems and that this theory is applicable
to the impacts of NOx emissions on ozone pollution. The environmental economics
literature also discusses the implementation challenges associated with differentiated
permit trading programs and potential second-best solutions. Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3
reviewed this literature.
Despite the scientific motivations for differentiation discussed in Chapter 2 and
the economic justifications discussed in this chapter, regulators have only implemented
un-differentiated cap-and-trade programs for NOx emissions from stationary sources in
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the Eastern United States. The studies that review the effectiveness of these regulations
offer little evidence in support of or against the use of differentiation (Section 3.2
reviewed these studies). The reasons for the lack of differentiation in the NOx cap-and-
trade programs are the implementation challenges. This chapter offered evidence that
some of these could now be overcome - largely because of experience with cap-and-trade
programs and because of technical improvements in air quality forecasting and modeling,
in emissions monitoring, and wholesale electricity markets. The final section in this
chapter discussed one conception of a potentially implementable, differentiated NOx cap-
and-trade program for ozone.

Chapter 4- An Example Benefit of Differentiation from
Coal Power Plants in the Eastern U.S.
The previous chapters presented the scientific and economic justifications for a
differentiated NOx cap-and-trade program to address ozone pollution. The scientific
justification is that the relationships between the weather and biogenic VOC emissions
mean that NOx emissions at different times and locations affect ozone concentrations
differently. The economic rational for a differentiated regulation is that it could achieve
the same amount of environmental improvement while requiring fewer total NOx
reductions if the NOx reductions it did require were those that directly mitigated ozone
formation in areas and times with high ozone concentrations. This chapter presents an
example of potentially ineffective, and therefore inefficient, NOx abatement that occurred
under the seasonal, un-differentiated cap-and-trade programs for stationary sources that
have been operating the Eastern U.S. since 1999.
The seasonal NOx cap-and-trade programs cap the total emissions from affected
stationary sources between May and September each year (the "ozone season"). The
seasonality of the programs is a crude recognition of the dependence of ozone formation
on hot, sunny weather. But within the ozone season, the operators of power plants could
make emissions reductions at any time. Section 4.4 discusses three incentives that could
have affected the timing of NOx abatement strategies of the operators of coal power
plants within the ozone season. The NOx emission characteristics of some coal power
plants could make it less costly to reduce NOx emissions during the early parts of the
ozone season (e.g. May and June) because electricity demand and therefore power prices
are typically lower during this period. Power prices are typically lower at the beginning
of the ozone season because electricity demand is lower do to cooler weather. But the
cooler weather also means that high ozone concentrations are less likely. If the incentives
discussed in Section 4.4 caused the operators of generating units to reduce emissions
more during the cooler parts of the summer it could mean that fewer reductions were
made when they were needed later it the summer. It could also mean that the reductions
made in the early summer were ineffective and therefore an example of costly over-
compliance made because of the lack of differentiation in the seasonal cap-and-trade
programs.
Section 4.5 uses historical data on the NOx emissions and generation of coal
power plants and on electricity and fuel prices to simulate counterfactual NOx emissions
(what emissions might have been without the cap-and-trade program) for two generating
units. This analysis suggests that at least some generating units reduced emissions more
during the earlier parts of the ozone season - a behavior consistent with the incentives
discussed in Section 4.4. Aggregate analysis of the NOx emissions from coal power
plants in the Northeastern U.S. in 2002 and 2005 suggests that the incentives may have
had a slight overall effect on the abatement decisions for more generating units.
The analysis in this chapter provides an example of a potential benefit of a
differentiated cap-and-trade program: it could reduce the quantity of ineffective NOx
reductions compared to the un-differentiated programs and it could ensure that reductions
occurred when they were needed. The NOx abatement behavior discussed in this chapter
was individually rational and legal but, based on the observation that ozone formation is
more likely during the later parts of the summer, it may not have reduced the most
harmful ozone concentrations.
In order to motivate the analysis in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, Section 4.1 provides
background information on the OTC and SIP Call NOx Budget Trading programs in
addition to that provided in Chapters 2 and 3. Section 4.2 discusses the NOx emission
characteristics of coal-fired boilers and Section 4.3 discusses the characteristics of NOx
control technologies that coal power plants have used in the regions covered by the
seasonal cap-and-trade programs. These details are necessary because they motivate the
incentives discussed in Section 4.4.
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 also suggest that the complex NOx emission characteristics
of coal power plants make a market-based regulation preferable to a prescriptive
regulation when addressing NOx emissions from power plants. The heterogeneity in the
NOx emissions characteristics of power plants is too great to be addressed efficiently by a
regulation that uniformly mandates technologies or emission rates. Empirical data show
that the relationships between NOx emissions and boiler technologies, NOx control
technologies, efficiency, and level of utilization vary greatly between different coal-fired
generators. In addition, NOx emissions often increase nonlinearly with output and NOx
emission rates increase as a function of output (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). Even if all NOx
emissions impacted ozone formation equally, it would not be practical for regulators to
determine the most cost-effective control strategies.
4.1. The OTC and SIP Call NOx Budget Trading Programs
4.1.1. The OTC NOx Budget Program (1999-2002)
The Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) NOx Budget Program cap-and-trade
program ran from 1999 through 2002.87 The EPA assisted the OTC states in the
implementation and design of the OTC NOx Budget Program and it was largely based on
the Acid Rain Program's cap-and-trade program for SO2 (Burtraw et al. 2005). The cap-
and-trade program was seasonal in that it only capped NOx emissions in the ozone season
(May 1st through September 3 0 th) - reflecting the fact that hot, sunny weather drives
87 The states covered in the OTC NOx Budget Program were CT, DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT.
ozone formation. The program's capped total ozone season NOx emissions from the
participating sources at 219,000 tons in 1999 (and 143,000 tons in 2003) and the baseline
emissions were 490,000 tons in 1990. The sources were power plants and large industrial
boilers 88 and the EPA gave each an initial allocation of permits.89 At the end of the
season each source was required to hold enough allowances to cover its emissions.
Within the ozone season, for the purposes of compliance, it did not matter when
the abatement occurred or which sources provide it, only that the total emissions within
the period fell under the cap and that each source held sufficient allowances. Allowances
that the sources did not use in one ozone season could be banked for use in following
seasons. If the total banked allowanced exceeded 10 percent of the total cap, the program
limited the number of banked allowances that could be withdrawn from each source's
account on a 1-to-i basis, requiring the rest to be withdrawn at a 2-to-1 ratio. This
provision was called "flow control" (OTC 2003).
Some measures indicate that the OTC NOx Budget was successful. In particular:
the cap was met each year, the cap was stringent enough to cause reductions of 60% from
1990 levels in ozone season NOx emissions (OTC 2003 pg. 6), trade did not result in
significant shifting of emissions geographically and the shifting that did occur was in the
direction that would improve air quality (Swift 2004, OTC 2003 pgs. 9-10), and sources
found it preferable to participate in the program by reducing emissions or buying permits
rather than by seeking exemption or delay via litigation. The allowance markets
functioned properly as economically significant trades occurred between unaffiliated
sources (Burtraw 2005 pg. 43, OTC 2003 pg. 14).
88 The program applied to fossil fuel fired boilers with a maximum rated heat input capacity of 250 mmBTU/hour or
greater and to electric generating units with a rated output of 15 MW or more. Some states chose to include smaller
units as well. See the EPA's, "Ozone Transport Commission (OTC) NOx Budget Program Overview" at
http://\www.epa.goviairmuarkets/ottcoverv iew.html.
89 The allocation process differs by states and is fairly complicated. See Burtraw et al. 2005 for a summary.
Farrell 2003 has noted, however, that summertime NOx cap-and-trade programs
may not be well suited to tackle ozone episodes because reductions can occur at any time
from any sources within the summer and region. However, reviews of the OTC and SIP
Call NOx Budget Trading Programs found "very little" state-level shifting of emissions
to concentrated areas (Swift 2004 and Farrell 2003). Farrell (2003) found that the OTC
NOx Budget lowered average and peak emissions in equal proportions between 1998 and
2000. An EPA and OTC analysis showed that under the OTC NOx Budget both daily
total emissions and daily peak emissions declined since 1997 (OTC 2003 pg. 8). Swift
(2004) found, in addition, that the largest NOx emission sources abated the most under
the OTC program. 90
The major indicator suggesting that the OTC NOx Budget Program could not
solve the ozone problem in the Eastern U.S. was simply that many areas remained unable
to attain the ozone NAAQS after the program ran for four years and led to substantial
NOx reductions (EPA 2003 pg. 18).
4.1.2. The SIP Call NOx Budget Program (2003-Present)
Post 2002, the major action taken to remedy this continued nonattainment of
ozone NAAQS in the Eastern U.S. was the implementation of a geographically extended
OTC NOx Budget program called the State Implementation Plan (SIP) Call NOx Budget
Trading Program.91 After the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, many Northeastern
states in the OTC region petitioned the EPA administrator under Section 126 of Title I to
require NOx reductions from states in the Midwest and Southeastern United States. The
Northeastern States argued that emissions from these other states contributed
significantly to their inability to attain the ozone NAAQS.
90 Ellerman offers an explanation of similar findings for the Acid Rain Program: the largest sources are the least
expensive sources of abatement, on a per-ton basis, when there are large capital costs associated with installing
emission control technologies (Ellerman 2004, pg. 86).
91 The program now involves the states AL, CT, DC, DE, IL, IN, KY, MA, MD, MI, NC, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, SC,
TN, VA, WV (Phase 1); GA, MO (Phase 2).
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In 1998, the EPA promulgated the NOx SIP Call. The rule called on states to
revise their SIPs, which the CAA requires them to submit as plans for how they will
attain the NAAQS. Under the SIP Call, the EPA assigned each state an annual budget for
NOx emissions from large stationary sources during the ozone season. The states could
comply with the SIP Call by reducing emissions as they chose or by participating in the
cap-and-trade program that effectively extended the OTC NOx Budget Trading Program.
All states chose to comply with the SIP call by participating in the SIP NOx Budget
Program. The program is very similar to the OTC NOx Budget Trading Program, but
extends to additional states.
4.2. NOx Emissions from Coal-fired boilers
In power plants and other boilers, the primary formation mechanism for nitrogen
oxides is the high temperature fixation reaction of nitrogen and oxygen that occurs in
high-temperature zones of the furnace (creating "thermal NOx"). High temperatures
dissociate atmospheric nitrogen (N2) and oxygen (02) in combustion air, or in excess air
in the combustion zone, into atomic nitrogen and oxygen, N and 0. The stoichiometric
ratio in the combustion zone (the air-to-fuel ratio; more air means more NOx), the flame
temperature, and the firing rate (the length of time the air is exposed to peak
temperatures) determine the rates of the two reactions that form nitric oxide (NO), the
principle component of nitrogen oxide (NOx = NO + NO 2) emissions from combustion.92
Fuel nitrogen also contributes to NOx emissions from coal-fired boilers. But its
contribution is less important at high combustion temperatures because the fixation of
atmospheric nitrogen dominates. Another mechanism forms "prompt" NOx through an
intermediate reaction with hydrogen cyanide (HCN). The formation of prompt NOx does
not depend much on temperature and forms under fuel-rich conditions, conditions that
92 The two reactions are called the Zeldovich equations: N2 + O 4 NO + N and N + 02 4 NO + O.
reduce the formation of thermal NOx. 93 Figure 4-1 shows the temperature dependence of
thermal, fuel, and prompt NOx formation for a coal-fired boiler (from U.S. EPA 1991).
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Figure 4-1 Temperature dependence of NOx emissions from coal-fired boilers (from
U.S. EPA 1991).
The different mechanisms of NOx formation combined with difference design-
specifications of coal boilers cause the NOx emission rates, even among uncontrolled
coal power plants to vary considerably. Thermal NOx emissions increase with the
availability of oxygen, the temperature of the combustion gas, and the length of time
oxygen and nitrogen are exposed to peak flame temperatures. The latter two increase at
higher levels of boiler utilization. NOx emission rates tend to be higher in larger furnaces
and those with high heat release rates. High heat release rates are associated with higher
peak combustion temperatures that increase NOx emissions. 94 Generating units with
quicker, more intense burning have higher NOx emission rates; these characteristics
93 U.S. EPA 1991
94 Larger furnaces have lower furnace surface-to-volume ratios. The results of a lower surface-to-volume ratio is higher
furnace temperatures and other changes to the combustion process that tend to cause higher NOx rates.
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correspond to a more complete mixing of fuel and combustion gasses.9 5 High levels of
excess air also cause high NOx emissions. Units with many burners close together also
tend to have high NOx emissions.
Conversely, generating units that operate on low levels of excess air, a large
amount of internal recirculation of combustion gas, and slower mixing processes for fuel
and air typically have lower NOx emissions. Just as a high heat release (firing) rate is
associated with high NOx, a high thermal quenching rate (the rate of removal of the
combustion-created heat) is typically associated with lower peak combustion
temperatures and therefore means lower NOx rates. Tangentially fired boilers typically
have the lowest NOx emissions among coal-fired units because the entire furnace acts as
a burner so the fuel to air ratio at precise points does not matter as much as in other
boilers. Also, tangentially fired units operate with low excess air as do fluidized bed
boilers, which also have low NOx emissions.
4.3. NOx Control Technologies for Coal-fired Boilers96
Power plants and other industrial boilers can control NOx emissions in a number
of ways. These range from simple operational changes to combustion modifications to
post-combustion ("end of pipe") controls. The specific characteristics of the boiler and
the method, or multiple methods, employed determine the potential reduction in NOx
emissions from these options for a particular source.
4.3.1. Simple Operational Controls
Fuel switching is one method by which boilers burning coal or oil could reduce
NOx emissions. Coal and oil produce the most NOx emissions and natural gas the least.
95 Boilers with higher turbulence also have higher NOx emissions. The mixing of air and fuel in the primary
combustion zone creates more turbulence. Yellow hazy flames are associated with low turbulence and blue, well-
defined flames with high turbulence.96 This discussion summarizes the detailed information in U.S. Army Corp 1998 and U.S. EPA 1994.
The reason for the differences between fuels relates to the amount of fuel-bound nitrogen
and to combustion temperatures. But switching fuel is not always an option because of
economic or technical considerations.
Load reduction, or decreased utilization, is another simple operational change that
reduces NOx emission rates. Load reduction not only decreases fuel use, and therefore
emissions, but also decreases heat release rate and furnace temperature. Lower furnace
temperatures decrease the rate of NOx formation and load reduction therefore decreases
the NOx emission rate of a coal-fired boiler.
The reductions in NOx emission rates from load reduction are not trivial.
Technical publications suggest that a load reduction of 25 percent can cause a decrease in
NOx emission rate of around 25 percent in some pulverized coal, tangentially fired
boilers (e.g. U.S. Army Corp 1988). One tangentially fired unit in a coal power plant in
the Eastern U.S., for example, had an average NOx emission rate of 0.36 lbs/mmBTU in
2002. For hourly generation levels between 860 and 870 MW, however, its average
emission rate was 0.45 lbs/mmBTU and for load levels 25% lower (from 646 to 652
MW), its average emission rate was 0.29 lbs/mmBTU. This is a reduction in emissions
rate of 35% from a 25% reduction in output. Previous studies have suggested that output
reduction was one of the chosen compliance strategies under the OTC NOx Budget
Program, although they do not discuss the magnitude of NOx reductions achieved with
this abatement strategy (e.g. Burtraw and Evans 2004).
Figure 4-2 shows scatter plots of hourly NOx emission rate versus output for this
unit (left graph, Plant 6094) and another tangentially fired coal unit (in Plant 1571) in the
ozone season of 2002. The graphs demonstrate that the plants' emission rates increase
with output and that the relationships between NOx emissions and output are different for
the two plants, despite the fact that they employ the same technologies (tangentially fired
boilers with low NOx burners). Differences in size, age, and design and operational
characteristics likely determine the difference in the NOx characteristics of these units.
One noteworthy point, however, is that the technical discussion suggests that NOx
emission rate increases with the size of boilers, but the unit in Plant 6094 has twice the
capacity of that in Plant 1571 and its NOx rate is generally lower for a given level of
output.
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Figure 4-2 Scatter plots of hourly emission rate versus output for two
tangentially fired coal power plants in the Eastern U.S. between May 1 st and
September 30 th of 2002.
In addition to decreasing a plant's NOx emission rate, reductions in output can
also decrease a plant's efficiency. Whether or not this occurs also depends on boiler
characteristics and initial load level. Figure 4-3 shows plots of hourly heat rate (inverse
efficiency) versus hourly generation for the same two plants. The heat rate of Plant 6094
(left graph) increases with decreasing output, indicating that load reductions decrease its
efficiency. The heat rate of Plant 1571 (right graph) has the opposite relationship with
output; its efficiency increases slightly with decreases in output.
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Figure 4-3 Scatterplots of hourly heat rate versus generation for two tangentially fired
coal power plants in the Eastern U.S. between May 1st and September 30 th of 2002.
Again, the relationships between output and efficiency are not solely results of
technology as these plants employ the same technologies. The exact characteristics that
cause these differences are not clear but could be related to size, age, and design and
operational choices.
4.3.2. Combustion Modifications
There are a number of NOx control methods that involve altering the combustion
process. These methods either reduce peak gas temperatures, oxygen concentrations in
the high temperature areas, the length of time combustion products remain in the high
temperature areas, or a combination of these.
Reducing excess air is a combustion modification to control NOx. Boilers need
some excess air (beyond theoretical stoichiometric requirements) to complete the
combustion of fuel. To decrease excess air, units must install combustion control systems
and high quality fuel and air distribution systems to regulate and monitor the ratios of
fuel and air used. Reducing excess air can improve boiler efficiency by reducing stack
heat loss. Reducing normal amounts of excess air by about 50 percent can reduce NOx by
15 to 40 percent depending on the initial levels (U.S. Army Corp 1988).
Flue gas recirculation is a combustion modification where the slightly cooled
combustion gases are returned to the furnace to reduce peak flame temperatures. Fuel
reburning is another method that involves introducing fuel into the boiler in stages and
then completing combustion with overfire air. Fuel reburn can reduce boiler efficiency by
between 0.5 and 1.5 percentage points (U.S. EPA 1994).
Two-stage combustion, also called off-stoichiometric firing, is another set of
combustion-altering methods to reduce NOx emissions.97 These methods lower attainable
peak flame temperatures by enforcing gradual mixing of fuel and air and they lower the
concentration of oxygen and nitrogen in the primary combustion zone. All of these
methods ensure that a large amount of the combustion occurs under conditions that
suppress NOx formation. Three types of two-stage combustion or off-stoichiometric
firing are overfire air, burners-out-of-service, and low NOx burners.
Overfire air and burners-out-of-service are a type of off-stoichiomteric
combustion where alternate burners are fired under fuel-rich and air-rich conditions. For
pulverized coal plants this typically means using upper burners in an air-rich or air-only
manner, for that reason it is often referred to as overfire air. Overfire air can also refer to
the method of operating burners fuel-rich with air injected above the burners. Low NOx
burners refer to a pattern of mixing air and fuel that both dissipates heat quickly and
keeps flame temperatures low.
For coal-fired boilers, two-stage combustion reduces NOx about 35 percent on
average (U.S. Army Corp 1988). Many boilers employ multiple methods of two-stage
combustion, like a combination of low NOx burners and overfire air. There is little
information available on how much one might expect NOx control methods to impact
efficiency. In 1994 the EPA reported that low NOx burners can reduce the efficiency of
97See EPA (U.S. Army Corp 1988) and EPA's, "Air Pollutants and Control Techniques: Nitrogen Oxides," at
htttp://www.epa.gov/eocapti l/module6/nitrogenicontrol/control. htm.
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coal-fired units by between "0.5 and 1.5 percentage points" and overfire air can reduce
efficiency be between "0.4 and 0.7 percentage points" (U.S. EPA 1994).
A simple calculation demonstrates the potential impact of the tradeoff between
efficiency and NOx emissions. If a generating unit had an initial efficiency of about 34%,
its heat rate would be 10 mmBTU/MWh: it could generate 100 MWh (or 341.3 mmBTU)
for heat input of 1000 mmBTU. 98 In this case, a decrease in efficiency of "1 percentage
point" implies a change from 34% to 33%, which also implies a change to about 331.3
mmBTU (or 97.1 MWh) of generation from 1000 mmBTU of heat input. Thus, a
reduction in efficiency of 1 percentage point corresponds to an increase in heat rate of
about 0.3 mmBTU/MWh for a generating unit with an initial heat rate of 10
mmBTU/MWh. Generating with the higher heat rate would increase costs by about
$0.50/MWh with coal prices at $1.5/mmBTU. 99 If NOx-permit prices were $1000/ton, a
decrease in NOx rate of 30% from 0.6 lbs/mmBTU to 0.42 lbs/mmBTU would decrease
NOx costs by $0.84/MWh.100
When a NOx control technology even slightly reduces a generating unit's
efficiency, it increases fuel costs to produce a given level of output. The reduction in
efficiency can also effectively reduce a generating unit's capacity. This is because
generating units have an "input" capacity, which is a limit on the amount of heat input the
unit can handle. At this maximum level of heat input, the unit produces maximum
amount of power that is the heat input divided by the unit's heat rate. If the heat rate
increases, the maximum possible output (maximum gross output) of the unit decreases.
98 The conversion factor is 3.413 mmBTU/MWh.
99 The change in heat rate from 10 to 10.3 mmBTU/MWh adds (0.3 mmBTU/MWh)*($1.5/mmBTU) to fuel costs.
100 If the NOx rate was 0.6 lbs/mmBTU at a heat rate of 10 mmBTU/MWh, this is 6 Ibs/MWh. NOx prices of
$1000/ton are equivalent to $0.50/lb. The NOx cost without the control would be $3/MWh. With the control, and
increased heat rate, the output-based NOx rate is 4.33 lbs/MWh. This gives NOx costs of $2.16/MWh. The difference is
$0.84/MWh.
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4.3.3. Post-combustion Controls
Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) and Selective Noncatalytic Reduction
(SNCR) are two types of post-combustion controls for NOx emissions. These systems
inject ammonia or urea into the stack gas. Because of the preference of ammonia to react
with NO rather than other gasses in the stack gas, its presence reduces nitrogen oxides to
molecular nitrogen and water. SNCR can reduce NOx by 20 to 60% and SCR by 75 to
90% (U.S. EPA 1994). These technologies also cause some parasitic power losses, which
could effectively reduce the generating unit's capacity. In this case, however, the unit's
gross generation would remain unaffected and while the net generation that it could
supply to the grid would decrease.
4.3.4. Control Technologies Used in the NOx SIP Call Region
The EPA tracks the control technologies used by sources that fall under the NOx
SIP Call in the northeastern United States. There are approximately 709 coal units (2005
data) in this region that primarily supply electricity to the grid. In the ozone season of
2005, this group of 709 coal boilers utilized about 55 different combinations of NOx
control technologies. Table 4-1 shows the most common combinations of control
technologies and the number of units that used them during the 2005 ozone season. The
most popular were low-NOx burners (LNB) and overfire air. Over half of the coal units
in the SIP Call region used low-NOx burners, alone or in conjunction with other
technologies. Policies in Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments were partially
responsible for the popularity of low-NOx burners. The policies required some coal-fired
boilers to meet NOx emission rate standards that they could generally achieve with low-
NOx burner technologies (Burtraw et al. 2005).
Table 4-1 Number of coal-fired units in the NOx SIP Call region that employed various control
technologies and combinations of control technologies in 2005.
Technology Count
Uncontrolled 123
Low NOx Burner Technology (Dry Bottom only) 109
Low NOx Burner Technology w/ Closed-coupled/Separated OFA 54
Low NOx Burner Technology w/ Overfire Air 48
Overfire Air 45
Other 31
Low NOx Burner Technology w/ Separated OFA 30
Low NOx Burner Technology w/ Closed-coupled OFA 29
Overfire Air Selective Catalytic Reduction 24
Selective Non-catalytic Reduction 22
Low NOx Burner Technology (Dry Bottom only) Selective Catalytic Reduction 21
Low NOx Cell Burner Selective Catalytic Reduction 16
Selective Catalytic Reduction 16
Low NOx Burner Technology w/ Overfire Air Selective Catalytic Reduction 13
Combustion Modification/Fuel Reburning 12
Low NOx Cell Burner 11
Low NOx Burner Technology w/ Separated OFA Selective Catalytic Reduction 10
There were also twelve different boiler technologies employed by the 709 generating
units. Tangentially fired and dry-bottom wall-fired boilers were most common, each
representing about 35% (249 and 246 respectively) of the boilers that operated in the
ozone season of 2005.
The NOx emission rates of generating units with the same boiler technologies and
NOx control technologies can vary considerably. Figure 4-4 shows box plots that
summarize the 2005 ozone season average NOx emission rates for coal power plants in
the SIP Call region. The box plots categorize 346 of the 709 units into groups according
to boiler technology and NOx control technology. The rightmost category summarizes
data for all 709 units. In some cases, as for dry-bottomed wall-fired boilers with low-NOx
burners (DBWF-LNB), the variation in average NOx rate between units with the same
technologies is almost as great as that between all the units. This does not even take into
account variation in the relationships between output and NOx rate.
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C,Figure 4-4 Box plots of average ozone season NOx emission rate for coal generating units grouped into
categories by boiler and NOx control technologies. The technology abbreviations are as follows: dry-
bottomed wall-fired (DBWF), tangentially fired (TF), wet-bottomed wall-fired (WBWF), low-NOx burners
(LNB), overfire air (OFA), selective catalytic reduction (gCR), combustion modification (CM), closed-
coupled overfire ai  (CCOFA), closed-coupled separated overfire air (CCSOA), separated overfire air
(SOFA), and uncontrolled (Uncntrl).
Generating units that employed SCRs tended to have lower NOx emission rates
than other coal fired units and the variation in the emission rates of these units was also
smaller (labeled DBWF-LMB SCR, TF-SCR, and TF-LNB SOFA SCR in Figure 4-4).
As might be expected, the median NOx rates of units that employed control technologies
were lower than those of uncontrolled units (labeled "Unctrl" in Figure 4-4); but the
range in emission rates was almost as large for some categories of units with NOx
controls as for those without. For example, tangentially-fired units with closed-coupled
overfire air (CCOFA) had emission rates that ranged from 0.06 to 0.46 lbs/mmBTU and
uncontrolled tangentially fired units had emission rates ranging from 0.12 to 0.67
lbs/mmBTU - the minimum rates were 13 and 18% of the maximum rates respectively.
Overall, the "cleanest" coal power plant had a NOx emission rate that was about 3% of
the NOx emission rate of the "dirtiest" plant.
Some of the variation in emission rates could be a result of policies that required
some coal-fired boilers to reduce NOx emissions prior to the seasonal cap-and-trade
programs. Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments specified two phases of NOx
emission rate standards for coal-fired electric generating units. Phase I required
tangentially-fired coal boilers to obtain an emissions rate below 0.45 lbs/mmBTU and dry
bottom wall-fired to obtain an emission rate below 0.5 lbs/mmBTU. Phase II required
boilers to reduce their NOx emission rates to between 0.4 and 0.86 lbs/mmBTU,
depending on type. Although some of the coal-fired boilers in this sample from the
Eastern U.S. appear to have average emission rates outside of these specifications, the
median and even 75th percentile emission rates are about at the required levels. However,
there is still considerable variation in the units' emission rates below these specifications.
The engineering documentation about NOx emissions from coal boilers, discussed
above, indicated that boiler size could be an indicator of NOx emission rate, with larger
boilers tending to have higher emission rates. For many of the technology categories, this
appears not to be the case. For example, Figure 4-5 shows box plots of 2005 average
ozone season emission rates for coal generating units in two technology categories
grouped by heat input capacity (dry-bottom wall-fired boilers with low-NOx burners and
uncontrolled tangentially fired boilers). In both cases, the median NOx rates of the
generating units with the largest heat input capacities were lowest and the largest range of
emission rates was found in the smallest size category.
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Figure 4-5 Box plots of average 2005 ozone season NOx emission rates for generating units with dry-
bottom wall-fired boilers and low-NOx burners and for uncontrolled tangentially fired boilers in the NOx
SIP Call region. Each technology category is divided into bins based on heat input capacity.
The considerable heterogeneity in emission rates that still existed in 2005
suggests that generating units found it worthwhile to undertake different levels of
abatement under the cap-and-trade programs. That is, the heterogeneity in abatement-cost
between these units was (and is) not trivial and the flexibility afforded by the market-
based incentive likely achieved the regulation's aggregate NOx reductions at lower cost
than would have been possible by mandating that all units achieve a particular emission
rate. In addition, with so much variety in the emission characteristics of generating units
with the same technologies and similar sizes it would have been impractical for the EPA
to determine the most efficient control technologies or quantities of NOx abatement for
these plants.
4.4. Incentives to Reduce NOx in the Early Ozone Season
The heterogeneity in NOx-emission characteristics of coal power plants in the
Eastern U.S. is a reason to utilize market-based incentives. But the complicated
chemistry of ozone formation and, in particular, its dependence on meteorological
conditions creates a challenge for the un-differentiated cap-and-trade programs now in
place. The most cost-effective regulation to reduce the likelihood of peak ozone
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concentrations would provide stronger incentives for sources to abate emissions during
the times and in the locations when ozone formation was most likely. A seasonal, but un-
differentiated, cap-and-trade program does not provide extra incentives for emission
reductions when ozone formation is most likely. In addition, this section discusses three
incentives that could cause power plant operators to reduce NOx emissions more when
ozone formation was less likely under a un-differentiated cap-and-trade program.
All three of these incentives stem from the coincidence that the same weather
conditions drive ozone formation and peak electricity demand.' 0 ' Wholesale electricity
markets are designed so that power plant operators have incentives (i.e. high prices) to be
available and to produce more power when electricity demand is high. First, as discussed
above, output reduction is a potential means to reduce NOx emissions and it is made
more attractive by the fact that the NOx emission rates of some coal-fired boilers
decrease with decreased levels of output. Reducing output carries a higher opportunity
cost when electricity prices are high than when they are low. For this reason plant
operators would prefer to utilize output reduction as a NOx abatement strategy during
cooler weather, which is also when ozone formation is less likely. Second, the use of a
NOx control technology could cause a unit's marginal costs to increase more quickly as a
function of output than if it did not employ the technology. In this case, it might only be
worthwhile to utilize the control technology when operating at low output levels and not
at the higher levels justified by power prices observed during the hottest parts of the
summer. Third, if a NOx control technology reduced a generating unit's efficiency it can
reduce its maximum output. The additional capacity is also more valuable when power
prices are high.
101 Hot, sunny weather provides the conditions most conducive to ozone formation. The sunlight drives the
photochemical ozone formation reactions. Also, trees and other biogenic sources emit more VOCs in hot, sunny
weather and high VOC levels make it more likely for NOx emissions to contribute to ozone episodes (e.g. Fiore 2005
and Purves et al. 2004).
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The following three subsections discuss these incentives in more detail. Following
the theoretical discussion, we evaluate empirical evidence that some plant operators
responded to these incentives.
4.4.1. Incentive 1: reduced generation at a given power price
The discussion of incentives for power plants to reduce NOx emissions more
during the early months of the ozone season, when power prices are low, begins from the
basic concepts of profit maximization and marginal costs for power plants. Assuming a
competitive market, the operator of a generating unit (i) will choose a level of output (q)
in an hour (t) that maximizes profit:
qit
Hit = ptqit - mci(qit)dqit
where pt is the price of power at time t and mci(q) is unit i's marginal cost of producing
q. 102 That is, the operator will choose a level of output, q, such that its marginal cost of
producing q are less than or equal to the price of power:
mc(qit) 5 Pt.
Baseload units with low variable costs, like coal-fired power plants, generate in most
hours and when power prices are greater than a plant's marginal cost of producing its
maximum output (qmx), it earns inframarginal rents that cover fixed costs. This margin
increases with power prices and can be quite large in some hours (Appendix A gives
examples). The price cap for wholesale power markets in the Eastern U.S is $1000/MWh.
Prices of this level do not reflect the marginal costs of the generating unit that would
provide an additional increment of power. Instead they indicate scarcity conditions when
102 The price of power also depends on the generator's location in the power network because the wholesale power
markets employ "locational marginal prices" (LMP). The price of power could therefore be indicated pi, but this aspect
is ignored for simplicity. The LMP for a particular generating unit's node on the power network varies from other
nodes, when congestion affects it.
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the system operator cannot maintain operating reserves. 03 In this case, higher NOx prices
could not cause increases in the electricity price and would only reduce generators'
profits.
Coal generating units are often large boilers that cannot be easily, or
inexpensively, turned on and off. This means that even when the price of power falls
below the marginal costs of doing so, most coal power plants generate at a minimum
level of output (qmin). A boiler also has a heat input limit, which restricts its maximum
output at some level (q,,m). A generating unit's maximum output level is often referred to
as its "rated capacity". A coal unit's minimum output level is typically between 20% and
40% of its rate capacity.
The cost of fuel dominates the variable costs of generating units. Other variable
costs include operating and maintenance (O&M) costs and the costs of emissions under
regulations like SO2 and the seasonal NOx cap-and-trade programs. Non-fuel O&M costs
are small for power plants and since these data are difficult to find for individual
generators or power plants; this analysis only considers fuel costs. The relationship
between fuel use and output, which is called an input-output curve, is the starting point
for developing marginal cost curves for generating units.
A generator's "input-output" curve, G(q), describes how hourly input of fuel (in
mmBTU per hr) to the generator varies with its hourly output, q (in MW). The observed
input-output relationships of coal power plants over their typical ranges of utilization are
linear. For this reason, and for simplicity, we employ linear input-output curves. 104
Multiplying the input-output curve by the cost of fuel, pf, in units of dollars per energy
103 For example see ISO New England's Operating Procedure Number 4 (OP 4) at
http://www. iso-ne. com/rules proceds/operating/iisone/index.htm I.
104 The industry standard is to model the input-output relationships of a generator, i, as cubic: Ri(q) = aý + biq + ciq 2 +
diq3 (e.g. Obessis and Lamont 1993). In reality though, these are often simplified to linear.
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input ($/mmBTU) then gives the unit's fuel cost as a function of power output, with units
of dollars per hour: Cr_(q) = pjGi(q).
Assume first that the unit's operator cannot change its emission rate within the
ozone season with a control technology but can only reduce output in order to reduce
NOx. Based on the previous section's discussion, this is a simplification because a NOx
control technology can impact the heat rate of a generating unit and therefore plant
operators may not find it worthwhile to utilize the control technologies for the entire
summer. The simplified case is relevant, however, because even with the use of a control
technology generating unit operators can reduce output to obtain additional reductions in
NOx. This section examines the simplified case and the following section examines the
case where the operator can alter the use of a NOx control technology during the ozone
season.
If Ni(q) is the relationship between the unit's hourly output and NOx emissions
(in lbs/hr) and the cost of emissions is the opportunity cost of selling permits at their
market value, the cost curve for fuel and NOx emissions takes the form: C1 q) = pjGi(q) +
pnNi(q)(I), where p,n is the price of NOx (in $/lb), and I is a dummy variable indicative of
the ozone season. The derivative of the cost curve yields the marginal cost curve for a
generator i, mci(q), which explains how fuel and NOx costs change with changes in
output. (The subscript, i, is dropped for notational simplicity in the remainder of the
discussion.) In a competitive market, a generator will produce q when the marginal costs
of doing so are less than or equal to the price of power (p):
dC(q)/dq = mc(q) = p (dG(q)/dq) + pn (dN(q)/dq)(I) 5 p.
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The operator will run the unit at q,,,a when the price of power is above the
marginal cost of doing so. 105 The unit's marginal costs are higher (by pn (dN(q)/dq)
during the ozone season because of the price on NOx emissions; thus, inside the ozone
season it would not be economic to generate at full capacity until power prices were
slightly higher to reflect this additional cost.
Now consider a case that is common for coal generators: an exponentially
increasing NOx-output relationship and a linear input-output relationship. Still assuming
that the operator cannot use a control technology to change the unit's emission rate within
the ozone season, this gives:
N(q) = ke" + u and k,m > 0 and (1)
G(q) = a+bq. (2)
The generator's marginal costs are constant outside the ozone season, but increase with
output during the ozone season and it will produce q when:
mc(q) = pjb + pnmkem(I) 5 p. (3)
Solving for the unit's output, q, as a function of the price of power, pp, both within an
outside of the ozone season yields:
qmin if pp < pb and I = 0 or if p < mc(qmi,) and I = 1.
q = qozo,,e(p) if mc(qmin) 5 p 5 mc(qm~) and I = 1 (4)
qmax otherwise.
105 Assuming that a unit will produce at its full capacity when the power price exceeds its marginal cost of doing so
while using these fuel-cost based marginal cost curves is somewhat of a simplification. There are reasons why a unit's
marginal costs of producing at full capacity might be higher than modeled here. These reasons include the opportunity
costs of participating in ancillary services markets, which essentially pay generating units to operate at less than full
capacity, and transmission constraints.
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If N(q) is exponential, then for mc(qmin) < p 5 mc(qm.) Equation (4) becomes:
qozone(pp) = (m)- [ln(p - p o) - ln(pnmk)]. (5)
Thus, depending on the values of the coefficients, a range of power prices may exist for
which it is profitable for a unit to generate at full capacity outside the ozone season, but
not during the ozone season. This creates an incentive for output reduction during the
ozone season for this range of power prices, which Figure 4-6 illustrates as p 5 p < pma
using hypothetical marginal cost curves.
mCI =
Figure 4-6 Marginal cost curves for a generating unit without a NOx price, cf, (i.e. non-
ozone season) and with a NOx price.
This incentive to reduce output at a given power price is similar when a
generator's NOx-output curve is quadratic. In either case, if a generator's NOx-output
curve increases nonlinearly, its NOx emission rate increases at higher output levels. A
plant operator has a stronger incentive to reduce output as an abatement strategy for a
unit with a NOx rate that increases with output, compared to one with an emission rate
that is a constant or decreasing function of output.
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4.4.2. Incentive 2: variable use of NOx control technologies
The discussion this far assumed that a generating unit's NOx-output relationship
remained constant throughout the ozone season; it assumed that the only way a generator
could decrease NOx emissions was to decrease utilization. But at least some NOx control
technologies provide the opportunity to alter a generator's NOx-output relationship (or
NOx emissions rate at a given q) on a time scale shorter than the five-month ozone
season. Some combustion-modifying NOx control methods involve tuning a unit's
operating conditions, which can be done somewhat flexibly. In this case, the analysis of
marginal cost curves suggests that it may not be worthwhile for an operator to use NOx
control technologies during periods with high expected electricity prices if the marginal
cost of abating NOx increases steeply as q approaches qmax.
Assuming that the use of a control technology may diminish a unit's efficiency,
and therefore require more heat input for a given level of output, the marginal cost curve
for a generator with the use of a control technology is:
dCcontrol (q)/dq = p(dRcontroq)/dq) +dVcontroq)/dq + pn(dNcontroq)/dq)(I) (6)
where Vcontro(q) represents the variable costs of operating the control technology. The
variable costs of control technologies tend to vary linearly with output, Vcontroi(q) = vcontq
(e.g. Foerter and Jozewicz 2001).
If, as before, the generator's NOx-output relationship is exponential and the input-
output relationship is linear, and coefficients with the subscript "c" represent the change
in the coefficient caused by the NOx control, then a generator will produce q if:
mc(q) = dCcontrot(q)/dq = p/(b + be) + vcont + pn((m+mc)(k+kc)e(m+mc))(I) < p (7)
with
N(q) = (k+kc)e(m+mc)+ (u+uc) and (7a)
G(q) = (a + ac) + (b + bc)q. (7b)
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As before, the marginal costs of NOx emissions increase as a function of q while the
marginal fuel costs are constant.
If a unit's controlled NOx emissions increased more steeply with increasing q
than its uncontrolled NOx emissions (for example, if the coefficient mr > 0), the unit's
marginal costs of generating q while utilizing NOx controls could be higher than if it did
not use the controls. Then for high p, the loss of margins from decreased utilization
could outweigh the savings from using a control technology.
A schematic of this possibility is sketched in Figure 4-7. The figure shows
hypothetical marginal cost curves for uncontrolled (mcnocontrol) and controlled (mCcontrol)
NOx emissions. For p < pint, controlling NOx emissions with is worthwhile. But, for p >
pint the generator could economically produce more power if it did not control NOx
emissions. For prices p > pma, it will always be economic for this generator to produce at
maximum capacity, but the operator will prefer not to employ the control technology if
the shaded area B is larger than the area A.
Figure 4-7 Sketch of marginal cost curves for the case when a generating unit's marginal
cost with NOx control increases more steeply than without a NOx control technology.
At some intermediate price p*, with pint < p < Pmax, the operator would prefer not to
control emissions if the opportunity cost from producing less power plus the cost of the
108
Mdr
control technology and any heat rate penalty outweighed the savings from controlling
NOx. This occurs when:
q *con trol q no control
(qonro) con q) dq < p(qnocontrol) - Cnocontro,(q) dq.
The technical requirements of control technologies suggest that it is likely that a
plant operator cannot turn on and off a unit's NOx controls on an hourly basis, but could
alter use of controls on a time frame of a month or a few weeks. In this case, a plant
operator with a generating unit that has marginal cost curves like those shown in Figure
4-7 might choose to control NOx only during periods when the expected power price
does not exceed p'.
4.4.3. Incentive 3: NOx control technologies reduce capacity
Another reason that a unit's operator might prefer to use control technologies only
in the early summer is that when NOx control technologies reduce efficiency (increase
heat rate) they also reduce maximum possible generation. The additional capacity, or
higher maximum hourly generation, is more valuable when power prices are high. A
unit's heat input capacity limits the amount of fuel that its boiler can burn in an hour. The
efficiency of the unit determines the fraction of the hourly heat input that it can covert to
output, or generation.'0 6 If the use of a control technology reduces a generating unit's
efficiency, it would not be able to generate as much power from its maximum heat input.
This section discussed three reasons that power plant operators might prefer to
abate NOx emissions more when power prices were relatively low. First, output
reduction as a NOx abatement strategy is clearly less costly when power prices are low.
Second, if a generating unit's marginal costs increase more steeply with a NOx control
technology than without it the operator might prefer to reduce emissions at lower power
106 As mentioned above, a typical efficiency of a coal boiler is about 34%, which corresponds to a heat rate of 10
mmBTU/MWh.
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prices. Third, if a NOx control technology increases a generating unit's heat rate it can
decrease its effective capacity, which is more costly when power prices are high.
4.5. Abatement under OTC and SIP Trading Programs
Historical emissions and generation data for coal power plants in the OTC and
NOx SIP Call regions provide evidence in support of the theory that some power plants
have incentives to reduce emissions more when power prices are low under a un-
differentiated cap-and-trade program. This section uses hourly data to assess whether the
three incentives discussed in Section 3 affected the generation and NOx emissions of
three generating units. The analysis of the three example units suggests that at least some
plant operators reduced the output of coal generating units as a result of the seasonal NOx
cap-and-trade program and that they reduced output and NOx emissions more during
periods with lower power prices. Weekly data on generation and emissions from power
plants in the New England and PJM power systems were then used to estimate whether
more NOx abatement occurred in 2002 and 2005 during the beginning of the ozone
season, when power price tend to be low, than in the later parts of the ozone season. 107
The estimates suggest that weekly abatement decreased slightly throughout both the 2002
and 2005 ozone seasons. For example, the average weekly NOx reductions in June in
2002 were about 1930 tons while those in August were about 1620 tons.
Ozone formation is most likely during hot, sunny weather and ozone episodes are
most frequent in July through September in the Eastern United States. 108 The observation
of slightly more abatement in the earlier months of the ozone season (May and June) is
107 Due to air conditioning demand, electricity demand and prices tend to be highest in the months of July and August
(see Appendix A).lOS EPA air quality monitoring data also suggest that exceedances of the ozone standards were more likely in the late
summer. There were 25 days on which ozone concentrations exceeded the ozone standard in the New York City area
during the summer of 2005 and that 22 of these occurred in the months of July, August and September. In the District
of Columbia nonattainment area, all 6 days with exceedences were in August. In the Philadelphia area, 9 of 13 days
with exceedances occurred in July, August and September. For these reason and for convenience, we split the ozone
season into the "early" portion (May and June) and the "late" portion (July through August).Calculated from EPA
Continuous Emissions Monitoring data at http://cfpnub.epa.gov/gdrn/.
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evidence of slightly perverse behavior that could have been caused by the incentives
discussed in Section 4.4. However, it is difficult to say whether additional reductions of
approximately 300 tons per week in July or August might have prevented ozone episodes.
Answering this type of question would require atmospheric chemistry modeling, but 300
tons was only a small portion (5%) of the total weekly NOx emissions of about 6400 tons
in July through September of 2002.
The remainder of this section discusses evidence that the incentives discussed in
Section 3 affected the generation and NOx emissions of example generating units
(Sections 4.1 through 4.3 discuss the incentives in the same order as Sections 3.1 through
3.3). Section 4.4 then discusses the estimation of a counterfactual for emissions from coal
power plants in the New England and PJM power systems for 2002 and 2005 and
compares the estimates to the base case year of 1998 before the OTC NOx Budget
Program began.
4.5.1. Incentive 1: reduced generation at a given power price
Section 4.4.1 suggested that if a generating unit's NOx emissions increased
nonlinearly with output, a price on NOx emission could then cause its marginal cost
curve to increase nonlinearly as well. In this case, a range of power prices may exist for
which the unit's operator would prefer to produce at full capacity when the NOx price
was not effective but at a lower level when it was.
Nonlinear relationships between NOx emissions and generation (NOx-output
curves) are often observed for coal generating units. However, the relationships between
heat input and generation for coal units tend to be linear. For example, Figure 4-8 shows
scatter plots of hourly heat input and NOx emissions versus output for coal units in three
power plants in the ozone season of 2002.109 The data are for two 913 MW units in Plant
o09 Appendix B discusses curve fitting results.
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6094, two 364 MW units in Plant 1571, and one 626 MW unit in Plant 1573. The units in
Plants 6094 and 1571 are dry bottomed wall-fired boilers that utilized low NOx burners
in 2002. The unit in Plant 1573 is a tangentially fired boiler that employed low NOx
burner technology and closed-coupled, separated overfire air to control it NOx emissions.
These units' NOx-output relationships suggest that a small decrease in utilization
disproportionately decreases their NOx emissions, especially at high initial levels of
output.
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Figure 4-8 Scatter plots of hourly heat input versus generation (input-output curves) and
NOx rate versus generation for two coal-fired power plants in the ozone season of 2002.
Linear and exponential fits to the data in Figure 4-8 produced estimates of the
input-output and NOx-output curves for these units. The input-output curves were
constructed by fitting linear curves to the hourly data using ordinary least squares. A
dummy variable for the ozone season months was also included. The hourly data are
from the EPA's Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS). For each unit, the
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hourly data were used to estimate the coefficients on output (q) in the relationship in
Equations 7b:
HI = a + a,*OZONE + bq + bc(q*OZONE) + e.
Where HI is the hourly heat input (mmBTU), q is the unit's hourly gross output (MW),
OZONE is a dummy variable that equals one during the ozone season, and e is the error
term.
The NOx-output curves were constructed similarly, but the data were transformed
to obtain an exponential fit like that described in Equation 7a. For each unit, the hourly
data were used to estimate the following relationship, where ln(NOx) is the natural
logarithm of the unit's hourly NOx emissions:
ln(NOx) = k + kcOZONE + mq + mc(q*OZONE) + E.
The estimates of the coefficients (discussed in Appendix B) were then combined
with historical data on NOx prices and coal prices in order to estimate marginal cost
curves for the example units inside and outside of the ozone season based on Equation
(7):
mc(q) = pjb + be) + pn((m+mnl)(k+kc)e(m+mcq)(I) (7)
Figure 4-9 shows marginal cost curves estimated with the input-output and NOx-
output and weekly historical fuel and NOx price data for three of the above units in 2002
(P6094U3, P1571U1, and P1573U2).' l0 These simple curves do not include variable
operating costs for the boilers or control technologies, which typically vary linearly with
q and would shift the marginal cost curves upward.
110 The Energy Information Association publishes monthly data on the cost of coal delivered to the power plants in
each state and spot prices were obtained for Big Sandy Barge Low Sulfur Coal (Bloomberg ticker COALBGSD). The
results discussed here use the spot price data, but the results were similar and only changed the threshold prices by
about $1 to 2/MWh for these units. NOx prices were fairly stable over the summers of 2002 and 2005, about $900/ton
and between $2000 and $2700/ton respectively. Weekly NOx price data from the Bloomberg OTC NOx allowance
price series (EMITNOXC) were used to create the marginal cost curves.
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Figure 4-9 Estimated marginal cost curves for coal generating units in Plants 6094, 1571,
and 1573 in 2002.
The curves yield estimates of the ranges of power prices for which the units'
operators would prefer to generate slightly less power during the ozone season without
the NOx price. These ranges are labeled on the graphs in Figure 4-9 for the three units.
Empirical evidence suggests that the operators of the three example units did respond to
incentives for reduced output in the ozone season.For example, Plant 1573's marginal
cost curves inside and outside the ozone season suggest that the operator might have
decreased output inside the ozone season for prices ranging between about $13 and
$16/MWh. Given power prices in this range during 2002, the mean hourly generation for
P1573U2 was 280 MW in the ozone season and 400 MW outside the ozone season. The
unit was also much more likely to have generated near its maximum capacity outside the
ozone season when prices were in this range:
Pnon-ozone(q > 0.9q,, 1 14 5 p < 18) = 0.08 and
Pozone(q > 0.9q,, 1 14 5 p < 18) = 0.00.
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Table 4-2 shows the ozone season and non-ozone season mean generation for the
three example units in each unit's relevant price range (the lowest price range shown for
each unit) and in higher price ranges of equal width for comparison. The mean ozone
season generation was less than that in the non-ozone season for all three units in the
relevant range (and the hypothesis that the difference between the two means for each
unit was zero could be rejected in all cases). The difference between the ozone and non-
ozone season means decreased at higher prices ranges for all units.
Table 4-2 Ozone season and non-ozone season mean hourly generation for the three
example generating units.
Price Mean Hourly Generation
Range Ozone Non-Ozone Difference*
12<p<=16 773 785 12 (2.6)
6094 16<p<=20 804 810 5(1.7)
20<p<=24 821 819 -2 (.40)
Plant 15<p<=21 259 271 12 (7.2)
1571 21<p<=27 305 318 13 (6.2)27<p<=33 317 320 3 (1.2)
Plant 13<p<=16 280 400 120 (17)
1573 16<P<=19 401 342 -59 (13)19<P<=22 561 575 14 (2.2)
($/MWh) Hourly MW
* T-statistic (absolute value) in parathenses; a t-statistic with
absolute value greater than 1.96 indicates that we can reject the
hypothesis that the ozone season and non-ozone season means
are equal (5% level of significance for the 2-sided t-test).
The observation that these generating units generated less at a given price inside
the ozone season suggests that the operators of these generating units may have reduced
output because of the NOx price. Transmission network congestion could also affect
whether a unit generates at full capacity, but network congestion is unlikely at lower
levels of electricity demand, which corresponds to prices in the relevant range, and is as
likely to occur both within and outside of the ozone season for similar levels of demand
and price.
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Another test of whether or not the NOx price caused units to reduce output during
the ozone season is a counterfactual that estimates what the generation of these units
would have been without the NOx regulation. The following section discusses observed
NOx emissions and uses counterfactuals for generation, heat input, and NOx emissions to
analyze the behavior of these plants.
4.5.2. Incentive 2: variable use of NOx control technologies
This section evaluates empirical evidence that the operators of the two of the
example generating units varied the use of the units' control technologies during the
ozone season. Counterfactual estimates of generation, heat input, and NOx emissions
were used to estimate the units' NOx abatement during the ozone season of 2002 and the
portion of this abatement that was due to output reduction versus the use of NOx control
technologies. Both units reduced emissions more during the months of May and June in
comparison to July through September. However, the units did not appear to greatly vary
their use of NOx control technologies throughout the summer.
One indication that a power plant operator may have used a control technology to
abate NOx emissions is the observation of a lower ozone-season emission rate. However,
as discussed earlier, if a unit's NOx emission rate decreases with level of output then an
observed decrease in NOx emission rate is not necessary indicative of the use of a control
technology or even of a response to the NOx cap-and-trade program. Figure 4-10 shows
the average NOx emission rates (lbs/mmBTU) of the three example units by week for
2002. The emission rate of P6094U3 was only slightly lower in the ozone season than
outside of it. The emission rates of the other two plants were lower during May and June
(weeks 18 through 25) than in July through August (weeks 26 through 40).
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Figure 4-10 Weekly average NOx emission rates for coal units in Plants 6094, 1571, and 1573 for 2002.
Two questions arise from the observation that at least some of the generating units
under the NOx cap-and-trade programs had lower emission rates during the "early" part
of the summer and less so in the "late" part of the summer. First, what physical
relationship or change caused the observed decreases in NOx rates? Decreased output, a
NOx control technology, or a combination could have caused lower emission rates.
Second, to what extent was the cap-and-trade program the motivation for the physical
changes? The NOx price and the previously discussed incentives could have caused the
plants' operators to abate, but lower electricity prices or other problems like
malfunctioning control technologies could also have been responsible.
Counterfactuals, or estimates of what the units' generation, heat input, and
emissions would have been without the NOx cap-and-trade program, are a useful tool to
answer these questions. The seasonal nature of the cap-and-trade program can be used to
construct the counterfactual because the NOx price would not have affected the
relationships between electricity price and generation, between generation and heat input,
and between heat input and NOx emissions during the non-ozone season months.
Constructing the counterfactuals requires understanding three relationships that a
NOx price can change. The first is between electricity price and generation. If one
controls for fuel costs and assumes that the units in question rarely, if ever, set the
electricity price, then generation can be predicted from electricity prices (p) and coal
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prices (pf). It is reasonable to assume that the coal power plants in question rarely set the
price of power because their variable costs are low. Additionally, it is difficult to
determine which hours these units may have been the marginal unit in the power system.
Regressions that used total electricity demand as a proxy for electricity price (because
total demand is inelastic and is not affected by the generation of any particular plant) did
not predict output as well and using demand as an instrumental variable for price did not
change the results.
In general, the generation of generating units increases as a function of the
electricity price. But, because the generating units have finite capacities, the relationship
between electricity price and output is flat when prices are high enough for the units to
consistently generate at or near their maximum. For this reason, piecewise linear
relationships were fit for the generating units. The marginal cost curves discussed above
predicted the break points for the piecewise linear curves: the prices at which the units
could be expected to generate at their full capacities inside the ozone season. Slightly
higher break points were used ($20/MWh for P1573U2 and $23/MWh P1571U1) in these
estimates to account for additional variable costs not modeled in the marginal cost curves.
The following relationship was fit for generation and power prices below and above the
break point for each generating unit:
qi, = Ro+ lipPt + 32iPft + P3iEARLY + f4iLATE + E (8)
The dummy variables EARLY and LATE are one during May and June and July
through September respectively."' Weekly coal price data and hourly generation and
power price data were used in the regressions.112 The counterfactual for generation in the
"' Dummy variables for the "early" and "late" summer were chosen arbitrarily to represent the portions of the ozone
season where power prices are generally low and ozone formation unlikely ("early") and when power prices are higher
and ozone formation more likely ("late").
112 The Energy Information Association publishes monthly data on the cost of coal delivered to the power plants in
each state and weekly spot prices were obtained for Big Sandy Barge Low Sulfur Coal (Bloomberg ticker
COALBGSD). The hourly historical locational marginal price data for the PJM pricing node that corresponded to the
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absence of the seasonal cap-and-trade program was constructed by predicting generating
using the observed electricity prices and fuel prices during the ozone season and the
predicted coefficients from Equation (8), but setting EARLY=LATE=O.
The second relationship to consider for the counterfactual is the amount of fuel
needed to produce a given level of output. A NOx price can change this relationship, the
input-output relationship, if controlling NOx emissions reduces efficiency. In this case,
the observed generation 113 was used to predict the required heat input (HI):
HIt = Oao + aliqit + a 2iEARLY + a3iLATE + e (9)
The counterfactual heat input was constructed by predicting HIj, from the counterfactual
estimates of qit (from Equation 8) with EARLY=LATE=O. This process estimated the
amount of heat input that would have been required to generate the counterfactual
generation given the non-ozone season relationship between heat input and output.
The final relationship estimated was between heat input and NOx emissions.
Although the NOx emissions and generation of these units are correlated, heat input - or
the burning of fuel - ultimately causes both NOx emissions and generation. The
relationship between NOx and output, discussed in Section 4.5.1 and Appendix B, was
exponential; but a quadratic fit between NOx and heat input was most appropriate. The
counterfactuals of NOx emissions for each unit were constructed similarly to the heat
input counterfactual, but with a squared term to reflect the nonlinearity between NOx
emissions and heat input:
NOxit = 1o + ýliHIit + E2i(HIit) 2 + O3iEARLY + a4iLATE + E (10)
power plant were used for each unit; available from the PJM website, "Daily Real-Time Locational Marginal Pricing
Files," at
http://www.pim.com/mrarkets/isp/lmnp.sp. The hourly generation data for the units were from the EPA's CEMS data.
"3 Predicting HI on the predicted generation from Equation 8 did not change the estimates of the coefficients in
Equation 9.
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The non-ozone season relationship (EARLY=LATE=0) between output and input was
used to predict the amount of NOx emissions from the counterfactual values of heat
input.
This process generated the counterfactual estimates of generation, heat input, and
NOx emissions. Table 4-3 shows the coefficients for the regressions in Equations 8, 9,
and 10. These were the coefficients used construct the counterfactual estimates. Most
coefficients were significant at the 5% level. The signs of the coefficients are as expected.
For example, the signs on the coefficients of the power price (LMP) in the regressions of
generation on LMP are positive for prices below the cut point; generation was expected
to increase as a function of the price of power in this region. At prices above the cut point
the magnitude of the coefficient on LMP is small reflecting the fact that the plant
operators cannot increase the units' output above their capacities.
The coefficient on generation (q) in the regressions of heat input on generation is
positive and about 9 or 10 (mmBTU/MWh). This was expected because this coefficient
represents the units' heat rates (normally about 10 for coal fired boilers). Negative
coefficients on the EARLY and LATE dummy variables indicate less generation for a
given power price than during the non-ozone season. Similarly, negative coefficients on
the dummy variables in the regressions of NOx emissions on heat input indicate a
decrease in NOx emissions at a given level of heat input during the ozone season.
Positive coefficients on the dummy variables in the regressions of heat input on output
indicate a higher heat rate during the ozone season possibly due to the use of control
technologies (or to ambient conditions).
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Table 4-3 OLS coefficients used to construct counterfactual estimates of generation, heat input, and NOx
for two coal generating units.
OLS Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) Number of AdjustedObservations R^ 2
Intercept LMP CoalPrice EARLY LATE
q for p < 23 217.6** 11,98** -5,04** -18,2** 2.70 3190 0.303
(16.56) (0.339) (0.539) (1.892) (1.774)
q for p >= 23 478.4** -0.040** -5,14** -4.61** -5.38** 3531 0.049
(14.12) (0.015) (0.506) (1.464) (1.178)
1571U12002 Intercept q EARLY LATE2002 HI 
-414** 10.8** 45** 157** 7933 0,958
(7.97) (0.026) (3.46) (2.96)
Intercept HI HI ^ 2 EARLY LATE
NOx -280** 0,687** 2.02E-06** -243** -135** 7933 0.840
(10.45) (0.0036) (4.729E-07) (5.24) (4.55)
Intercept LMP CoalPrice EARLY LATE
q for p < 20 -6.9 45** -9.3** -86.7** -72.1** 2887 0.533
(56.3) (0.86) (1.99) (4.98) (4.84)
q for p >= 20 734.0** 0.18** -5.14** 2.06 -1.50 3705 0.022
(26,4) (0.025) (0.956) (2.56) (2.18)
1573U2
2002 Intercept q EARLY LATE
HI 240** 9.00** 77.4** 151.9** 6727 0.996
(3.96) (0.0069) (2.66) (2.185)
Intercept HI HIA2 EARLY LATE
NOx 539** 0.171** 4.8E-05** -496** 13.8** 6727 0.900
(48.2) (0.0245) (2.868E-06) (8.73) (7.19)
** indicates significance at the 5% level
* indicates significance at the 10% level
Figure 4-11 shows the observed, predicted, and counterfactual estimates of
generation for the coal units in Plants 1571 and 1573. The predicted generation, shown by
the line with marked with "x" is a reasonable estimate of the generation, although for the
P1571U1, it does not quite fully predict the peaks and valleys. The counterfactual
estimates of generation were slightly higher than the observed generation for both plants
in the early ozone season and for P1573U2 during the entire ozone season. This is
indicative of a reduction in output during the ozone season." 4 Figure 4-12 shows the
counterfactual, predicted, and observed weekly NOx emissions for the two generating
114 Changes in electricity prices and fuel prices did account for some of the observed reductions in output during the
ozone season because the counterfactual estimates of generation did decline at the beginning of the ozone season.
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units. Both of these units abated NOx emissions more during the beginning of the ozone
season compared to the late ozone season.
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Figure 4-11 Observed, predicted, and counterfactual average hourly generation by week
for two coal units in Plants 1571 and 1573 during 2002.
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Figure 4-12 Observed, predicted, and counterfactual average hourly NOx emissions by
week for two coal units in Plants 1571 and 1573 during 2002.
About 70% of the NOx abatement for P1571U1 occurred in May and June and
nearly all (98%) occurred in May and June for P1573U2. Reductions in output caused
about 87% of the NOx abatement from P1571U1 in May and June and none of the
observed abatement between July and September (calculated from the counterfactual
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emissions rate and the observed generation). Reductions in output caused about 43% of
the NOx abatement during May and June for P1573U2. The unit P1573U2 likely only
used its control technology in May and June because it abated very little between July
and September and reductions in output only explain 43% of the unit's abatement in May
and June.
The counterfactual estimates provide evidence that the operators of coal fired
power plants may have responded to incentives to reduce emissions (through reductions
in output and the use of control technologies) more during periods when power prices
were lower (Appendix A shows that power prices were lower in May and June in 2002
and 2005). The exact implication of this for the effectiveness of the seasonal NOx cap
and trade program is not easily determined because of the complicated chemistry of
ozone formation. However, ozone episodes are less likely during May and June compared
to the later months so this behavior is an example of how a differentiated program might
provide a benefit. A successful differentiated cap-and-trade program would not require
these reductions if they would not have helped some area achieve the ozone air quality
standards.
The counterfactual estimates also provide examples of the tradeoff between heat
rate and NOx rate that was explained in Section 4.3.2. Table 4-4 summarizes the
observed and counterfactual NOx and heat rates for the two units for the early, late, and
non-ozone seasons. Based on the discussion in Section 4.3.2 we would expect an increase
in heat rate of about 3% to accompany a decrease in NOx emission rate of about 30%
from a generating unit employing low NOx burners (which these did). The changes
described in Table 4-4 were roughly this order of magnitude. The NOx emission rate of
P1573U1I decreased by about 19% and its heat rate increased by about 3.5%.
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Table 4-4 Average NOx emission rates and heat rates for two coal generating units in 2002. "Early" refers
to the months of May and June, the early ozone season. "Late" refers to the months of July through
September.
NOx Rate Heat Rate
% %
Observed CF Reduction Observed CF Increase
Plant Early 0.51 0.61 15 9.5 9.4 1.21571 Late 0.54 0.61 11 9.9 9.5 5.0
Off 0.59 0.61 2.6 9.4 9.4 -0.2
Plant Early 0.42 0.52 19 9.7 9.4 3.5Late 0.53 0.53 -0.5 9.8 9.8 -0.6
Off 0.52 0.53 0.4 9.5 9.3 3.1
Ibs/mmBTU % mmBTU/MWh %
4.5.3. Incentive 3: NOx control technologies reduce capacity
One of the implications of the increases in heat rate caused by the use of a NOx control
technology is a reduction in the generator's maximum output. As discussed in Section
4.4.3, generating units are limited by a heat input capacity; an increase in heat rate
implies that the unit cannot generate as much from its maximum heat input.
As an example, the average heat rate of P1571U1 was 9.9 mmBTU/MWh during
the late ozone season, compared to 9.5 mmBTU/MWh during the early ozone season of
2002 (Table 4-4). Although power prices were higher in the late ozone season, the unit's
maximum generation was only 349 MW in the late ozone season, compared to 364 and
360 during the early and non-ozone seasons respectively. The unit did not generate above
the annual 9 9 th percentile of its hourly generation in the late ozone season.
The examples discussed in Sections 4.1 through 4.3 provide evidence that the
operators of at least two power plants found it worthwhile to reduce output and NOx
emissions more in the early part of the ozone season, when power prices were low, than
in the later parts of the ozone season. The observation of this behavior is consistent with
the incentives discussed in Sections 3.1 through 3.3.
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4.5.4. Aggregate effects of incentives for poorly timed NOx reductions
This section presents counterfactual estimates of weekly NOx emissions without the
seasonal cap-and-trade programs in 2002 and 2005 for the coal generating units in OTC
region of the PJM and New England power systems. The aggregate counterfactual was
used to test hypothesis that more NOx abatement occurred from these units during the
early weeks of the ozone season (i.e. in May and June) compared to the later weeks. The
estimates suggested that the weekly average NOx reductions in May and June of 2002
were about 1930 tons, compared to 1510 tons in the months of July through September.
In 2005, the weekly average NOx reductions were about 3880 tons, compared to about
3380 in the later months. The estimates suggest that at least some power plant operators
reduced emissions more in the earlier months, which is consistent with the incentives
discussed in Section 4.4.1 through Section 4.4.3.
To construct the counterfactual estimates, weekly panel datasets were created for
the years 1998, 2002 and 2005. The year 1998 was included a control because the
seasonal NOx cap-and-trade program first began in the summer of 1999. The datasets
included observations on roughly 100 generating units for 52 weeks in each year. The
dataset included weekly generation, heat input, and NOx emissions for each unit. It also
included weekly average electricity price (hub prices) and average weekly electricity
demand for the New England and PJM power system. Only PJM and New England were
included because electricity prices and total electricity demand data were not available
for 1998 and 2002 for the New York Power Pool. Only the OTC region (and not the
entire SIP Call region) was included so that the number of units in the analysis did not
increase dramatically between 2002 and 2005.
The estimation procedures were similar to those for the counterfactual estimates
for the individual units discussed in Section 4.5.2, but did not include a piecewise linear
estimate of generation. The piecewise linear estimates of generation from electricity price
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(Section 4.5.2) required high frequency data to determine the unique cut-point for each
generating unit and this was not practical for the larger set of units. The aggregate
estimates also used weekly average electricity demand to predict generation from the coal
power plants rather than electricity prices. Primary reasons for this were that the average
demand predicted generation better for all three years and this analysis did not necessitate
estimating a coefficient for electricity price. In addition, total electricity demand is
inelastic and therefore independent of the generation from any particular generator. As
discussed below, the relationship between electricity demand and generation from the
coal plants did not change significantly during the "ozone season" of 1998 (before the
cap-and-trade program was implemented). This suggests that total electricity demand can
be used as a reference point to determine whether or not the coal plants generated more or
less as a result of the NOx cap-and-trade programs in 2002 and 2005.
Instrumental variable regressions of output on electricity price (with total
electricity demand as an instrumental variable) predicted generation reasonably well in
2002 but not in 1998 or 2005 (see Appendix C)." s One possible reason that it was
difficult to predict output from electricity prices consistently between the three years is
that changes in the structure of wholesale electricity markets occurred between 1998 and
2005 because of liberalization and expansion (including in the middle of the year in 2005
when PJM added the Dominion Control Area). This could have changed the relationships
between prices and generation during these years. In addition, electricity prices are
disproportionately high (e.g. $1000/MWh) during scarcity conditions that occur when
system operators cannot maintain operating reserves. Under these conditions, the prices
are not set by the costs of the marginal generating unit - they are much higher. The
11s Total weekly electricity demand was used as an instrument for average weekly electricity price in these regressions.
Electricity prices are likely endogenous in the regression of generation on price because even if a coal unit is not
marginal, the level of its generation could influence which other unit was marginal - and therefore the price. Total
electricity demand is inelastic and therefore not determined by the generation of any particular coal unit. Electricity
demand is also correlated with price.
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regressions of generation on electricity price tended to over-predict generation during
these price spikes (the piecewise linear estimates were able to address this problem for
the estimates of generation for individual units in Section 4.4.2).
For the aggregate estimates, ordinary least squares estimates using the fixed
effects model were used to create counterfactuals for generation, heat input, and NOx
emissions. To predict generation, the coefficients in the following equation were
estimated:
qit = Bo+ P iDEMANDt + [ 3iEARLY + P4iLATE + E. (11)
where DEMAND was the weekly average electricity demand in the power system
corresponding to each generating unit (i.e. PJM or New England), EARLY was a dummy
variables for May and June and LATE for July through August. Weekly heat input was
then regressed on the predicted generation (q it) from Equation 11 and on the dummy
variables:
HIu = ao + aliq it + a2iEARLY + a3iLATE + e (12)
In the last stage, weekly NOx emissions were regressed on the predicted heat input (HI it)
from Equation 12, the square of the predicted heat input and the dummy variables:
NOxie = Lo + [ltIiHI~it + Vl2i(FI it)2 + R3iEARLY + a4iLATE + e (13).
The "staged" regressions (regressing the heat input on the predicted generation in
Equation 12 and the NOx emissions on the predicted heat input in Equation 13) were
performed because generation, heat input and NOx emissions are simultaneously
determined in this system. For example, the NOx emissions from a given level of heat
input are determined by whether or not a NOx control strategy was used and NOx control
strategies can affect a generating units' efficiency (how much heat input is required to
generate a given amount). The staged regressions insured that only the variation in
generation due to changes in total electricity demand was used to explain variations in
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heat input and, in turn, that only the variations in heat input due to electricity demand
(and not NOx abatement decisions) were used to predict NOx emissions.
Table 4-5 shows the coefficients estimated in these panel regressions. The
coefficients on the EARLY and LATE dummy variables were negative and significant in
the 2002 and 2005 regressions of generation on total electricity demand (except the
coefficient on LATE in the 2005 regression was not significant). The coefficients on the
dummy variables were not significant in 1998. This suggests that the seasonal NOx cap-
and-trade programs caused a reduction in output from this set of coal generating units. In
addition, the hypothesis that the coefficients on the LATE and EARLY dummy variables
were equal was rejected at a 5% level of significance in the 2002 and 2005 regressions of
generation on demand. This indicated that a larger reduction in generation occurred in
May and June compared to July through August.
The coefficients on the dummy variables in the regressions of NOx emissions on
heat input were negative and significant in all years, but were larger in magnitude in 2002
and 2005. The significant coefficients on the dummy variables in 1998 suggest that slight
NOx reductions for a given level of heat input occur during the summer even without the
NOx cap-and-trade programs. However, the coefficient on EARLY was smaller in
magnitude than that on LATE in 1998 (although this difference was not significant at the
5% level). The opposite was true in 2002 and 2005. This suggests that more NOx
abatement occurred in May and June in 2002 and 2005 than in July through August,
which is consistent with the incentives for more NOx abatement in the early summer.
However, in both years, the hypothesis that the coefficients on EARLY and LATE were
equal could not be rejected.
The estimated coefficients in Equations 11 through 13 for the non-ozone season
(i.e. without the ozone season dummy variables) were used to predict the counterfactual
generation, heat input, and NOx emissions. Figure 4-13 shows the observed, predicted,
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and counterfactual NOx emissions for the three years. The graphs show that, especially in
1998 and 2002, the regressions predicted the non-ozone season NOx emissions
reasonably well. Figure 4-14 shows that the estimated weekly NOx reductions were
higher in the early weeks of the 2002 and 2005 ozone seasons and declined throughout
the ozone season. In 2002, the average weekly NOx reductions were larger in May and
June, compared to July through August, by about 430 tons. In 2005 this difference was
about 500 tons. The observation of addition reductions early in the summer is consistent
with the incentives discussed in for power plant operators to reduce NOx emissions more
when power prices were lower and ozone formation less likely (in the early ozone
season). However, the estimation procedure also suggested that slightly more NOx
reductions in 1998 - which is used as a control since it was the final year without a
seasonal cap-and-trade program - occurred in May and June. The difference between the
average reductions in May and June compared to July through August in 1998 was about
130 tons. This suggests that mechanisms not related to the seasonal cap-and-trade
programs may have caused a portion of the observed "extra" NOx reductions in May and
June in 2002 and 2005.
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Table 4-5 Predicted coefficients from regressions of generation on total electricity demand, heat input on
predicted generation, and NOx emissions on predicted heat input in 1998, 2002, and 2005 using weekly
panel data for coal plants in the OTC region in the New England and PJM power systems.
Regression of Generation on Regression of Heat Input Regression of NOx Emissons on
1998 Total Demand on Predicted Gen Predicted Heat Input
Generation Standard Heat Input Standard Standard
Coefficient (gen) Error (HI) Error NOx Error
Demand 1.74** 0.15 -- -- -- --
Early -311 838 4171 8040 -3.8* 2.1
Late 59 952 4036 9218 -5.3** 2.5
Constant -11770** 3777 -4354 26763 -45.9* 25.5
Predicted Gen -- -- 9.91** 0.83 -- --
Predicted HI -- -- -- -- 0.00049** 0.00014
Predicted HIA2 -- -- -- -- -2.9E-10* 1.69E-10
Number of Observations 4440
Number of Groups 88
2002
Generation Standard Heat Input Standard Standard
Coefficient (gen) Error (HI) Error NOx Error
Demand 0.65** 0.07 -- -- -- --
Early -3117** 620 20890** 4815 -11.3** 1.1
Late -1668** 650 21922** 4239 -11.0** 1.2
Constant 6687** 2062 -3124 21139 -78.7** 24.9
Predicted Gen -- -- 9.75** 0.84 -- --
Predicted HI -- -- -- -- 0.00083** 0.00018
Predicted HI^2 -- -- -- -- -1.17E-9** 3.23E-10
Number of Observations 6869
Number of Groups 137
2005
Generation Standard Heat Input Standard Standard
Coefficient (gen) Error (HI) Error NOx Error
Demand 0.50** 0.06 -- -- --
Early -1140** 568 2880 4057 -31.7** 1.47
Late -215 580 6537* 3982 -30.3** 1.59
Constant 35953** 1774 11436 42310 -- --
Predicted Gen -- -- 6.58** 0.83 -909** 167
Predicted HI -- -- -- -- 0.0053** 0.0009
Predicted HIA2 -- -- -- -- -7.24E-9** 1.28E-09
Number of Observations 4840
Number of Groups 104
** indicates significance at the 5% level
* indicates significance at the 10% level
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Figure 4-13 Observed, predicted, and counterfactual NOx emissions for coal
region in the PJM and New England power systems in 1998, 2002, and 2005.
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Figure 4-14 Weekly NOx reductions in 2002 (middle) and 2005 (right) for coal plants in
New England and PJM.
4.6. Summary
The problem of ozone pollution creates a challenge for environmental regulation.
The effectiveness of NOx reductions in mitigating peak ozone concentrations depends on
timing and location and fluctuates with meteorological changes. Seasonal cap-and-trade
programs have caused large stationary sources, like coal power plants, to reduce NOx
emissions in the Eastern U.S. during the summer since 1999. Air quality monitoring data
suggest that these reductions have helped reduce the frequency of high ozone
concentrations in many areas, but not all highly populated areas in the Eastern United
States have attained the ozone standard.
A prescriptive regulation to address ozone nonattainment might mandate specific
emission rates or control technologies for particular power plants - such as those that
were uncontrolled or those that operated more during hours with high electricity demand
and prices." 6 But the heterogeneity in the NOx emission characteristics of coal power
plants alone, not to mention natural gas and oil generating units, suggests that it would be
difficult for regulators to determine the most cost-effective NOx control options, making
116 Recent regulations in some OTC states are requiring NOx reductions from peaking units. But, neither the EPA nor
state regulators have performed air quality modeling that indicates that the reductions will affect peak ozone
concentrations in non-attainment areas (personal conversations with EPA and state regulators). See the OTC's
"Memorandum of Understanding Among the States of the Ozone Transport Commission Concerning the Incorporation
of High Electrical Demand Day Emission Reduction Strategies into Ozone Attainment State Implementation Planning,"
March 2, 2007
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decentralized abatement decisions under a market-based regulation preferable. In
addition, the prescriptive measures would not guarantee that the reductions would
mitigate ozone formation, especially since the places and times in which reductions are
needed vary with the weather.
When considering regulatory options for obtaining further NOx emission
reductions from large stationary sources, reductions in the seasonal cap of the current
NOx cap-and-trade program could also be an inefficient, and potentially ineffective,
solution. Seasonal cap-and-trade programs to not guarantee that only the most cost-
effective NOx emission reductions occur. Indeed, under these programs the operators of
coal power plants have incentives to reduce NOx emissions when electricity prices are
low, which are also times when ozone formation is least likely. Three incentives were
discussed that suggested that it could be less costly for the operators of some coal
generating units to abate NOx emissions when power prices were low. First, output
reduction is an effective NOx control strategy because some coal units' NOx emission
rates decrease at decreased levels of output and reduced output is less costly when power
prices are low. Second, if a generating unit's marginal costs increase more steeply with a
NOx control technology than without it the operator might prefer to use the technology
only during periods with low expected power prices. Third, if a NOx control technology
increases a generating unit's heat rate it can decrease its effective capacity, which is more
costly when power prices are high.
The estimated NOx abatement of example power plants under the OTC NOx
Budget Program in 2002 was consistent with these incentives. In one example, nearly all
of a generating unit's NOx abatement occurred in the first two months of the ozone
season when power prices were lower than in the latter three months. Aggregate
estimates of NOx abatement in 2002 and 2005 from coal generating units in the OTC
regions of the New England and PJM power systems suggested that, although NOx
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reductions occurred during the entire ozone season, slightly more abatement took place in
the earlier weeks. Atmospheric chemistry modeling would be needed to determine
whether the additional NOx reductions of about 400 tons per week that occurred in the
early weeks of the ozone season might have helped mitigate peak ozone concentrations if
they had also occurred in the later weeks. But this chapter shows that a differentiated cap-
and-trade program could improve the cost-effectiveness of the current cap-and-trade
programs by providing stronger incentives for the emission reductions with the greatest
potential to reduce ozone concentrations.
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Chapter 5- Flexible NOx Reductions through Power
Plant Redispatch in Classic PJM117
The literature has called for a more finely differentiated regulation of NOx
emissions to address the temporal and locational variation in the contribution of NOx to
ozone formation and associated damages to human health and welfare (Chapters 2 and 3).
The examination of the NOx characteristics of coal power plants supports this need
(Chapter 4). This chapter examines one of the necessary conditions to apply such a
program to stationary sources: that electric generators would have sufficient flexibility to
reduce NOx emissions in the short term if faced with higher NOx prices on summer days
when ozone formation is a problem.
One method to obtain short-term NOx emission reductions from power plants is
through redispatch: substituting generation from units with high NOx emission rates with
generation from the units with the lowest NOx emission rates. Full utilization of capacity
and network constraints could limit opportunities to substitute to low-NOx emitting
generators. Because electricity demand is inelastic, if substitutions (or "redispatch") were
not possible, a higher NOx price would increase electricity prices instead of achieving
reductions in NOx. In addition, there is the concern that reductions in one or several areas
would create "hot spots" or higher NOx emissions in another area.
The results of the simulations described in this chapter suggest that flexibility to
reduce emissions from power plants through redispatch does exist, even in high demand
hours. The capability to reduce NOx through the substitution of generators exists because
117 This work also appears in the following working paper: Martin, K.C., P.L. Joskow, and A.D. Ellerman (2007),
"Time and Location Differentiated NOx Control in Competitive Electricity Markets Using Cap-and-Trade
Mechanisms," Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research Working Paper.
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of considerable variation in commitment among generators, even in high demand periods,
and heterogeneity in emission rates, including that for coal plants described in Chapter 4.
Heterogeneity in emission rates is often overlooked because models of NOx emissions
from power plants typically use emission rates that aggregate over region, month, and
rarely by time of day or in response to specific operating conditions. This type of
aggregation does not capture the full range of variation in power plant utilization and in
heterogeneity of emission rates.
Moreover, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the complex relationship between
NOx emissions, temperature, and atmospheric chemistry means that reductions in
nighttime NOx emissions could do more to mitigate peak ozone concentrations than
reductions in daytime emissions. The potential to reduce NOx emissions through
redispatch increases at lower levels of demand, such as those observed at night during the
summer. While this chapter considers only the potential reductions from redispatch, the
analysis in Chapter 4 suggested that operators have some ability to control NOx
emissions rates of generating units through control equipment, changes in boiler
combustion attributes, and through fuel switching. In the longer run, time and locational
differentiated NOx prices could affect investments in NOx control equipment, boiler and
turbine equipment.
5.1. Methodology
Two complementary methods were used to simulate the potential magnitude of
reductions in NOx emissions that can be achieved as a consequence of redispatch while
meeting electricity demand and transmission network constraints in the "Classic" PJM
power system. The "Classic" PJM power system is the original Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, Maryland power system that included these three states as well as the District of
Columbia and Delaware. PJM has now expanded, this original areas is generally upwind
of the remaining ozone nonattainment areas (U.S. EPA 2006b). Both methods used
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generator-level emission rates to simulate Classic PJM and balanced electricity supply
and demand. The "zonal" method accurately incorporated emission rates and historical
load characteristics to demonstrate the physical potential for significant NOx reductions
through redispatch. Optimal power flow (OPF) and Security Constraint OPF (SCOPF)
estimated both the physical feasibility of redispatching generators to reduce NOx
emissions and the levels of NOx permit prices required to induce economic redispatch
through wholesale market mechanisms. 8' The OPF and SCOPF simulations used
PowerWorld Simulator and modeled network constraints more accurately than the zonal
model. The two methods produced reasonably consistent results.
5.1.1. Background: Electric Power Systems and Wholesale Electricity
Markets
The process of electricity production and delivery includes the generation of
power as well as its transmission and distribution and the provision of "ancillary"
services related to reliability.' 19 The power plants in the Eastern U.S. that participate in
seasonal NOx cap-and-trade programs provide bulk power (generation) and ancillary
services. The transmission network is also important for these generators because the
capability of the network to transmit power over long distances determines which of the
generators in the wholesale power market can be used to fill demand. The transmission
network therefore partially determines both the costs and the environmental impacts of
the generation used to fill electricity demand.
118 The independent market monitor for PJM does not believe market power to be a significant problem in PJM, see
PJM (2006) pages 59-69 and 83-93. For this reason, the NOx price simulations assume that generating units engaged in
Bertrand competition and bid their marginal costs into the PJM markets. The capabilities of PowerWorld allow
exploration of the implications of market power and this is an opportunity for future research. For examples of work on
the interactions of market power and emissions in PJM see Mansur 2006a and 2006b. Mansur (2006a) found that the
exercise of market power in the PJM region leads to lower emissions and that, in this situation, a tradable permit system
is superior to a tax in terms of welfare effects. Mansur (2006b) also found that electricity restructuring and the
accompanying exercises of market power explained about one third of the emissions reductions observed when PJM
restructured in 1999 and when the NOx cap-and-trade program first took effect in the ozone transport region.
119 Ancillary services include spinning reserves, frequency control, voltage support, and black start services. For a more
complete description than that provided here, see generally Stoft 2005.
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Most power plants in the Eastern U.S. that participate in the seasonal NOx
programs also participate in one of three deregulated, or competitive, wholesale
electricity markets: the New England Power Pool, the New York Power Pool, or the PJM
Interconnect. 120 Although these power systems have unique characteristics, their basic
structures are similar and are important for analysis of past and potential behavior under
NOx cap-and-trade programs. All of the systems have "system operators" that coordinate
the balancing of supply and demand and the provision of ancillary services. The real-time
and day-ahead wholesale electricity markets in these regions use security constrained bid-
based dispatch auction mechanisms that yield locational prices for electricity (e.g.
Joskow 2006). The remainder of this subsection provides a brief explanation of these
concepts (for further detail see Hogan 1998, Stoft 2002, and Joskow 2006).
Bid-based economic dispatch refers to a system in which generating unit owners
bid cost curves to the system operator, who uses these curves to decide which generating
units to "dispatch" to fill demand while minimizing total system operating costs subject
to network and security constraints. A bid defines the minimum price at which a
generator will provide a quantity of power on an hourly basis. If the network constraints
allow, this process calls on generating units to provide power in "merit order": those with
the lowest bids are used first to fill demand. In a competitive market the bids reflect the
generating units' marginal costs of increasing output. The price of electricity is the cost to
supply the system with one more megawatt of power; in a competitive market this is the
marginal cost of the marginal generator - the generator that would be used to fill the next
increment of demand. A cap-and-trade program that places a price on emissions increases
a generating unit's costs and, under bid-based economic dispatch, the unit operator's bids
will presumably reflect the additional costs associated with emissions when a cap-and-
trade program is in place.
120 The latter was formerly the "Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland" power system but has expanded considerably
and is now referred to only as "PJM".
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A number of complications to the straightforward concept of economic dispatch
are important affect the potential short-term responses of power plants to a high NOx
price like that from a differentiated cap-and-trade program. For any given hour, economic
dispatch to meet electricity demand on a power network results in the transfer of
electricity between network nodes according to complex but well understood physical
laws. Thermal transmission constraints that limit the amount of power than can flow
across transmission equipment can prevent the system operator from implementing the
lowest cost dispatch. A transmission line, or other piece of equipment like a transformer,
becomes "congested" if the thermal limitations on the amount of power it can carry cause
generators to be dispatched out of merit order. In this case, a lower cost generator could
have provided more power if the transmission equipment was not constraining.
The related concept of locational marginal pricing assigns prices to the nodes of
the power network that reflect the costs imparted by congestion and losses as well as the
marginal costs of generation.'12 On a power network with no transmission constraints and
no physical losses, the generator with the lowest marginal cost can always fill an
increment of demand at any node and, as a result, all nodes on the network have the same
price for electricity. However, network congestion means that the lowest cost generator
cannot be used to fill an increment of demand at some nodes. The locational marginal
price of "import-constrained" nodes is higher to reflect the higher marginal cost of
generators needed to fill any additional demand at the nodes. Thus, prices at different
nodes on the network vary to account for the marginal cost of congestion and the
marginal cost of losses. The marginal costs of losses vary across the system because
losses themselves vary with the particular impedances of lines and transformers.
121 The wholesale electricity spot markets in New England and New York have included the marginal cost of losses in
locational prices for a number of years. The PJM Interconnection, which we focus on here, began including the
marginal cost of losses in its locational pricing mechanism in 2007 - after the 2005 summertime period studied here.
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System operators also consider security constraints in addition to physical
network constraints. A single contingency (e.g. line or power plant outage) can cause
cascading failures on a power network. To prevent catastrophic failure, system operators
use security-constrained dispatch: they operate the system to minimize the potential
impact of any major contingencies. For example, a contingency might be that the line
from A to B opens unexpectedly. If the line from A to B opens, the flows across the other
lines in the network change and the event could cause overflows or faults on other
equipment. A security-constrained economic dispatch that considered the contingency of
the line from A to B opening might minimize operating costs subject to the constraint that
if the line from A to B opened, no other overflows would occur. The system operators
consider sets of hundreds to thousands of contingencies.' 22
The redispatch simulations performed to estimate the flexibility to reduce NOx
emissions assume that if generating units' costs change so too will their bids and, if the
new costs change the merit-order of the generating units, the resulting security-
constrained economic dispatch will change as well. A new dispatch of generating units
will likely create a new set the binding network constraints (both thermal and
contingency). The new patterns of congestion and the increases in generators' marginal
costs due to the NOx price will be reflected in the locational marginal prices (LMP).
5.1.2. Simulating NOx Reductions from the Redispatch of Power Plants
The redispatch simulations were designed to account for the interactions between
generator marginal costs, congestion, and dispatch. The simplest simulations used a zonal
model to identify portions of the Classic PJM network that were reasonable
approximations of areas where the transmission system was capable of handling the
exchange of generation between units without causing congestion on the lines between
122 The PJM system operator, the largest of the three power systems, considers over 1000 contingencies: PJM, "FTR
Model Information," at http://www.pim.com/markets/ftr/model-info.htmi.
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zones or severely altering flows on these lines. That is, the analysis identified
interconnected zones of generating units that could be considered good physical
substitutes for each other during the ozone season of 2005. Substitution between zones
was assumed to be infeasible if it required increasing power flows from one zone to
another zone where network constraints were binding.
There has been a debate in the academic literature over the relative merits of zonal
and nodal pricing systems (e.g. Stoft 1997 and Hogan 1999). The literature shows that the
complexities caused by flows over parallel lines in electricity networks, and the
variations in those flows over time due to fluctuating demand, make it difficult to create
consistent zones by collecting nodes that have the same or similar LMPs (Stoft 1997).
But the zonal model captured many of the details of the Classic PJM power system
important for estimating potential NOx reductions - like the actual emission rates of
generating units in PJM and the locations of generation and of congested lines - while
using only publicly available data and a relatively simple characterization of the topology
of the transmission network.
PowerWorld's OPF and SCOPF capabilities were used to capture a richer
characterization of network power flows and constraints. The model used power flow
bases cases parameterized to match the classical PJM network as a second method to
estimate the physical capabilities to reduce NOx emissions. This model provided a more
refined account of the physical complexities, constraints, contingencies and parallel flows
on the network. However, despite this method's ability to model nodal prices, the
parameters of the network used in this model also change in time due to fluctuating
demand. Any feasible representation of an electric power system will not capture how its
electrical properties change in real time with patterns and levels of utilization and with
ambient conditions.
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5.1.3. Construction of the Zonal Model
Publicly available data on the PJM transmission system1 23 - on the name, type
(e.g. generator, load), and voltage of each bus and the buses to which each connects -
were used to create an abstract representation of the PJM system, or a network graph. 124
The network graph represents the substations, as nodes, and the inter-substation
transmission lines, as arcs, between the nodes. Substations were defined broadly as
closely connected collections of electrical equipment. Examples are a power plant with
multiple generators and transformers, multiple power plants, or a switching station.
The data were matched by substation name into a system that includes over 900
nodes and over 8500 connecting lines. The substation names, voltages, and equipment
were used to match the generators in the EPA's Continuous Emissions Monitoring
System (CEMS) to the nodes. 12 5 Hourly generating unit operation data, like heat input,
generation, and emissions, are available from the CEMS data. These data are available
for fossil fuel-fired generating units with rated capacities of at least 15 or 25 MW,
depending on the state. The same EPA website houses data on the characteristics of
emission sources like their location, technology type (e.g. dry bottom wall-fired boiler),
types of fuel burned, the sources' emission control technologies, and when they installed
these control technologies. Less detailed data on the rated capacities of other types of
generating units (e.g. nuclear, hydro, and municipal waste) and smaller units are available
from the Energy Information Association (EIA). 126
123 PJM, "Transmission Facilities," available at http:i/www.pim.comiservices/transm-facilities.isp.
124 Network graphs are used in the mathematical field of graph theory, computer science, and social network theory.
They are abstractions that model pairwise relationships between objects using nodes (e.g substations) and "edges",
"arcs", or "lines" (in this case transmission lines). For other applications of network theory to electric power systems
see Watts (1998).
125 See Environmental Protection Agency's Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) (unit generation and
heat input data) and data on emissions and characteristics of regulated sources at http:/ictf]ub.epa.pov/igdm/.
126 See EIA "Form EIA-860 Database: Annual Electric Generator Report," available at
htttTp://www.eia.doe.gov/cneiaf'electricitv/pae/eia860.html.
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Using these publicly available data sources, approximately 49.1 GW of fossil
fuel-fired capacity (rated summertime capacity) in the EIA's database of existing
capacity were matched to the appropriate substation in the PJM network graph. The 2005
PJM State of the Market Report states that there were about 50.6 GW of fossil capacity in
PJM in 2005 (PJM 2006); the matching process covers about 97% of the fossil capacity
in PJM. Of the 49.1 GW capacity in the EIA database, about 96% of it (47.2 GW) reports
emission data to the EPA's CEMS database. In all this yielded detailed data on the
emissions from about 93% of the fossil fuel-fired capacity in PJM.
Two criteria were used to create zones in the PJM network within which
congestion rarely occurred. In its State of the Market Report, PJM discusses the impact of
frequently congested lines on market concentration (PJM 2006). For 2005, it lists
thirteen transmission lines and transformers that were congested for over 100 hours in
2005. In addition, the State of the Market Report discusses three other lines and one other
transformer that were frequently congested in 2004. The first criterion used to identify
zones within PJM was that these 17 lines must be located on the borders between zones
and not within the zones.
The second criterion used historical hourly locational marginal price (LMP) data
to define zones and created smaller zones than the first criterion alone. Hourly LMP and
zonal demand data for PJM are available on the PJM website and were matched to the
network graph. 127 The second criterion was that the standard deviation of the LMP's
within each zone was less than $10/MWh for at least 90% of a sample of 144
summertime hours in 2005. This criterion was selected because differences in LMP of
less than $10/MWh rarely indicate congestion; more typically, they indicate other
127 PJM website "Real Time" energy market data at http://www.pim.com/markets/energv-market/real-ime.htm I.
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differences in marginal cost between nodes. 12 8 Additionally, the zonal model was
designed to capture only the most frequent patterns of congestion, not every pattern that
occurred. Many of the identified zones easily met the LMP criterion. For example, in the
largest zone of 117 nodes, the standard deviation of LMPs was less than $5/MWh in 90%
of the hours and less than $10/MWh in 98% of hours.
These two criteria created 35 zones with between 117 and 4 nodes in each. The
network graph was then used to match generating unit emissions and generation data to
the zones. This matching allowed estimation of the potential reductions in NOx from
redispatch while taking account of the constraints caused by the most frequent patterns of
network congestion in 2005. To estimate the maximum potential NOx reductions, or the
technical upper bound on NOx reductions from redispatch, NOx emissions from the fossil
fuel-fired generating units in Classic PJM were minimized subject to five constraints for
each hour of analysis:
1. Total generation from the generators was held constant.
2. The generation from any unit operating in the hour could only be reduced to
20% of its rated capacity; not to zero.
3. Only combustion turbine units could "turn on", all other units remained off if
they did not generate in the hour. Generating units could produce power up to
100% of rated summer capacity. 129
4. The total generation from all the generating units in zones on the high-LMP
side of congested lines and transformers could not decrease.
5. The total generation from all the generating units in zones on the low-LMP
sides of congested lines and transformers could not increase.
128 PJM lists both LMPs and data on "real time constraints" or "transmission limits". The LMPs between nodes often
vary up to $30/MWh without the line between those nodes being listed as a constraint. See "PJM Operational Data" at
http://www.pim.com/pub/account/lm2penilmppost.html or "Real Time Transmission Constraints 1998-2005" at
http://www.pinm.com/markets/enerav-market!real-time.html.
129 The summer rated capacities used in these simulations do not reflect forced outages. In PJM for 2005, the demand
equivalent forced outage rate was about 7.3% (PJM 2006). The forced outage rates are not available for the summer
months when high electricity prices provide an extra incentive for plants to be available and operational. The fact that
some plants might not be able to turn on or up to 100% of their capacities makes estimates that do not account for
outage rates optimistic. We include some simulations that account for annual average forced outage rates. These
estimates are slightly restrictive because summertime forced outage rates tend to be lower than the annual rates.
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The second of these constraints reflected the high start-up costs that prevent some
generators from being turned off often and it also maintained levels of operating reserves.
The third reflects the time and costs associated with start-up for units other than
combustion turbines, which can start quickly. The fourth constraint was necessary
because a decrease in the net generation from units on the high-LMP side of a constraint
would cause an increase in the power flowing over a congested line. Similarly, the fifth
constraint was necessary because increasing the net share of power from units on the low-
LMP side of a constraint would necessitate an increase in the power flowing over the
congested line. It is possible, however, to increase the generation from units on the high-
LMP side of a congested line while reducing that from the generators on the low-LMP
side. This would decrease the flow of power over that line (i.e. create counterflow),
thereby relieving congestion.
An additional assumption used in this analysis was that the NOx rates for the units
generating electricity in a given hour did not change from those observed in that hour,
regardless of any changes in the quantity generated by that unit or changes in the
utilization of NOx control equipment or changes in combustion attributes. If the unit was
not initially operating in an hour, its NOx emissions were estimated based on its average
NOx rate for the hours between May 1 st and September 3 0 th, 2005. This assumption is
likely to underestimate the potential NOx reductions because the emission rates of many
coal units decrease with decreasing utilization and generators have some flexibility to
vary NOx emissions rates in the short run (Chapter 4).
The zonal model was used to estimate NOx reductions for a 24-hour diurnal
period between August 3 rd, 2005 at 2pm and August 4 th , 2005 at 2pm as well as for
various other hours during the summer of 2005. Three variations of the analysis also
tested the impact of the five constraints listed above on the results. First, relaxing the
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fourth and fifth constraints estimated the "unconstrained" case: the potential NOx
reductions if network constraints were not a factor. In the second variation, the capacities
of generating units were derated by the forced outage rate for PJM in 2005 (about 7.3%,
see PJM 2006). Last, the most restricted case strengthened the third constraint by
redispatching only the unused ("excess") capacity of generating units that were already
operating in each hour to estimate potential NOx reductions (i.e. no generating units were
"turned on").
The zonal analysis has three major limitations. First, it does not consider new
network overloads that the redispatch of generating units might cause. Second, it does not
consider the loop flows at the borders of zones that might require units on the either side
of a constraint to increase or decrease their output in order to avoid an increase in the
flow over a congested line. Third, it does not consider contingency constraints. The
second method using a security constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) model of the
PJM network, described immediately below, helps to address these issues.
5.1.4. Security Constrained Optimal Power Flow with PowerWorld
Simulator@
PowerWorld Simulator contains a security constrained optimal power flow
(SCOPF) analysis package that can solve power flows for large electricity systems while
optimally dispatching generators and enforcing transmission limits, interface limits, and
contingency constraints.130 PowerWorld was used to simulate how a range of uniform
NOx permit prices for Classic PJM, incorporated into linear cost curves for generators,
changed the security constrained economic dispatch of those generators. This exercise
130 PowerWorld uses a full Newton-Raphson AC load flow algorithm or a DC approximation to solve the power flow.
The optimal power flow capability simulates economic dispatch by iterating between solving the power flow and
minimizing total system operating cost, using generator cost-curves, while enforcing system constraints like line and
generator operating limits. Thus, the security constrained optimal power flow simulates economic dispatch while
enforcing both normal operating limits and ensuring that there are no operating limit violations during specified
contingencies (PowerWorld Corporation at http://www.powenrworld.com/). For more explanation of the widely used
algorithms behind optimal power flow models such as PowerWorld Simulator see, for example, Sun et. al. (1984).
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also estimated the NOx prices needed to achieve a range of NOx reductions up to the
maximum level (i.e. when further increases in NOx prices caused little additional
reductions). This analysis provided a measure of the physical capability to alter NOx
emissions from redispatch, estimated the NOx prices required to induce different levels of
NOx emissions through redispatch of generating units.
"Base-case" or "solved" power flow models are one way to convey information
about the network elements in a power system. Base-case power flows include data like
the voltages and impedances of the elements in a power network as well as characteristics
of power plants and loads. The information can either be very detailed or highly
aggregated. The base-case power flows also include predetermined power injections at
generator nodes and power withdrawals at load nodes. Base-case power flows are
typically specified for a season or month because the characteristics of equipment change
with ambient temperature. The voltages and impedances, and the implied physical limits,
of the network equipment represent the network for the specified load level and ambient
conditions. This information allows a program like PowerWorld simulator to solve for
the power flows across the network.
Adding generator cost and capacity information to a base-base power flow
enables optimal power flow simulations, which minimized total cost of operating the
power system subject to network and security constraints. In the Classic PJM
simulations, the variable costs of the power plants were represented by linear cost curves
(i.e. constant marginal cost curves). 13 1 The linear cost curves were defined simply by
incorporating NOx emissions as an addition fuel cost:
ci ($/MWh) = Hi(pfi + PniNi) + O&Mi
131 The generation and load in areas of PJM outside the Classic PJM footprint were held constant between the base case
and the "redispatched" cases. The generation and load in the areas surrounding the larger PJM were zero in the base
case and subsequent cases; thus imports and exports to and from PJM as a whole were assumed to be zero.
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where, for each generating unit i, Hi is its heat rate (mmBTU/MWh), pt, is the price of
fuel ($/mmBTU), Pni is the price of NOx permits ($/ton), Ni is the unit's NOx emission
rate in (tons/mmBTU), and O&Mi is the unit's variable O&M costs in ($/MWh). For
each level of demand and NOx price, the units were "dispatched" in order of least cost
according to these cost curves. The NOx price was applied uniformly to all units in PJM
and was varied between $2000/ton and $125,000/ton. 132
Data on the average delivered cost of fuel for natural gas, coal, petroleum
products, and petroleum coke delivered to the electricity sector from the EIA's Electric
Power Monthly for August 2005 were used to generate the cost curves. These data were
matched to the generating units by state and fuel. The variable O&M data were from the
Annual Energy Outlook for 2006 matched roughly by technology type and fuel.' 33 The
EPA CEMS provided data on 2005 ozone-season heat rates and NOx emission rates.
As in the zonal model, we compared the NOx emissions resulting from three
cases: 1) an "unconstrained" case where the generation from units in Classic PJM was
dispatched economically without enforcing network constraints, 2) the constrained case
(optimal power flow "OPF") in which the network constraints, like line limits, were
enforced, and 3) the security constrained case in which both network and contingency
limits were enforced (security constrained optimal power flow "SCOPF"). In this way,
the PowerWorld analysis complemented the zonal analysis, which did not address
security constraints or whether redispatch created new congestion. To mimic the zonal
analysis, we designated only combustion turbine units as "fast start" generators. This
meant that the dispatch algorithms could turn on combustion turbines, but could only
increase or decrease the output of all other units. As in the zonal analysis, we constrained
the generation from all initially operating units to be at least 20% of their capacity and
132 In August of 2005 these prices were around $2500/ton. Prices are currently about $1000/ton.
133 (U.S. EIA 2006b) Table 38, page 77 and EIA's Electric Power Monthly, Tables 4-10 through 4-13, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneafielectricit,'/epm/epm ex bkis.html.
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units could generate up to 100% of their summertime rated capacities. We also held the
generation from all units outside Classic PJM and imports and exports constant.
Two base-case power flow models were obtained to simulate Classic PJM and
each contained different data. The PJM Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) base-case
power flows contain nodal loads and power injections for average levels of demand for
hours in different months. 134 They do not include detailed information about generator
capacities or NOx rates, only that the generators existed at certain buses and that some
produced a given amount of power in the modeled hour. Also, the generating unit
identifiers in the PJM FTR model and the EPA and EIA capacity and NOx rate data are
not the same so matching the EPA and EIA data with the correct buses in the FTR model
was a challenge and required some assumptions (see Appendix D). The model
information for the FTR power flows includes a list of contingency (or security)
constraints that PJM considers.' 35
The FTR base case power flows simulated hours with average electricity demand,
around 38 GW in Classic PJM, which was typically in Classic PJM during nighttime
hours in hottest parts of the summer.' 36 NOx reductions in nighttime hours may be
important for ozone formation because, for example, winds can transport nighttime NOx
emissions to highly populated areas where ozone can form during the day. The
integration of this work with atmospheric chemistry models will eventually show whether
NOx emission reductions during nighttime or daytime hours will most effectively reduce
ozone concentrations.
134 The PJM FTR base-case power flows are available at PJM, "FTR Model Information,"
http://www.pim.com/markets/ftr/model-info.html. These cases are available publicly to participants in the PJM
wholesale markets but require a password, which was obtained from PJM.
'35 About 1600 of the 4300 contingencies apply to Classic PJM, but the system operator does not always enforce all of
them, see PJM's information on Contingencies at http://www.pim.com/mnarkets/energv-market/Imp-contingencies.html.
136 For the analyses reported in this paper, we used the Annual FTR load flow case that PJM posted in February 2007
and the monthly FTR load flow case posted in July 2006.
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Daytime electricity demand, however, is typically higher with peak electricity
demand reaching about 60 GW in Classic PJM in 2005. It is important to simulate
potential NOx reductions in peak demand hours because the higher demand requires
more complete utilization of generating units. If the generating units with low NOx
emission rates were fully utilized to meet demand there would be little flexibility to
reduce emissions. In addition, if demand were higher in areas with little generation, or
with only costly generation, then higher demand would increase the likelihood of
congested transmission lines. If the low-NOx generation were also located far from high-
demand areas then network constraints could similarly limit NOx reduction potential. In
order to simulate high demand conditions, the PJM FTR model was scaled to
approximate the higher demand hours studied with the zonal model and the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Multiregional Modeling Working
Group (MMWG) base-case power flow models were obtained through a Freedom of
Information Act filing with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Three scaled cases were developed that had similar levels of total demand, fossil
generation, and NOx emissions as those observed in historical peak demand hours in
Classic PJM. The first of these cases mimicked the historical LMP patterns observed on
August 4th at 2pm ("Matched LMPs"). The Matched LMPs case started with two binding
constraints in the security constrained optimal power flow. In the second case, the nodal
load data were altered until there were 9 initially binding constraints, four of which PJM
reported as active on August 4 th at 2 pm ("Constraints"). In the third case, there were six
initially binding constraints and one of these was observed on August 4th at 2pm. In
addition, the Classic PJM fossil units generated 37 GW and emitted 39 tons of NOx in
this base case ("High Fossil Gen"). In the Matched LMP and Constraints cases the initial
generation was 34 GW and initial NOx was 38 tons. On August 4 th at 2pm these fossil
units generated 35 GW and produced 38 tons of NOx. The High Fossil Gen case better
replicated the observed initial NOx emissions than the other two cases although the initial
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generation was higher. It also provided a conservative estimate of potential NOx
reductions because by requiring more generation from the fossil units - there was less
under-utilized generation available for redispatch. In addition, the fossil units in Classic
PJM also initially generated 37 GW in the highest demand MMWG case (the "Summer"
case, discussed below) and the units emitted 43 tons of NOx. Comparisons between the
MMWG Summer case and FTR cases use the High Fossil Gen case for this reason.
The MMWG cases were simpler to use because they did not require scaling. Four
cases were used. In the summer case the total electricity demand in Classic PJM was
about 59 GW. In the fall and spring cases Classic PJM demand was about 41 GW and 40
GW respectively and in the "low load" case it was about 24 GW. The MMWG cases also
contained more information on the capacities of generating units as well as information
on how the generators corresponded to the EIA's database of generating units, which still
required matching to the EPA's database. The MMWG cases did not include information
on contingencies and used different bus numbers and a slightly different network
aggregation (or network topology) compared to the FTR cases. The MMWG cases
contain information on the entire Eastern Interconnection including the power systems of
New York and New England. PowerWorld was used to build an "equivalent" network
that contained only the Classic PJM and "electrically equivalent" but simpler
approximations of the surrounding systems (see Overbye et al. 2004 for another example
of using an "equivalenced" system). The imports and exports to and from Classic PJM
from the approximated adjoining systems were held constant in the simulations.
For the PowerWorld simulations the DC approximation to the AC load flow was
utilized. Both the AC and DC methods solve for the power flows over the network, but
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the former does not consider reactive power flows or line losses. 137 The literature
suggests that DC SCOPF is sufficient for most economic analyses of electricity networks.
Schweppe et al. (1988) proposed the DC load flow as a tool for economic analysis.
Overbye et al. (2004) analyzed the accuracy-tractability trade off between using the full
AC load flow and the DC SCOPF for LMP studies for the 13,000-bus model of the
Midwest U.S. transmission grid. They found that DC SCOPF performed reasonably well:
although the power flows were not identical, the DC method identified very similar
patterns of constraints and the average LMP only differed by about $2.40/MWh (lower in
the DC case). The DC approximation found that some lines were only about 99% loaded
while the AC load flow found them to be congested, causing the observed difference in
LMPs. Given this finding, any inaccuracies resulting from the use of a DC approximation
are likely overshadowed by the use of linear cost curves, the choice only to model Classic
PJM and not the entirety of the PJM network, matching the generators to the FTR case
buses, and the necessity of scaling the FTR cases to represent peak demand conditions.
5.2. Results and Discussion
Three characteristics of a power system create the flexibility to reduce NOx
emissions (or emissions in generally) through redispatch (herein "NOx flexibility"). First,
for redispatch to be possible at all requires the existence of under- or unutilized
generating capacity. Second, NOx reductions may be possible if some of the
underutilized capacity burns natural gas because natural gas units tend to have lower NOx
emission rates than coal and oil units. Third, if the NOx rates of generators within the
same fuel category differ and the low NOx generation is underutilized then the redispatch
of these units could reduce NOx emissions. The characteristics of capacity, generation,
and NOx emissions Classic PJM suggest that flexibility to reduce NOx through
137 According to Overbye et al. 2004, the major simplifications of the DC power flow are that it 1) ignores the reactive
power balance equations, 2) assumes identical voltage magnitudes of one per unit, 3) ignores line losses, and 4) ignores
tap dependence in the transformer reactances.
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redispatch may be available and the simulations were designed to test whether network
constraints limit this potential. The following subsections discuss the results: first,
estimates of the maximum technical potential for NOx reductions by redispatch in PJM
and second, estimates of the magnitude of the NOx prices needed to achieve various
levels of NOx reduction up to that maximum. Because of the temporal- and locational-
variations in the impact of NOx emissions on ozone formation, the results are presented
in terms of their temporal and locational characteristics. Comparisons of zonal and
PowerWorld simulations are also discussed.
5.2.1. Relevant Background Characteristics of PJM
Both demand and fossil fuel-fired generation in PJM and in Classic PJM were
highest during the ozone season (May through September). Table 5-1 displays the
average and maximum hourly demand in PJM in 2005 during the ozone season and
during the non-ozone season months. The table also shows the average and maximum
hourly generation from the fossil-fired generating units used in the simulations ("371
units in Classic PJM"). 138 The maximum-demand hour for all of PJM in 2005 occurred
on August 3 rd at 5 pm. The demand of about 116 GW in that hour, not including the
Duquesne Light Company (DUQ) Control Zone, was about 1.6 times that of the average
demand in PJM during the ozone season of 2005. The maximum-demand hour for Classic
PJM occurred on July 27 th at 4 pm with demand of also about 1.6 times that of the
average demand in Classic PJM in the ozone season of 2005.
The average hourly NOx emissions from the units in Classic PJM in 2005 were
about 20 tons per hour (Table 5-1). The maximum hourly NOx emissions in 2005 did not
occur during the ozone season in 2005, but occurred in January when the cap-and-trade
program for NOx was not in effect.
138 Our simulations do not model the further possibilities of exchanging hydro or nuclear power for fossil generation -
although for nuclear we would expect the possibilities to be small as most nuclear plants are typically run near their full
capacity in most hours.
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Table 5-1 Average and Maximum demand in PJM and Classic PJM and Fossil Fuel-
Fired Generation and Emissions in Classic PJM.
Hourly Data, Ozone- Off-
2005 Season Season Annual
PJI Demand avg 74 68 71
max 116 97 116 (GW)
Classic P3M avg 36 32 33 (GW)
Demand max 59 46 59
Classic PJM avg 19 16 18 (GW)
Fossil max* 36 26 35
Classic P3M avg 19.6 30.0 25.7
NOx Emissions max* 44.7 46.2 46.2
ADoes not include the DUQ control area that joined PJM May 1, 2005
*Max from the highest demand hour in Classic PJM in 2005 in the ozone season
(7/27/05 16:00) and non-ozone season (1/18/05 19:00) respectively
While total generation in the summer peak hour in Classic PJM was about 28%
higher (13 GW) than at the winter peak, the summer peak NOx emissions were slightly
lower, 45 tons in contrast to 46 tons during the winter peak. The increased use of natural
gas-fired generation to meet the higher levels of summertime demand can partially
explain this: on average, natural gas-fired generators filled about 16% of hourly summer
demand but only 10% of hourly demand in the winter. In addition, the average emission
rate of coal-fired generation was about 2.15 lbs/MWh in the ozone season and about 4
lbs/MWh outside the ozone season in 2005. The ozone season NOx price likely explains
this lower ozone season emission rate for coal-fired units because, in the absence of a
price on NOx, the NOx emission rates of coal-fired units would be higher in the summer
because emission rates increase with utilization and because of the increased use of less
efficient units to fill the higher peak demand.
An important feature of Classic PJM (and all electricity systems in the U.S.) is
that even during the hours of the highest peaks in demand, there is generating capacity
that is in some form of reserve status and not actually generating electricity. This is the
first reason to expect that NOx reductions through redispatch might be possible. Table
5-2 shows the capacity of the 371 fossil fuel-fired generating units that the simulations
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redispatched. The total capacity of these units was about 46 GW (or 42 GW if de-rated by
the annual forced outage rate for PJM in 2005). 139 The maximum hourly generation from
these units during 2005 was about 36 GW, leaving about 6 to 10 GW of capacity that was
not generating electricity in the peak hour. Some of this remaining capacity was
providing spinning, non-spinning, and supplemental reserve margins for reliability
purpose. The simulations assume that units with higher NOx emission rates that were
generating electricity during the peak hours could be exchanged for lower NOx units in
these reserves, at least for short periods of time.
Table 5-2 Capacity and Generation by Fuel-Type in Classic PJM during the 2005 Ozone Season.
Hourly Data, Ozone Coal Natural Gas 011 TOTALSeason 2005
Capacity rated 21 15 10 46
unforcedA 19 14 9 42 (GW)
Generation avg 15 3.0 1.6 19
max* 18 10 8.2 36
NOx Emissions avg 15.8 1.2 2.6 19.6 (Tons)
max* 20.2 6.9 17.6 44.7
NOx Emission avg 2.15 0.78 3.19 2.02 (Ibs/
Rates max* 2.24 1.37 4.29 2.46 MWh)
Fuel Category Designations from the EPA's Clean Air Markets Database
*Max from the highest demand hour in Classic PJM In 2005 in the ozone
season (7/27/05 16:00)
ADerated by the equivalent demand forced outage rate for PJM in 2005 (7.3%)
(PJM 2006)
Table 5-2 also shows that a mix of fuels were used to generate electricity in
Classic PJM and that natural gas generation had the lowest average NOx rate, about half
the average for coal-fired generation. Moreover, and the second reason to expect NOx
flexibility, natural gas-fired capacity represented the largest portion of the unutilized
capacity (for both peak and average hours). This likely occurred because the bid-based,
security constrained economic dispatch utilized the highest marginal cost units last and
139 Since the annual forced outage rate may be too restrictive, as noted earlier (infra note 129), the range is presented in
Table 2.
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natural gas-fired units tend to have the highest marginal costs due to natural gas prices
(which were particularly high in 2005). For all fuel-types, the generation dispatched to
fill peak demand had a higher NOx rate than that dispatched to fill average demand. This
is as expected since there is no differentiation in NOx pricing between peak and other
summer hours and the units pressed into service during peak hours are typically those of
all fuel types with lower efficiency (higher heat rates).
For a high NOx permit price to cause redispatch that reduces NOx emissions in a
given hour, unutilized capacity that is available to generate must have a lower NOx rate
than the original generation used to fill demand. The graphs in Figure 5-1 show
cumulative distributions over NOx emission rate of the generation used to fill demand
and the remaining capacity in Classic PJM on August 4t , 2005 at 2 pm (one of the
highest demand hours in PJM during 2005). The median NOx emission rate for this hour
was 2.2 lbs/MWh for all units and for coal-fired units. The graphs show that about 42%
and 34% of the remaining, undispatched capacity for fossil fuel-fired and coal-fired units,
respectively, had a lower NOx rate than the median for the units used to fill demand in
that hour. This provides the third reason to expect NOx flexibility.
Inn nClassic P3M 1uuAll Units
75S
50
34
- Generation 25
2:2 - Undispatched Capacity
0
Classic PJM
Coal Units
- Generation
- Undispatched Capacity2.2
0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 4 6 8 10
NOx Rate (lbs/MWh) NOx Rate (Ibs/MWh)
Figure 5-1 Cumulative distributions of generation and undispatched capacity over NOx Rate in Classic
PJM on August 4"t , 2005 at 2pm. The graph on the left shows fossil fuel generating units in Classic PJM
and that on the right shows only coal units. If a heat rate of 10 mmBTU/MWh is assumed, these NOx
emissions rates translate to the equivalent NOx emission rate in lbs/mmBTU by dividing by a factor of 10.
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This result is fairly consistent across other hours and levels of demand. In hours
with lower demand, the median NOx rate of the units that were generating electricity was
slightly higher and that of the undispatched capacity was slightly lower. The availability
of relatively low-NOx capacity, even in high demand hours, suggests that redispatch
could reduce NOx emissions if the economic incentives to do so were in place and
network constraints did not prevent the utilization of the lower-NOx rate generation.
5.2.2. Temporal Variation in Potential NOx Reductions
The potential NOx reductions from redispatch vary in time primarily because the
total demand for electricity, and the pattern of the demand on the network, varies
diurnally and according to the weather. 140 Table 5-3 reports the generation, emissions,
and simulated NOx "reductions" using the zonal model for the 24 hours preceding the
peak demand hour of 2005 in PJM, August 4th at 2pm. The range of total hourly
generation for the units we considered in Classic PJM was from about 19 GW per hour,
which occurred during the middle of the night, to 35 GW on August 4th at 2pm. The
range of initial hourly NOx emissions was between about 19 and 38 tons. The reductions
ranged from about 6.1 tons (17%) during the day to 8.4 tons (about 35%) in early
morning and late night hours for the transmission constrained estimates (labeled
"Transmission"). 14 1 Larger reductions should be possible at night because the network is
typically less constrained and less capacity is utilized during the lower demand hours.
140 There will also be some variation due to planned maintenance of facilities, which will be scheduled primarily for
other than the peak summer demand season.
141 Since natural gas prices were high during the summer of 2005, observed emissions, and therefore the simulated
reductions, might have been higher than in a more normal year. For comparison, we looked at a peak demand hour of
2001 when natural gas prices were much lower. During this hour, there were about 31 GW of fossil generation in
Classic PJM (vice 35 during the peak-hour in 2005) and 51 tons of NOx emissions (vice 38 tons). The potential
unconstrained NOx reductions were about 16 tons or 32%. Both the initial emissions and NOx reductions were higher
in the 2001 peak-hour than in the near-peak hour in 2005 with the same level of fossil generation (e.g. 8/3/05 20:00);
however, the percent reduction was about the same.
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Table 5-3 Potential Reductions in NOx Emissions from Redispatch in Classic PJM using the Zonal Model.
Zonal Model Simulations of Maximum Potential NOx Reductions
Base Case Unconstrained Transmission 'Unforced CapacityA Only "ON" Units
Date Generation NOx Reduction % Reduction % Reduction %i Reduction %
8/3/05 14:00 33 35 7.0 20 6.6 19 6.5 18 6.0 17
8/3/05 18:00 33 35 9.2 26 6.1 17 7.4 21 6.1 17
8/3/05 22:00 26 26 10.8 42 6.9 27 9.2 36 6.5 25
8/4/05 2:00 19 19 7.8 42 7.6 41 9.8 52 3.9 21
8/4/05 6:00 23 23 8.6 37 8.4 36 9.3 40 4.5 19
8/4/05 10:00 31 28 7.2 25 6.9 24 6.7 24 4.5 16
8/4/05 14:00 35 38 8.2 21 8.0 21 7.5 20 7.1 19
(GW) (Tons) (Tons) (%) (Tons) (%) (Tons) (%) (Tons) (%)
^ Capacities were derated by the 2005 demand equivalent forced outage rate for PJM of 7.3% (PJM 2006).
Two additional series of simulations are reported in Table 5-3 in the columns
labeled "unforced capacity" and "Only 'ON' units." Both were intended to represent
plausible restrictions on the potential to switch generating units that were additional to
transmission constraints. In the former, the summertime rated capacities of all generating
units were multiplied by a factor of one minus the forced outage rate of PJM in 2005 to
represent the possibility that all capacity may not be available at a level of 100% in all
hours.142 The last column represents the case where the low NOx-emitting units that
could substitute for higher NOx emitting units were limited to those providing spinning
reserve services. Of these two further limitations, restricting the pool of exchangeable
units to operating units with unused capacity in spinning reserves has the greater effect.
Moreover, this effect is significantly greater during non-peak hours than in peak hours.
Or, stated differently, most of the NOx-reducing substitution capability during peak hours
comes from units in spinning reserve while most of that during non-peak hours is from
units that are not generating at those times.
The available load flow cases restricted the PowerWorld simulations to "generic"
hours with different demand, generation, and congestion characteristics (rather than for a
series of hours). The results agreed reasonably well with those from the zonal model,
142 PJM (2006), page 244, states that the forced outage rate for PJM in 2005 was 7.3% for all generating units. This
rate does vary by type of generating unit (steam units have the highest outage rate and combined cycles the lowest of
the fossil-fuel fired units). In this analysis, the capacities of all generating units were scaled by a factor of 0.927.
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although the zonal simulations tended to be slightly optimistic compared to the
PowerWorld simulations. Table 5-4 shows PowerWorld optimal power flow results for
high NOx prices of $125,000/ton for cases with varying levels of demand and generation
from the set of redispatched fossil units. NOx prices above $100,000/ton caused only
small additional reductions in NOx emissions (see Table 5-7). In Table 5-4 the base case
was the result of OPF dispatch with assumed NOx prices of $2000/ton (indicated by
"2k") to roughly represent the observed NOx prices of between 2000 and 3000 $/ton in
the summer of 2005. (The security constraints (SCOPF simulations) did not alter the
magnitude of potential reductions but did cause two tons of additional base-case NOx
emissions - see Table 5-6.)
Table 5-4 suggests that the maximum physical reductions depend on the initial
levels and patterns of demand and are between about 6 and 8 tons hourly (between about
13% and 30%) in Classic PJM. The MMWG cases yielded the most conservative
estimates of the potential NOx reductions of about 6 tons per hour.
Table 5-4 Potential Reductions in NOx Emissions from Redispatch in Classic PJM using
PowerWorld optimal power flow.
PowerWorld Simulations of Maximum Potential NOx Reductions
Base Case Unconstrained Trans. Const.
Generation NOx Reduction % Reduction %
Matched LMP 34 35 8.2 23 8.0 23
Peak Constraints 34 35 7.4 21 7.2 21
Demand High Fossil Gen 37 39 7.5 19 6.4 16
MMWG Summer 37 43 5.9 14 5.8 13
Avg Demand 19 20 12 60 12 60
Averagend Low MMWG Low Demand 14 16 6.9 43 6.9 43
Demand MMWG Spring 24 28 7.5 27 7.5 27
MMWG Fall 23 26 7.7 30 7.7 30
Comparable zonal and PowerWorld cases are the peak MMWG Summer case and
August 4th at 2pm and the average MMWG Fall case and August 4th at 6am. The
generation in the two peak cases was slightly different (37 GW in the MMWG Summer
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case compared to 35 GW on Augst 4t at 2pm). The potential reductions in the MWMG
case were only about 6 tons (from 43 tons) compared to 8 tons in the zonal model
simulations (from 38 tons). The NOx reductions represented a change in average
emission rate by 13% (from 2.3 to about 2.0 lbs/MWh) in the MMWG Summer case and
by about 18% (from 2.2 to about 1.8 lbs/MWh) in the zonal simulation of August 4" at
2pm. The generation in both the average cases (MMWG Fall case and August 4 th at 6am)
was 23 GW. The zonal simulation reduced NOx emissions by 8.4 tons (from 23 tons)
compared to 7.7 tons in the MMWG Fall case (from 26 tons initially). The reduction in
initial average NOx emission rate was 35% in the zonal simulation (from 2.0 to 1.3
lbs/MWh) and 30% in the MMWG Fall simulation (from 2.3 to 1.6 lbs/MWh). The zonal
simulations were slightly optimistic compared to the PowerWorld simulations (this is
discussed further in the Section 5.2.4).
Recent actions taken in the OTC States suggests that the magnitude of potential
NOx reductions from redispatch is nontrivial. A recent OTC Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) signals an intention by the signatory states to reduce emissions on
high electricity demand days. 143 Four of the signatory states are in the Classic PJM region
and the MOU requires these states to make total daily NOx reductions of about 72 tons
on high electricity demand days, an average of 3 tons per hour over a 24-hour period.144
Given that 6 tons of reductions are available from redispatch in the highest demand
hours, the potential reductions from redispatch are about twice the targets for reducing
NOx emissions.
143 The states agreed to make the reductions beginning in 2009 and no later than 2012. See, OTC's "Memorandum of
Understanding Among the States of the Ozone Transport Commission Concerning the Incorporation of High Electrical
Demand Day Emission Reduction Strategies into Ozone Attainment State Implementation Planning," March 2, 2007.
The MOU does not fully define a high electricity demand day, but some related analysis suggests that these are the
days on which the high demand requires peaking units that typically generate in less that 10% of annual hours to
generate power (NESCAUM 2006)
144 The four signatory states that are in the Classic PJM area are DE, MD, NJ, and PA. The other signatory states are
CT and NY.
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A major difference between the FTR and MMWG cases was the pattern of the
loads on the network. The locations of the loads on the network partially determine which
generators are dispatched to fill them because of transmission constraints. Even if the
overall magnitude of the demand is the same in two cases, different generators might be
dispatched to fill them and this causes differences in NOx emissions. For example, the
same set of fossil units generated 37 GW in the "High Fossil Gen" FTR case and in the
MMWG Summer case, but the NOx emissions in the "High Fossil Gen" base case were
39 tons compared to 43 tons in the MMWG Summer case. Because the units have the
same NOx emission rates in both cases, this demonstrates that different units were
initially dispatched to fill demand in each case due to differences in the patterns of
demand on the network. The resulting redispatch and potential NOx emissions were also
different as a result. The scaling process exaggerated provided, at best, a rough
approximation of nodal peak load patterns in the FTR cases so the MMWG summer case
is likely more representative of peak demand conditions in Classic PJM. Notably, more
lines were congested in the FTR simulations with the scaled loads (6 lines in the "High
Fossil Gen" case) compared to the MMWG Summer case (only 2 lines) with the same
total demand characteristics. This suggests that "congestion" per se does not limit the
flexibility to reduce emissions through redispatch and that the nodal pattern of demand
relative to the locations of the generators has a greater effect.
5.2.3. The impact of network constraints on potential NOx reductions
The most striking feature of the results is that transmission constraints do not
significantly reduce potential NOx emissions reductions from redispatch in Classic PJM.
There are three primary reasons. The first is related to the spatial heterogeneity in the low
and high NOx generating units in PJM. High NOx units are not mostly in one area of
PJM and low NOx units in another; they tend to be located together within the zones
created by transmission constraints. This is particularly important in high demand hours.
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In these hours congestion is less of a problem if local demand is predominantly filled by
local generation. If there is significant local NOx-rate heterogeneity then NOx emissions
can be reduced without substantial increases in the utilization of transmission lines.
Figure 5-2 suggests that there is local heterogeneity in the NOx emission rates of
generating units. The figure shows distributions of generation over NOx rate for all units,
for only coal units, and for all units located in Middlesex County, NJ. The two lines
represent generation as observed and as simulated when all units have been redispatched
to minimize NOx constraints using the zonal model to simulate August 4 h, 2005 at 2 pm.
As would be expected, the range of the distribution of generation across NOx emission
rates is similar among the three panels and it is not drastically altered in the simulations.
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Figure 5-2 Distributions of generation over NOx rate for all units in Classic PJM, for coal units in Classic
PJM, and for all units in Middlesex County, NJ. If a heat rate of 10 mmBTU/MWh is assumed, these NOx
emissions rates translate to the equivalent NOx emission rate in lbs/mmBTU by dividing by a factor of 10.
Redispatched cases are from the zonal model for August 4 th , 2005 at 2 pm.
The trimodal distribution that is observed for all units in Classic PJM is as true for
coal units as it is for the entirety of units and it is still evident in the distribution for
Middlesex County. The main effect of the Low NOx Case is to shift generation from the
high (> 4 lbs/MWh) part of the distribution to the two lower modes for all three cases.
The shift is particularly evident in Middlesex County where the share of generation in the
high emission rate segment is reduced by about two-thirds. In cases like this, which occur
in many of sub-regions of Classic PJM at the county-scale, transmission constraints are
simply not a problem.
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The second reason for the small effect of transmission constraints is that, to the
extent low-NOx generation is located at one end of a congested line, it tends to be on the
high-LMP side of the constraint. For example, the capacity-weighted average NOx
emission rate of the units on the low-LMP side of the frequently constrained 10 OTHST to
OST line was 3.1 lbs/MWh in the summer of 2005, while that on the high-LMP side was
1.8 lbs/MWh. On August 4th, 2005 at 2 pm, the generation on the low-LMP side of this
constraint had an average NOx rate of 2.6 lbs/MWh and that on the high-LMP side an
average NOx rate of 1.7 lbs/MWh. Anything that would increase the use of unused low-
NOx generation on the high-LMP side of the constraint in place of the higher-NOx
generation on the low-LMP side will relieve the transmission constraint. Here again, the
transmission constraint was not a problem because the NOx-reducing exchange creates a
flow in the opposite direction.
The third and final reason is that NOx reducing substitutions involve small
amounts of generation, especially in the peak hour. In peak demand hours in PowerWorld
and the zonal model, the simulations exchanged about 4.5 GW of generation to reduce
emissions to the physical limit, within a set of units contributing about 35 GW total. In
the average demand hour, the simulations exchanged about 8.5 GW of generation of
about 20 GW total.
5.2.4. Locational Variation in NOx Reductions
The location, in addition to the time, of NOx reductions affects their impact on
ozone formation. One of the first criticisms of the cap-and-trade approach was that
"hotspots" could result because these programs have not traditionally captured time and
locational variations of the impacts of emissions on air quality standards. These hotspots,
which have not been shown to occur in any of the currently implemented cap-and-trade
programs, would occur when sources in an environmentally sensitive area chose to buy
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permits for their pollution, rather than taking actions that resulted in abatement.'45 This
motivates the question of whether the redispatch of units to reduce NOx is accompanied
by substantial increases in NOx emissions in some geographic areas.
It is certainly true that on the level of individual plants, some locations will
produce more and some will produce less NOx as a consequence of redispatch. But at a
higher level of aggregation it is not necessarily true that the redispatch, which results in a
net reduction of NOx, will result in areas with significantly higher NOx emissions. Table
5-5 shows the observed NOx emissions by county for August 4th at 2 pm and the base
case NOx in the MMWG Summer case. It also shows the changes in NOx and generation
due to redispatch subject to network transmission constraints in the zonal model and the
reductions in the MMWG summer case with NOx prices of $100,000/ton. The table
shows only those counties in which the redispatch changed NOx emissions by at least
200 lbs.
In the MMWG summer case, emissions increased the most in Middlesex County,
New Jersey as a consequence of the increased output of one generating unit. The same
unit reduced its output as a consequence of redispatch in the zonal model of August 4th at
2 pm, so emissions in Middlesex County decreased in the zonal simulation. Emissions
increased the most in the August 4th, 2pm zonal simulation in the District of Columbia.
Again this increase occurred because of the increased utilization of one generating unit.
In the MMWG summer case the redispatch caused the unit to generate less, decreasing
emissions in DC. The air quality consequences of these changes would ultimately depend
on the meteorology and atmospheric chemistry conditions at the times they occurred.
145 For a summary of analyses of these issues see Swift (2004).
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Table 5-5 Original emissions and changes in at the county-level for simulated redispatch
subject to network constraints for the MMWG Summer OPF simulation in PowerWorld
and on August 4 h, 2005 at 2 pm in the zonal model. The chart shows counties that had a
net change in NOx of at least 200 lbs.
PowerWorld Zonal
MMWG Summer August 4th, 2 pm
Change Change in
State County NOx In NOx NOx NOx
NJ Burlington 4580 -4234 2553 -1557
PA Bucks 3012 -2240 335 -257
NJ Hudson 5624 -1808 5370 -3258
MD Harford 1841 -1035 1146 -749
MD Talbot 1017 -1017 0 0
NJ Essex 1044 -963 719 -337
PA Philadelphia 1628 -898 546 32
PA Clearfield 2206 -674 1464 -967
NJ Cape May 1969 -488 1752 -1134
MD Prince Georges 6375 -357 5283 -715
PA Northampton 3452 -208 6304 -1754
DC DC 1470 0 613 1011
PA Venango 27 89 81 213
PA Delaware 3185 126 3141 257
NJ Gloucester 463 202 427 -3
MD Baltimore 2050 206 2605 -1451
PA Union 0 223 0 0
MD Dorchester 311 558 744 -595
NJ Middlesex 3034 1782 4651 -1716
lbs
The magnitudes of the increases in NOx were generally small. Emissions
increased more than 200 lbs in only 5 counties in the MMWG Summer case and in 3
counties in the August 4 h, 2 pm zonal simulation. In both simulations, the redispatch
increased emissions in 19 of the 57 total counties.
As Table 5-5 suggests, the initial emissions and the changes from redispatch were
different in the PowerWorld and zonal models. The nodal load data for historical hours,
such as August 4th at 2pm, are not available. This makes simulating historical hours with
PowerWorld difficult and makes it a challenge to determine whether the differences in
the results of the zonal model and PowerWorld simulation were more a result of the
simulation method or of initial conditions. The significant differences between the
PowerWorld simulations that used the FTR and scaled FTR cases and the MMWG cases
suggest that initial conditions partially determine the potential NOx reductions from
redispatch.
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A rough comparison of the changes in generation from units in the PowerWorld
MMWG Summer case and the zonal August 4", 2pm case does suggest, however, that
the zonal simulations allowed many more substitutions than did the PowerWorld
simulations. For example, there were 191 units that generated in the base cases for both
of these simulations. Of these 191 units, 95 units had similar levels of initial generation in
both cases (less than 11.5 percent different, the median difference in generation between
the two cases was 11.5 percent).
Although the extent to which these 95 units can be redispatched depends on the
initial states of other generating units and on the pattern and magnitude of nodal loads, it
is somewhat telling to compare the changes in generation of these units between the two
simulation methods. In the PowerWorld MMWG Summer base case, the 95 units
generated about 19.1 GW and in the zonal base case they generated about 19.2 GW. After
redispatch, the units generated 19.4 GW in the MMWG Summer case and 19.1 GW in the
zonal case. The redispatch changed only 3 units' output by more than 20% in the
MMWG Summer simulation, while it changed 23 units' output by more than 20% in the
zonal simulation. This suggests that the constraints limiting the exchange of generation
from units in the PowerWorld simulations are more stringent than those in the zonal
simulations and that the PowerWorld simulations give a more conservative estimate of
the potential NOx reductions from redispatch.
5.2.5. SCOPF Simulations and Emissions-security Tradeoffs
The results discussed this far suggest that the redispatch of power plants in
Classic PJM can cause nontrivial reductions in NOx emissions from dispatch of about
15% in peak demand hours and 30% in average demand hours. Network congestion does
not drastically limit the potential reductions, but the magnitude and pattern of initial
nodal load and generation partially determine the potential NOx reductions and so does a
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realistic representation of the network. Security constraints are an additional restriction
on the operation of the electricity grid.
Data on security constraints were available for the FTR base case power flows. In
Classic PJM, the data included 1455 contingency constraints. It is possible that the
consideration of this entire set of contingency constraints is overly restrictive. PJM
reports on its website that they do not always enforce all contingency constraints and
their operating procedures allow for the system operators to use their judgment with
regard to whether lines can be overloaded. 146 The addition of security constraints not only
changes the potential NOx reductions from redispatch but also the base case NOx
emissions. Table 5-6 shows the OPF and SCOPF simulations in the FTR High Fossil Gen
and Average Demand cases with the entire set of 1455 contingency constraints.
Table 5-6 OPF and SCOPF Simulations for the FTR High Fossil Gen and Average
Demand cases.
NOx OPF SCOPF
Price NOx Reduction % NOx Reduction %
High Fossil 2ký 39 -- -- 41 -- --
Gen 100k 33 6.5 17 34 6.9 17
Average 2k: 20 -- -- 17 -- --
Demand 100k' 8 11.3 58 12 5.7 33
$/ton Tons % Tons %
In the High Fossil Gen case the initial NOx emissions (in the $2000/ton NOx
price base case) increased from 39 to 41 tons with the addition of security constraints.
The potential NOx reductions were 17% in both the OPF and SCOPF simulations. In the
Average Demand the opposite was true: the initial NOx emissions decreased from 20 to
17 tons with security constraints and the potential reductions from redispatch were
smaller. Because the impact of security constraints on the initial NOx emissions and
146 See PJM's information on Contingencies at http://wwww.pim.com/markets/energy-market/Imp-contingencies.htmI.
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potential reductions varies with the level of electricity demand, there is not a clear
tradeoff between the goals of security and environment in the case of NOx emissions.
5.2.6. NOx Prices Needed to Encourage Redispatch
Table 5-7 shows the relationship between NOx prices and potential reductions in
NOx emissions for the PowerWorld simulations. All simulations economically
dispatched the generators in Classic PJM (minimized total operating costs) for ranges of
NOx prices in the average and peak demand hours using the cost curves discussed in
Section 5.1.4. The simulations suggest that even in the unconstrained case in the average
demand hour, NOx prices of about $50,000/ton would be necessary to obtain substantial
reductions. 147 The NOx reductions at $50,000/ton in both the average and peak demand
cases were similar, about 5 or 6 tons. In the average demand hour, higher NOx prices
caused further reductions by increasing generation from natural gas. In the peak demand
case, these natural gas units were already generating; there was less excess capacity to
exchange.
Table 5-7 Results of the PowerWorld simulations for a range of assumed NOx permit
prices. Reductions (absolute and percentages) are calculated from the $2000/ton (2k)
NOx price case in the corresponding panel.
MMWG Summer MMWG Fall
NOx, Unconstrained OPF Unconstrained OPF
Price; NOx Reduction NOx Reduction NOx Reduction NOx Reduction
2k 43 -- -- 43 -- -- 26 -- -- 26 -- --
10k 40 3.0 7 40 3.0 7 24 1.8 7 24 1.8 7
20k 38 4.5 11 38 4.5 10 23 2.9 12 23 3.0 12
50k 37 5.4 13 38 5.2 12 19 6.2 24 19 6.1 24
100k 37 5.8 14 37 5.6 13 18 7.4 29 18 7.5 29
125k 37 5.9 14 37 5.8 14 18 7.7 30 18 7.7 30
M/ton Tons Tons % Tons Tons % Tons Tons % Tons Tons %
147 If the NOx emission rate of the marginal generating unit were 3 lbs/MWh then a $20,000/ton NOx price would add
(roughly) $30/MWh to the locational price for electricity. If the marginal generating unit had a NOx rate of only 0.5
lbs/MWh, the NOx price would only add about $5/MWh to the locational price for electricity.
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The average costs of NOx abatement from redispatch were calculated by dividing
the total change in fuel and O&M costs by the NOx reductions between the different NOx
price simulations and the $2000/ton base case simulation. Table 5-8 shows the average
abatement costs for the MMWG Summer and Fall OPF simulations. The average costs of
abatement at NOx prices below about $20,000/ton are roughly half of the NOx prices.148
Table 5-8 NOx emissions, abatement, and average abatement costs for NOx prices
between $2000/ton and $100,000/ton in the MMWG Summer and Fall simulations.
MMWG Summer Case
NOx Price NOx
2k 42.7
10k 39.8
15k 39.2
20k 38.3
25k 38.1
30k 38.0
50k 37.5
100k 37.2
$fTon T(
MMWG Fall Case
Abatement
3.0
3.6
4.5
4.6
4.7
5.2
5.6
ons
Percent
Abatement
7
8
10
11
11
12
13
%
Average
Cost of
Abatement
..
5741
6635
9203
9397
9778
15061
21414
/lTon
Average
Percent Cost of
NOx Price NOx Abatement Abatement Abatement
2k 25.6 -- -- --
10k 23.8 1.8 7 5792
15k 23.1 2.5 10 7524
20k 22.6 3.0 12 10844
25k 22.0 3.6 14 14911
30k 21.3 4.3 17 18964
50k 19.5 6.1 24 32913
100k 18.1 7,5 29 44218
$/Ton Tons % M/Ton
Figure 5-3 shows the marginal and average abatement cost curves for the same
simulations. Especially in the MMWG Summer case, the costs increase steeply as the
simulations approach the maximum potential NOx reductions. The costs are also similar
for the MMWG Summer and Fall cases for abatement up to about 10%, at which point
the costs increase more quickly in the higher demand MMWG case.
148 Personal conversations with industry representatives suggests that this was they expected.
169
ns
120
100
so80
I- 6040
20
0
. NOx Price Summer
-- *-Average Price Summer
*-O NOx Price Fall
-e- Average Cost Fall
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Percent NOx Abatement (Tons)
Figure 5-3 Marginal and average abatement cost curves for the MMWG Summer and
Fall OPF simulations.
The OTC MOU again provides a point of comparison (see Section 5.2.2). The
MOU does not require specific actions to reduce the peak demand day NOx emissions
and it notes that the reductions could come from controls on peaking units or through
other measures like energy efficiency or demand response. As an example of action that
states could take to control emissions from power plants on peak electricity demand days,
the EPA calculated that the average abatement costs of installing water injection NOx
control technology on peaking units in the Northeastern U.S. would be about
$158,000/ton to reduce NOx by about 0.23 tons per day over a 12-day, high-electricity-
demand period for each unit that installed the technology. 149 The same EPA analysis
estimated average costs of installing SNCRs on uncontrolled coal plants of $18,000/ton
to reduce NOx by about 2.2 tons per day per unit over the same 12-day period.
Redispatch appears preferable on a cost per ton basis to controlling NOx emissions from
infrequently used peaking units, although other control options may also be available.
149 EPA Clean Air Markets Division presentation by Chitra Kumar, "High Electricity Demand Day Attainment
Strategies for the OTC," December 6, 2006.
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One of the benefits of time varying NOx prices is that the control decisions could be
made through decentralized market incentives rather than by regulatory fiat. Another
related benefit is that, with the incorporation of air quality forecasting, these costly
reductions could come during the times and locations that would most likely impact
ozone formation in critical areas - rather than from a specific, predefined set of
generating units. For comparison to these cost examples, Mauzerall et. al. (2005)
estimated the damages of ozone per incremental ton of additional NOx emissions to be
between about $13,000 and $64,000 per ton.150
5.2.7. NOx Reductions from Changes in Fuel Use
A NOx price of about $50,000/ton was required to reverse the merit order of
typical coal and gas generating units given summer of 2005 fuel prices. The exact NOx
price for particular plants depended on heat rates, NOx rates, and fuel prices. For
example, a coal and a natural gas generating unit with only fuel and NOx costs would
generate one megawatt of electricity for the same cost if NOx prices were $52,000/ton,
coal prices were $2.5/mmBTU, natural gas prices were $9/mmBTU and the units had
respective NOx emission rates of 0.4 and 0.15 lbs/mmBTU and heat rates of 10
mmBTU/MWh. The NOx price to cause substitution would decrease with increases in the
coal unit's NOx rate or the natural gas unit's heat rate.
The heterogeneity in the emission rates and efficiency of power plants (Chapter 4)
caused substitution between coal, natural gas, and oil to occur for prices that ranged
between $2000 and about $100,000/ton. NOx prices of $20,000/ton did not cause any
change in coal generation in the MMWG Summer simulation, but natural gas generation
did replace oil generation (Table 5-9). Some substitution of natural gas generation for
coal occurred in the MMWG Summer case at NOx prices of $50,000/ton and more at
150 Mauzerall et. al. (2005) page 2863. Estimates converted from 1995 to 2005 dollars with a Consumer Price Index
conversion factor of 0.78.
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higher prices. A small amount of coal to natural gas substitution occurred at lower prices
in the lower demand MMWG Fall simulation and much more substitution occurred at the
higher prices.
Table 5-9 Changes in generation from coal, oil, natural gas and municipal solid waste
(MSW) caused by NOx prices of $20,000/ton (20k), $50,000/ton (50k), and $100,000/ton
(100k) compared to the base case generation ($2000/ton NOx prices).
Base Case Change in Generation
MMWG Summer Generation 20k 50k 100k
Coal 17996 0 -196 -425
Oil 7185 -182 -128 -104
Natural Gas 10377 198 409 670
MSW 225 0 -60 -115
MMWG Fall
Coal 16461 -132 -1900 -2965
Oil 2217 -142 393 844
Natural Gas 4130 284 1548 2233
MSW 143 -10 -40 -112
MW
The substitution between fuels does not explain all of the simulated NOx
reductions. Within-fuel substitutions also caused NOx reductions. For example in the
$100,000/ton MMWG Fall simulation, coal generating units reduced their output by a
total of 3487 MW but the net change in coal generation was a decrease of 2965 MW
(Table 5-9). This meant that some coal units increased their output, by a total of about
522 MW. Likewise, there was also substitution within natural gas generating units of
about 1000 MW in the same simulation.
5.2.8. Distributional Effects
The distributional effects of a high, short-term NOx price (that a differentiated
cap-and-trade program could cause) for companies that own generating units depend on
the electricity demand in the hours in which the higher NOx price applies and on the
initial allocation of NOx emission permits. The initial allocation of permits to emission
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sources determines the distributional consequences of any cap-and-trade program.15 ' If
transaction costs are low, the initial allocation of permits does not affect a cap-and-trade
program's ability to achieve the required emission reductions at least cost, but the initial
allocation does determine which sources will be required to purchase permits to cover
their emissions and which will have extra to sell. 152
The distributional effects of a high NOx price for power plants in the redispatch
simulations depend on the level of electricity demand because both electricity demand
and NOx prices affect the marginal generating units - the units that set the wholesale
electricity price at different network nodes. "53 When a generating unit is at or near the
margin it does not earn large profits. In general, coal power plants have the lowest
marginal costs and the largest profit margins of all the fossil fuel generators, which they
use to cover fixed costs. But a high NOx price could cause coal to become the marginal
fuel, decreasing the profit margins of coal plants and increasing those of the natural gas
plants with lower NOx emissions. For any given NOx price, the level and pattern of
electricity demand will determine the marginal generating units. If the marginal
generator burns fossil fuel, which is typically the case, the price of electricity will
increase to reflect the costs associated with NOx emissions. Companies that own nuclear
and hydro plants will enjoy larger profits as the margin between the price of electricity
and their operating costs grows.
A rough measure of the effects of redispatch on the changes in relative profits of
companies that own the redispatched fossil units is the change in share of the total profits
151 For example analyses of the effects of distributional consequences on the potential and actual implementation of
cap-and-trade programs see Atkinson and Tietenberg (1982) who analyzed the distributional consequences and other
attributes of cap-and-trade program design for particulate control in St. Louis using simulations. Joskow and
Schmalensee (1998) used empirical methods to study the political economy of the initial allocation of permits in the
U.S. Acid Rain Program. See generally Tietenberg (2006).
152 See Stavins (2005) for a discussion of the impact of transaction costs on the efficiency implications of the initial
allocation of permits in a cap-and-trade program.
'53 The number of marginal generating units in a power network depends on whether or not there is congestion. If no
lines are congested there will only be one marginal generating unit.
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between two NOx price scenarios. The simulations of Classic PJM allow only a rough
characterization of the distributional effects of a differentiated cap-and-trade program.
The simulated LMPs only roughly reproduced the magnitudes and patterns of observed
LMP (Appendix E) and the cost curves were also simplified. This meant that the
simulated profit margins were not necessarily accurate in an absolute sense. Also,
whether or not the differentiated program would require some companies to buy
additional permits would depend on other control decisions throughout the ozone season,
on which days and how many days the high exchange rate applied, and on whether the
exchange ratio could be relaxed on days when ozone pollution was not a problem.
Table 5-10 shows the profit shares of the ten companies with the largest shares in
the MMWG Fall base case simulations. It also shows two scenarios of the potential
changes in profit shares of these companies for the $50,000/ton NOx-price redispatch.
The first scenario assumed that all companies purchased (from an imaginary bank)
enough permits at the prevailing price to cover all emissions in that hour. The second
scenario assumed that each generating unit was given an allocation of 76% of its base
case emissions because the total NOx reductions in the MMWG Fall $50,000/ton NOx-
price simulation were 6.1 tons (24%). In this case, the owners would only have had to
purchase permits if their emissions exceeded 76% of the units' base case emissions and
they could have sold any additional permits at the prevailing price of $50,000/ton. The
results of the same "allocation" scenarios are shown for the MMWG Summer case for the
same companies (those with the top ten profit shares in the MMWG Fall case). The
allocation for the MMWG summer case was 88% of base case emissions because the
$50,000/ton NOx price caused emission reductions of 12%.
Even these rough scenarios demonstrate that the level of demand and the
allocation of permits would determine the relative effects of the differentiated cap-and-
trade program on the companies. For example, the profit shares of the ten companies
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were different in the base case simulations of the MMWG Fall and Summer cases. This
demonstrates the effects of the level of demand and is expected because of the varied
ownership of different types of generators and because the high demand causes higher
electricity prices and increased generation from natural gas and other peaking units.
Although their profit shares decreased between the Fall and Summer cases, the top two
companies were the same in both the base case simulations. Eight of the top ten
companies remained in the top ten (see the "ranking" columns in Table 5-10).
Table 5-10 Profit shares and changes in profit shares due to $50,000/ton NOx prices assuming the owners
of generating units must purchase permits to cover all emissions at the prevailing price ("Profit Share NOx
at $50,000/ton") and assuming they received enough permits to cover 76% of their base case emissions in
the Fall case and 88% of their base case emissions in the Summer case ("Profit Share ... with Allocation").
MMWG Fall Case (OPF Simulations) MMWG Summer Case (OPF Simulations)
Profit Share Profit Share Rank in Profit Share Profit Share
Rank in Base Case Profit Share NOx at MMWG Base Case Profit Share NOx at
MMWG Fall (NOx at NOx at % $50,000/ton % Summer (NOx at NOx at % $50,000/ton %
Owner Base Case $2000/ton) $50,000/ton Change with Allocation Change Base Case $2000/ton) $50,000/ton Change with Allocation Change
C1 1 17.7 23.3 32 18.3 3 1 13.7 13.3 -3 12.7 -8
C2 2 15.9 9.7 -39 11.5 -27 2 8.3 3.9 -52 4.9 -40
C3 3 10.7 11.4 7 8,4 -21 6 4.6 3.5 -24 2.9 -36
C4 4 8.5 9.1 6 6.7 -22 9 4.2 3.1 -26 2.6 -37
C5 5 6.4 6.7 5 4.9 -23 11 3.0 2.7 -11 2.3 -25
C6 6 5.9 3.6 -39 5.6 -6 7 4.5 3.4 -25 4.2 -7
C7 7 5.6 5.9 7 4.4 -21 5 5.2 5.2 0 4.4 -16
C8 8 5.4 4.2 -22 6.6 21 8 4.3 6.4 49 8.0 85
C9 9 3.7 5.5 49 5.5 50 4 5.8 7.6 32 7.8 35
C10 10 2.8 3.0 4 2.2 -24 16 2.1 2.1 2 1.8 -14
of Total (% of Tot al % % (% of Total Profits) % (% of Total
Profits) Profits)
The profit shares of some companies decreased with the higher NOx price in both
the Fall and Summer simulations and regardless of the allocation of permits (e.g. C2 and
C6) and increased in all scenarios for one company (e.g. C9). The results for other
companies were ambiguous. For example, regardless of the allocation scenario, Cl's
profit share increased in the Fall case with the higher NOx price but decreased in the
Summer case. The profit share of C8 increased dramatically in the MMWG Summer case
with the high NOx price and in the MMWG Fall case with the initial allocation, but
decreased in the Fall case without allocation.
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Another way to analyze the distributional effects of a differentiated cap-and-trade
program is to compare the differentiated approach to a more stringent aggregate cap.
Three scenarios were used to make this comparison. In all scenarios, a day was
constructed out of 12 peak hours (using the MMWG Summer simulations) and 12
average hours (using the MMWG Fall simulations). Then in the first scenario ("Stringent
Aggregate Cap") a NOx price of $5,000/ton was applied in all hours to approximate the
effects of a more stringent aggregate cap. The second scenario ("Differentiated Peak")
approximated the differentiated program by applying a NOx price of $50,000/ton to four
of the peak demand hours, while using the base-case price of $2,000/ton in the other 8
peak demand hours and in the 12 average demand hours. The third scenario
("Differentiated Average") approximated the differentiated program by applying a NOx
price of $50,000/ton to four of the average demand hours, while using the base-case price
of $2,000/ton in the other hours. The two differentiated scenarios represent the possibility
that NOx reductions could be needed to reduce ozone at different times of the day.
All three scenarios caused similar levels of daily NOx reductions. In the base
case, the generators emitted about 820 tons of NOx during the day. The Stringent
Aggregate Cap and Differentiated Peak scenarios reduced the NOx emissions by about 21
tons per day and the Differentiated Average scenario reduced NOx by about 24 tons.
In all three scenarios, each companies' profits from its fossil generators' 54 were
compared to the base case of the $2000/ton NOx price applied to all hours (12 peak, 12
average) assuming that the companies were required to purchase the permits necessary to
cover their emissions at the prevailing price in the hour. The Stringent Aggregate Cap
and the Differentiated Peak scenarios both increased the total aggregate profits from the
fossil units of these companies by about $5.4 million (12%) and by about $6.6 million
154 The profits considered were total revenues from electricity generation less fuel costs, variable O&M costs, and NOx
costs (assuming permits for all NOx emissions were purchased at the assumed price).
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(14%) respectively. The simulated cap-and-trade programs increased the aggregate
profits because the increases in locational marginal prices more than compensated for the
increases in costs caused by the NOx prices.
In the Differentiated Average Scenario, the overall profits decreased by about
$1.2 million (3%). The decrease in this scenario occurred because the $50,000/ton NOx
price in the average demand hour caused much more substitution from coal to natural gas
than the same price applied in the peak demand hour. This substitution caused coal to
become the marginal fuel and therefore caused a larger portion of the generation to have
a smaller profit margin (the difference in costs between natural gas and coal generators is
larger than the difference between coal generators with different NOx rates). This
suggests that although the application of higher exchange rates for permits during average
hours could cause more NOx reductions than the same exchange rate in peak demand
hours, it would also be more costly for the owners of coal plants if the higher exchange
rates for permits applied during average hours. Ultimately, however this result would
depend on the initial allocation of permits.
All three scenarios also created winners and losers. The Stringent Aggregate Cap
scenario decreased the profits of 13 companies that owned fossil generation, compared to
the base case, and increased profits of 51 (of 65 total). The Differentiated Peak scenario
decreased profits for 11 companies and increased profits for 53. The Differentiated
Average scenario decreased profits for 29 and increased profits for 26 companies. Table
5-11 shows the base case profits and changes in profits for the three companies in each
scenario that gained and lost the most (there was some overlap so only ten companies are
shown in the table).
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Table 5-11 Changes in profits from fossil generators for three cap-and-trade program
scenarios for all companies in Classic PJM with fossil generation as well as for the
companies most affected.
Stringent Aggregate Differentiated Peak Differentiated
Cap Scenario Scenario Average Scenario
Base Case Change in Percent Change Percent Change Percent
Profit Profit in Profit in Profit
Total 46 5.4 12 6.6 14 -1.2 -3
Average 0.7 0.08 12 0.10 14 -0.02 -3
Companies
C114 1.9 1.54 g 79 0.61 31 -0.10 -5
Ci15 1.8 1.36 77 0.27 15 -0.33 -19
C8 4.9 0.35 7.1 1.36 28 -0.08 -2
C14 2.0 0.10 5.3 0.57 29 0.09 4
C26 1.8 0.01 0.8 0.02 1 0.13 7
C6 5.3 0.01 0.1 0.13 3 -0.19 -4
C31 0.1 -0.01 -7.8 -0.03 -34 -0.01 -8
C66 0.1 -0.01 -23 -0.02 -32 0.00 -1
C9 5.6 -0.02 -0.3 1.44 g 26 0.23 g 4
C2 8.4 -0.29 I -3.5 -0.72 I -9 -0.57 I -7
M$/day M$/da y  % Mf/day % M$/day %
*g indicates the company that gained the most in daily profits under the scenario
*I indicates the company that lost the most in daily profits under the scenario
This analysis suggests that the distributional effects of a differentiated regulation
might not differ dramatically from the application of a more stringent aggregate cap on
NOx emissions. In the Stringent Aggregate Cap scenario, the maximum amount gained
by a company was about $1.5 million (79%) compared to a similar maximum gain of
$1.4 million (26%) in the Differentiated Peak case and a smaller maximum gain of $0.2
million (4%) in the Differentiated Average case (indicated by "g" in Table 5-11). The
maximum loss in the Stringent Aggregate Cap scenario was about $0.3 million (3%)
compared to larger maximum losses of about $0.7 million (9%) and $0.6 million (6%) in
the Differentiated Peak and Average cases respectively (indicated by "1" in Table 5-11).
By combining the two differentiated scenarios, assuming that the NOx reductions might
be required in some peak and some average hours, the average change in profits would be
about $83,000 in the Stringent Aggregate Cap scenario compared to $40,000 in the
differentiated case.
The differentiated program does, however, differ in an important way from the
more stringent aggregate cap. The distributional affects of the differentiated cap-and-
trade program would depend on the hours in which the more stringent exchange rates
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applied. For example, some companies could gain a lot if the more stringent exchange
rate applied in peak as opposed to average hours. Although the two companies that
gained and lost the most in the two differentiated cases were the same (Table 5-11), some
companies that lost in one scenario gained in the others (as also suggested by Table
5-10). For example, the Peak scenario increased the profits of C 115 by about 15% but the
Average scenario decreased C115's profits by about 19%. This would be an incentive for
companies like C115 to try to affect the definitions of the differentiated program by
offering their own models that suggested when the reductions were needed. As discussed
in Section 3.3.3, if they succeeded it could impact the effectiveness of a differentiated
regulation. However, in the example of the Clean Air Interstate Rule discussed in Section
3.3.3, the attempts of state governments and industry to alter the EPA's definitions did
not succeed. This suggests that a differentiated regulation could also withstand this
implementation challenge.
Future work will integrate this analysis with atmospheric chemistry modeling to
understand which reductions would actually be necessary to reduce ozone
concentrations.' 55 This analysis would also help refine the analysis of distributional
impacts.
5.3. Summary
The problem of the continued nonattainment of ozone air quality standards in the
Eastern U.S. may lie in the mismatch between the relatively uniform incentives to reduce
NOx provided by existing regulatory systems and the highly variant temporal and
locational impact of NOx precursor emissions on ozone formation in any given area. A
time- and location-differentiated cap-and-trade program implemented using ozone
forecasting to alter NOx emission permit exchange ratios in a wholesale electricity
155 This work is currently being performed by the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
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market that uses bid-based, security-constrained economic dispatch could help the states
in the Eastern U.S. reduce the likelihood of peak ozone episodes cost effectively. One of
the necessary conditions for this type of regulation is that power plants have the
flexibility to reduce NOx emissions in the short term.
Two simulation methods suggest that the potential magnitude of NOx reductions
from the redispatch of generating units in the area of Classic PJM, while taking
transmission constraints into account, is between 6 tons (or 15%) on the highest demand
days of 2005 in Classic PJM and 8 tons (or 30%) on average demand days. The
magnitudes of potential hourly reductions depend on the time of day and the
corresponding level of electricity demand. These region-wide net reductions are not
accompanied by "hotspots" - large increases in NOx in subareas of Classic PJM. In
addition, redispatch is only one way that power plants can reduce emissions in the short
term. Some control technologies can be used to alter emission rates on the timescale of a
few weeks. In the longer term, high NOx prices would also provide incentives for power
plants to invest in NOx control technologies.
Optimal power flow simulations of the potential NOx reductions from redispatch
were more conservative than zonal model simulations, which were based on an abstract
network graph representation of the power network. The zonal model estimated the
potential emissions reductions reasonably well, but allowed many more exchanges of
generation between power plants than did the optimal power flow simulations. This
suggests a need to account for the details of a power system's physical parameters and for
network constraints other than those that are initially binding in redispatch simulations.
Although future work is needed to link the estimates of potential NOx reductions
to atmospheric chemistry modeling, the results of these simulations are encouraging.
They suggest that an important pre-condition for the implementation of a time and
location differentiated regulatory system is satisfied, namely, the existence of significant
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flexibility to reduce NOx precursor emissions through the redispatch of power plants on
hot summer days when ozone formation is most likely and the electricity system is most
likely to be constrained.
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Chapter 6 - Summary and Future Work
6.1. Summary of the motivation for this research
This work contributes to a larger research effort that is seeking to determine
whether a NOx cap-and-trade program that differentiated between emissions by time and
location could reduce ozone concentrations more cost-effectively than reductions in the
aggregate cap now in place. The difficulties that some highly populated areas of the
Eastern U.S. have had attaining the federal air quality standards for ozone provides the
primary motivation for this inquiry. Three factors suggest that differentiation between
NOx emissions at different times and locations might help solve this problem. First, the
atmospheric chemistry literature shows that the timing and location of NOx emission
reductions determines their effectiveness in preventing peak ozone concentrations.
Second, the environmental economics literature cautions that the failure to address the
temporal and spatially important features of environmental problems can lead to
inefficiencies because a lack of differentiation can cause costly over-compliance in some
areas and times and under-compliance in others. Third, despite the atmospheric chemistry
and economic justifications for doing so, the cap-and-trade programs (and other
regulations) designed to address ozone pollution in the Eastern United States have not
accounted for the influence of the location and timing of NOx emissions on ozone
formation.
6.1.1. Atmospheric chemistry evidence supporting differentiation
The atmospheric chemistry literature suggests that the lack of differentiation
across NOx emissions emitted at different times and locations may contribute to the
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inability of seasonal cap-and-trade programs in the Eastern United States to help all areas
attain the ozone air quality standards. The reason for this is that the reactions governing
ozone formation depend on the relative concentrations of VOCs and NOx and on the
temperature and amount of sunlight. Decreases in NOx emissions will limit ozone
formation the most during hot, sunny conditions in areas and times with high
concentrations of VOCs. In areas and times of low VOC emissions and high
concentrations of NOx, a reduction in NOx can actually increase ozone concentrations.
One of the clearest examples from the literature of the implications of this
chemistry is a study by Mauzerall et. al. (2005) that examined differences in ozone
formation from NOx emissions from large point sources at different locations and times
in the Eastern United States. They chose times and locations that captured relevant ranges
of variation in temperature and local biogenic VOC emissions and found that the same
amount of NOx emissions at these different times and places can cause ozone formation
that varies by factor of five. This study and others suggest that regulations aimed to
reduce ozone concentrations should account for the impact of the timing and location of
NOx emissions on ozone formation but they do not address the details of how such a
regulation could be implemented.
6.1.2. The mismatch between science and policy
Congress first recognized the environmental and health effects of ozone and its
precursor emissions when it passed the Clean Air Act of 1970. Subsequent policies and
regulations in the United States, and specifically in the Eastern United States, have
reduced emissions of NOx and VOCs from both mobile and stationary sources. The joint
discussion of the science and policy background of the ozone problem helps explain why
policies to reduce ozone concentrations have not been entirely successful even though
they have caused reductions in ozone precursor emissions.
184
Policymakers have adjusted their approach to controlling ozone concentrations as
our scientific understanding of the problem improved. For example, prior to 1990, the
EPA focused on regulating VOC emissions from stationary sources in order to reduce
ozone pollution. As science stressed the importance of reducing NOx emissions, the EPA
shifted their focus. However, with the exception the California Air Resources Board's
recognition of the weekend effect in southern California and the rough seasonality of the
ozone cap-and-trade programs in the Eastern United States, regulations to reduce ozone
precursor emissions have not accounted for the impact of the timing and location of NOx
emissions on ozone formation.
6.1.3. The economic rational for differentiation
The efficiency losses from treating dissimilar emissions alike provide the basic
economic rational for differentiated regulations. Regardless of the reasons that the
impacts of two unit-quantities of emissions differ (e.g. location, timing, or chemical
composition), treating dissimilar emissions as the same creates the need for costly over-
control. For example, a un-differentiated cap-and-trade program for emission permits
equalizes marginal abatement costs among sources by allowing the sources with the
lowest marginal abatement cost to reduce emissions and sell excess permits to sources
with higher marginal abatement costs. Under a un-differentiated program, the sources
that impact air quality the most in a targeted area, like an ozone NAAQS nonattainment
area, only reduce emissions if their marginal abatement costs are less than those at all
other sources, including those that have little effect on the air quality in a targeted area.
This means that too little is spent to control the most harmful emissions and too much is
spent to control those that are least harmful.
The regulator's only control mechanism in the un-differentiated case is the overall
cap on emissions. In order to meet air quality goals in stubborn areas, the regulator must
lower the overall cap on emissions until the air quality is acceptable at all locations. This
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causes two inefficiencies: over-control at sources emitting emissions with little impact on
targeted areas and the necessity of larger aggregate reductions.
6.1.4. Barriers to the implementation
There are barriers to the implementation of a differentiated cap-and-trade program
for NOx and these help explain why regulations have not addressed the temporal and
spatial aspects of the ozone problem. These barriers are technical, economic, political,
and legal. Technical barriers include the modeling requirements needed to support a
differentiated regulation. Experience with ozone air quality forecasting and
improvements in atmospheric chemistry modeling techniques may now mitigate this
challenge. Ongoing research, of which this dissertation is a part, is verifying whether the
modeling and forecasting requirements of a differentiated regulation are feasible.
Two other barriers to implementation are whether emission sources could respond
to incentives for NOx reductions that changed in time and by location and whether the
distributional impacts of a differentiated regulation could constrain its effectiveness. This
dissertation evaluated these barriers and found that although they are not trivial
challenges, they could be overcome. The details of this analysis are summarized in the
following sections.
6.2. Findings and contributions
6.2.1. An example benefit of a differentiated NOx cap-and-trade program
The analysis presented in Chapter 4 suggested that seasonal, un-differentiated
cap-and-trade programs in the Eastern United States did not guarantee that only the most
cost-effective NOx emission reductions occurred. This illustrated an opportunity for a
differentiated cap-and-trade program to improve upon the current regulations.
Chapter 4 examined the NOx emission characteristics of coal power plants and
the hypothesis that the operators of coal power plants reduced NOx emissions at the times
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when ozone formation was least likely under the summertime cap-and-trade programs in
the Eastern United States in 2002 and 2005. This behavior was economically rational
because it was consistent with the incentives that the operators of some coal power plants
have to reduce NOx emissions when electricity prices are low.
Three incentives were discussed that explain why it could have been less costly
for the operators of some coal generating units to abate NOx emissions when power
prices were low. First, output reduction is an effective NOx control strategy because
some coal units' NOx emission rates decrease at decreased levels of output and reduced
output is less costly when power prices are low. Second, if a generating unit's marginal
costs increase more steeply with a NOx control technology than without it the operator
might prefer to use the technology only during periods with low expected power prices.
Third, if a NOx control technology increases a generating unit's heat rate it can decrease
its effective capacity, which is more costly when power prices are high.
The estimated NOx abatement of specific power plants under the OTC NOx
Budget Program in 2002 and of a larger set of coal power plants in 2002 and in 2005
under the SIP NOx Budget Program provided evidence that the abatement strategies for
some coal plants were consistent with these incentives. In one example, nearly all of a
generating unit's NOx abatement occurred in the first two months of the ozone season
when power prices were lower than in the latter three months. Aggregate estimates of
NOx abatement in 2002 and 2005 from coal generating units in the OTC regions of the
New England and PJM power systems suggested that, although NOx reductions occurred
during the entire ozone season, slightly more abatement took place in the earlier weeks.
Atmospheric chemistry modeling would be needed to determine whether the additional
NOx reductions of about 400 tons per week that occurred in the early weeks of the ozone
season might have helped mitigate peak ozone concentrations if they had also occurred in
the later weeks. But the analysis of the abatement decisions of the operators of these coal
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plants shows that a differentiated cap-and-trade program could improve the cost-
effectiveness of the current cap-and-trade programs by providing stronger incentives for
the emission reductions with the greatest potential to reduce ozone concentrations.
6.2.2. Flexible NOx reductions from power plants in Classic PJM
One of the technical barriers to the implementation of a differentiated cap-and-
trade program is whether or not sources could respond to incentives that change in time
and by location. In the case of stationary sources in the Eastern U.S., a differentiated
regulation would require the response of power plants because they contribute about 90%
of NOx emissions from stationary sources. A commonly held misperception that this
work dispelled was that high levels of generation and network constraints would limit the
flexibility of power plant operators to reduce emissions with redispatch in peak electricity
demand hours.
Chapter 5 presented the results of the simulations that used two methods to
estimate the potential short-term NOx reductions from power plants under a differentiated
cap-and-trade program. The simulations were performed for the electric power network
that covers Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and the District of Columbia
(called "Classic PJM"). Both simulation methods - a zonal model based on an abstract
representation of the network and Optimal Power Flow (OPF) simulations - accounted
for network constraints. Both methods suggested that power plant redispatch could
reduce hourly NOx emissions from power plants by between 6 tons (or 15%) on the
highest demand days and 8 tons (or 30%) on average demand days. These potential
reductions are nearly twice those being required on peak electricity demand days by a
recent Memorandum of Understanding in OTC states in the Northeastern United States.
Simulations of the NOx prices required to cause redispatch also indicated that the costs of
redispatch would be similar or less than those considered as options in the OTC
Memorandum of Understanding.
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Similar reductions to those estimated for Classic PJM would likely be available
from the other Eastern U.S. power systems because they all share three key
characteristics. First, the diversity of the NOx emission characteristics of coal-fired power
plants contributed to the potential NOx reductions from redispatch in PJM (the analsyis
in Chapter 4 demonstrated that the New York and New England power systems share this
characteristic). Second, operating reserve margins also contributed to the flexibility to
reduce NOx emissions in Classic PJM: the other two power systems also maintain
reserve margins." 56 Third, New England and New York also fill demand with a mixture
of coal, oil, and gas generating units - the last key characteristics that led to the
availability of flexible NOx emission reductions from PJM.
The analysis described in Chapter 5 found that network congestion did not greatly
impact the potential short-term emission reductions from redispatch in Classic PJM. The
results of these simulations were a useful contribution because of the commonly held
misperception that high levels of generation and network constraints would limit the
flexibility to reduce emissions with redispatch in peak electricity demand hours. The
finding of emissions flexibility as well as the comparison of the zonal and optimal power
flow methods stressed the importance of a detailed representation of electric power
systems when addressing questions about the ability of the systems to respond to new
challenges, environmental or otherwise.
Section 5.2.3 offered three explanations for the finding that network constraints
had little effect on emissions flexibility. The first was related to the fact that there was
variation in the low and high NOx generating units within most relatively small
subsections of the interconnected network. High NOx units are not mostly in one area of
PJM and low NOx units in another; they tend to be located together within the zones
created by transmission constraints. This is particularly important in high demand hours
156 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation require this.
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because congestion is less of a problem if local demand is predominantly filled by local
generation. If there is significant local NOx-rate heterogeneity then NOx emissions can
be reduced without substantial increases in the utilization of transmission lines. The
second reason for the small effect of transmission constraints was that when low-NOx
generation was located at one end of a congested line, it tended to be located on the on
the high-LMP side of the constraint. This meant that increasing the output from the low-
NOx generator reduced congestion. The third and final reason for the small impact of
transmission constraints was simply that the redispatch that reduced NOx emissions
involved only small amounts of generation, especially in the peak hour.
Security-constrained optimal power flow modeling was also used to examine
whether a tradeoff occurred between the environment (in the form of NOx emissions) and
enforcing security constraints in Classic PJM. No clear tradeoff existed because although
NOx emissions from security-constrained dispatch simulations were about 5% higher
compared to simulations without security constraints in peak demand hours, NOx
emissions were about 18% lower in security-constrained simulations in average demand
hours. The addition of security constraints did not greatly change the potential NOx
reductions from redispatch in the peak demand simulations. However, they did reduce the
potential reductions in average demand hours. This occurred because a larger amount of
generation is available for redispatch in the average demand hours than in the peak hours
and the additional constraints limited some of the potential exchanges in the average case.
In the peak case, so little generation was exchanged to obtain the NOx reductions that the
security constraints did not have an effect.
The potential distributional effects of a differentiated regulation would depend
greatly on the particular reductions needed to mitigate ozone episodes. Further work
currently being undertaken will help determine these details by integrating atmospheric
chemistry modeling with the simulations of the potential flexibility in NOx from power
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plants from this work. The variation in the potential distributional effects of the
redispatch simulations modeled here does suggest that industry or state governmenta
would likely attempt to use political means or legal arguments to influence the details of
a differentiated regulation because small changes in the determination of the timing and
location of reductions needed to mitigate ozone concentrations would have large impacts
on the winners and losers from the regulation.
There are two reasons that this could limit the effectiveness of a differentiated
regulation more than a un-differentiated regulation. In the case of a differentiated cap-
and-trade program, small changes in the definitions of trading ratios or boundaries could
have large impacts on particular companies or states. This is true of any regulation. But in
the differentiated case these changes could also impede the effectiveness of the
differentiated regulation. As discussed in Section 3.3.3, companies typically dispute the
EPA's modeling and the resulting definitions of required emission reductions by offering
their own modeling results that show that they are less responsible for the air quality
problems. This could more of a problem in the differentiated case if the uncertainties in
the models were greater at, for example, the finer spatial resolution required to support a
the differentiation. However, in the most recent example of the Clean Air Interstate Rule
the disputes did not ultimately cause the EPA to adjust their initial decision. This
suggests that it would be possible for a differentiated regulation to be implemented
successfully. In addition, a differentiated program could reduce the total amount of NOx
abatement required by sources because it would not require emission reductions that
would not help solve the ozone problem. This could reduce the overall costs to industry
of the NOx cap-and-trade programs for ozone, which could generate support for the
differentiated approach.
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6.3. Conclusion
The broad conclusion, or recommendation, of this dissertation is that further
analysis is warranted of the topic of whether a differentiated cap-and-trade program for
NOx emissions is an implementable and cost-effective strategy to reduce ozone
concentrations in the Eastern United States. The reasons for this are three-fold:
* First, ozone air quality standards have been difficult to attain in all areas and the
atmospheric chemistry literature suggests that a the mismatch between policy and science
is one reason for this difficulty. Existing NOx cap-and-trade programs require stationary
sources in the Eastern U.S. to reduce NOx emissions without reference to timing or
location although the timing and location of emissions influence the amount of ozone
formed from a given amount of emissions. Recent advances in air quality modeling and
forecasting may also mitigate implementation challenges.
* Second, differentiation could provide efficiency gains and the analysis of
historical compliance data from coal power plants in this work offered an example of the
possible gains relative to existing regulations.
* Third, simulations of an electric power network in the Eastern U.S. found that,
given network constraints, power plants could respond to differentiated incentives with
nontrivial NOx emission reductions. The finding that network constraints did not greatly
affect the flexibility for potential NOx reductions from the redispatch of power plants
allayed the common misperception that they would.
Further research is needed before the implementation of a differentiated cap-and-
trade program can be fully recommended because the potential NOx reductions from
power plants must be linked to atmospheric chemistry modeling to show whether or not
they could mitigate ozone formation in target areas (see Section 6.4.1). If this modeling
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shows that the reductions from power plants could help some areas attain the ozone air
quality standards, the distributional impacts of the needed reductions could be assessed in
more detail in order to understand whether a differentiated regulation could be effectively
implemented. The costs of potential reductions from power plants should also be
compared to those of reducing emissions further from other sources (Section 6.4.2).
This dissertation suggests that these further research challenges are worth
pursuing because a differentiated regulation could help some highly populated areas of
the Eastern U.S. attain the ozone air quality standards cost-effectively. If the EPA
implements the more stringent ozone air quality standards it is now considering, the
problem of nonattainment and the need for a cost-effective solution will become more
widespread. In addition, the ozone problem provides an opportunity for regulators to
experiment with a spatially and temporally differentiated cap-and-trade program. Just as
experiments with cap-and-trade programs have proven fruitful, so too could experience
with differentiated cap-and-trade program because ozone pollution is not the only
environmental problem with spatial and temporal dimensions. For example, particulate
matter pollution also has complex elements on spatial and temporal dimensions and
systems to forecast particulate matter are being developed (e.g. Ojha et al. 2002 and Lee
et al. 2003).
6.4. Opportunities for further work
6.4.1. Integrating potential NOx reductions with atmospheric chemistry
modeling
Work is currently being undertaken at the Center for Energy and Environmental
Policy Research at MIT that will link the estimates of potential reductions from power
plants described in this dissertation to weather forecasting and atmospheric chemistry
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models in order to determine if the simulated NOx reductions are of the necessary
magnitude to reduce the likelihood of ozone episodes. Then changes in ozone
concentrations can be matched to estimates of marginal damages from the literature (e.g.,
Mauzerall et. al. 2005). This will enable evaluation of the economic opportunities to use
time and locational variations in emissions prices to take advantage of the physical
opportunities to reduce NOx emissions. It will also enable a more thorough analysis of
the potential distributional impacts of the specific NOx reductions that a differentiated
regulation might require.
6.4.2. Mobile sources
The focus in this work, and the primary focus of regulators, has been on reducing
NOx emissions from electric generators, but another option is to tighten controls on NOx
emissions from mobile sources. Mobile sources could also respond to incentives that
changed based on forecasts. For example, the variable cost of using selective-catalytic
reduction (SCR) on diesel trucks is high due to the cost of urea. The use of these controls
could be mandated only in locations and at times when the NOx reductions would reduce
the formation of ozone in highly populated areas. A pricing system could also be used to
deter driving during specific periods and in highly populated areas where the resulting
reductions in NOx emissions would reduce the likelihood of high ozone concentrations.
Because controlling NOx emissions from vehicles has not been thoroughly analyzed as
an option to target ozone episodes, it is difficult to find cost information to compare to
the above estimates of short-term reductions in NOx from stationary sources. But because
little has been done to reduce NOx from mobile sources, especially in comparison to the
number and stringency of NOx regulations on stationary sources, it is possible that the
reductions would be less expensive than further reductions from stationary sources. 157
157 In a general, non-targeted sense, the cost effectiveness of retrofitting heavy-duty on-road vehicles with SCRs is
about $5,000/ton over the lifetime of the equipment. EPA, "NOx Mobile Measures", available at
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One study estimates that the margin costs of reducing NOx emissions from mobile
sources are currently about one-fifth of those from obtaining further reductions from
power plants (Fowlie et al. 2007).
6.4.3. Comparison of theoretical network models to optimal power flow
models
The abstract network model of the Classic PJM power system constructed in this
dissertation provides an opportunity to examine questions posed in the literature on
theoretical networks. For example, the literature has characterized power systems other
than Classic PJM as having degree distributions that are power laws with an exponential
cutoff. 158 This means that, up to some degree, highly connected nodes are common in the
networks. These nodes are called hubs and the literature suggests they may increase the
robustness of a network because a system with hubs will remain interconnected in the
face of failures at the many nodes that are not hubs. The abstract network graph and
optimal power flow models of Classic PJM could be used to test the predictions of
network theory about whether the network could withstand the removal of nodes with
actual optimal power flow simulations of the impacts of removing nodes on the network.
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www.epa.gov/air/ozonepollution/SIPToolkit/documents/nox mobile measures.pdf.
158 See, for example, Amaral, L.A.N., et al. (2000).
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Appendix A: Non-NOx Price Incentives for more
generation in the late ozone season
The power plants in the OTC and SIP NOx Budget Programs participate in one of
three power systems: the PJM Interconnect, the New York Power Pool, or the New
England Power Pool. Although these power systems have unique characteristics, they are
all based on the concept of economic dispatch. Generating unit owners bid cost curves to
the system operator, who then uses these curves to dispatch the units to fill demand while
minimizing total system operating costs given network constraints. Electricity prices
reflect the cost to supply the system with one more megawatt of power; in a competitive
market they reflect the marginal cost of the marginal generator. The system operator calls
on generating units with bids lower than the price of power to generate; again, in a
competitive market bids reflect units' marginal costs of providing power.
Average and maximum locational marginal prices (LMP) in 2002 and 2005 for
the New England Power Pool and PJM for the "early" and "late" ozone season and the
"non-ozone" season months are shown in
Table A-6-1.159 Prices are notably higher in 2005 compared to 2002 because natural gas
prices were higher (e.g. PJM 2007). The average price in the late ozone season is higher
than that in the early ozone season for both regions and in both years. The maximum
prices were observed in the late summer except in 2005 for New England when the peak
price occurred in the winter.
159 Data from the New York Power Pool are not available.
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Table A-6-1 Average and maximum locational marginal prices in New England and PJM in 2002 and
2005.
LMP ($/MWh) 2002 2005
Average Maximum Average Maximum
Non-ozone 35 198 76 856
New England Early 31 147 60 197
Late 40 1000 89 341
Non-ozone 26 137 55 262
PJM Early 25 147 46 192
Late 36 792 72 287
The duration of high prices was also longer in the late ozone season for both
power systems. For example, in 2005 for PJM, prices were over $100/MWh in 30% of
the late summer hours compared to 7% of the early summer hours and 10% of the non-
ozone season hours (Figure A-1).
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Figure A-6-1 Price duration curves for the New England Power Pool and PJM Interconnect in 2005.
Given experience with these power systems and the relationships between weather,
electricity demand, and price, plant operators likely expect power prices to be higher in
the late summer.
Some generators also shut down to tune NOx control technologies, or to make
combustion modifications that enable them to operate at low-NOx firing conditions. The
performance of the NOx control strategies can then degrade over the course of the
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summer and the high late summer prices mean that the operators do not want to shut
down the unit in order to re-tune the NOx controls.'60
The forced outage rate of generators can also increase when they run at full
capacity for extended periods. This may be another incentive for them to operate at a
lower level when prices are lower in the early summer - to ensure that the generator will
be available when power prices are high. Figure A-6-2 shows the percent of unit-days
each week that coal-fired generators spent entirely off during 1998 and 2002 in the OTC.
This figure suggests that high electricity prices in the late summer created incentives for
generators to operate more in the late summer both prior to (1998) and while (2002) the
OTC NOx Budget Program was in effect.
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Figure A-6-2 Percentage of unit-days that coal-fired generators did not operate during 1998 and 2002.
The generators spent a higher percentage of days operating during the late ozone
season in both years. The percentage of days that units did not operate started to fall from
about 20% to about 5% between the beginning of June and the beginning of July and then
increased again starting in September. The units spent slightly more time off in April and
May than in March and previous months (with the exception of the first week of February
160 Personal conversation with a former power plant operator in New England.
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in 2002). These data do not suggest that generators were turned off in the early summer
in 2002 as a response to the cap-and-trade program, but give an example of how high
electricity demand and prices in the late summer are incentives for generators to operate
as much as possible. This leads to more emissions during the months of July and August
when ozone formation is the biggest problem.
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Appendix B: Curve Fitting to Estimate Coal Plant
Marginal Cost Curves
This appendix discusses the curve fitting results for the input-output and NOx-
output curves for the three example units. These curves were used to obtain the estimates
of marginal cost curves shown in Figure 4-9. They were also used to calculate the NOx
prices required to cause the units to begin to decrease output given the electricity prices
observed in 2002 (Section 4.5.3).
The input-output curves were constructed by fitting linear curves to the hourly
data using ordinary least squares. A dummy variable for the ozone season months was
also included. The hourly data are from the EPA's Continuous Emissions Monitoring
System (CEMS). For each unit, the hourly data were used to estimate the coefficients of
the relationship:
HI = Po + Piq + P20ZONE + P3(q*OZONE) + E.
Where HI is the hourly heat input (mmBTU), q is the unit's hourly gross output (MW),
OZONE is a dummy variable that equals one during the ozone season, and E is the error
term.
The NOx-output curves were constructed similarly, but the data were transformed
to obtain an exponential fit. For each unit, the hourly data were used to estimate the
following relationship, where ln(NOx) is the natural logarithm of the unit's hourly NOx
emissions:
ln(NOx) = ao + acq + a 20ZONE + a3(q*OZONE) + e.
Table B-6-2 shows the coefficients from these regressions.
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Table B-6-2 Regression results for Input-output curves (Heat Input "HI" on generation "q") and NOx-
output curves (the natural logarithm of NOx emissions "ln(NOx)" on generation).
OLS Coefficient (standard error in parenthesis) Number of AdjustedObservations R^2
Intercept q OZONE q*OZONE
HI 110.19** 8.73** -267.0** 0.10* 7260 0.921
(34.56) (0.0426) (49.36) (0.0609)
6094U3
2002
In(NOx) 5.61** 0.003** -0.097** 1.77E-05 7260 0.784
(0.0214) (0.0000264) (0.0306) (0.0000377)
Intercept q OZONE q*OZONE
HI -422.3** 10.65** -83.64** 0.83** 8431 0.903
(15.19) (0.049) (24.7) (0.082)
1571U1
2002
In(NOx) 5.40** 0.0065** 0.20** -0.00078** 8431 0.740
(0.0155) (0.0000509) (0.0252) (0.0000833)
Intercept q OZONE q*OZONE
HI 261.0** 8.96** 76.23** 0.094** 6727 0.996
(6.12) (0.0011) (7.89) (0.0146)
1573U2
2002
In(NOx) 6.45** 0.0026** -0.17** 0.00024** 6727 0.864
(0.0115) (2.071E-05) (0.0148) (2.739E-05)
** indicates significance at the 5% level
* indicates significance at the 10% level
Most of the coefficients are significant at the 5% level. The positive sign on the
coefficients of the interaction terms for the input-output regressions (q*OZONE)
indicates that the unit's heat rates were slightly higher during the ozone season as
expected. The magnitudes of the estimated heat rates (coefficients on q in the input-
output regressions) are of the right magnitude.
The results of the regressions of ln(NOx) on output are difficult to interpret
without graphs. Figure B-6-3 shows the predicted ozone season and non-ozone season
NOx-output relationship for the three plants in 2002 (calculated with the coefficients in
Table B-6-2).
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Figure B-6-3 Predicted NOx emission versus output curves for the three example units in 2002.
The exponential fit was chosen for the NOx-output relationship because residual
plots indicated that it was superior to either a linear fit or a quadratic fit. Example plots
for P1573U2 are shown in Figure B-6-4. The residuals of the exponential fit were much
closer to zero for all values of output.
Residual Plot for Linear Fit
Plant 1573 Unit 2, 2002
Residual Plot for Exponential Fit
Plant 1573 Unit 2, 2002
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Figure B-6-4 Residual plots for regressions of linear (left), exponential (middle), and quadratic (right) fits
for hourly NOx emissions on output for Plant 1573 Unit 2 in 2002. All regressions include dummy
variables for the ozone season and interaction terms for the dummy variable with output.
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Appendix C: Aggregate Estimates of Generation and
Emissions
This appendix presents the results of the aggregate estimates of counterfactual emissions
that used electricity prices to predict generation from the same sample of coal power
plants discussed in Section 4.5.4. These estimates used the same procedure as that
discussed in Section 4.5.4 and the only difference was the use of electricity prices to
predict generation in the first stage. To predict generation, the coefficients in the
following equation were estimated:
qit = 3o+ liPRICEt + P3iEARLY + P4iLATE + e (C-l)
where PRICE was the weekly average electricity price in the power system
corresponding to each generating unit (i.e. PJM or New England), EARLY was a dummy
variables for May and June and LATE for July through August. The omitted variables
version of the Hausman test indicated that PRICE was contemporaneously correlated
with the error term in this equation. This was an expected possibility because the amounts
particular units generate can affect electricity prices. Even in the case when none of the
units in question set the electricity price, if coal power plants reduced their output, more
generation would be required from other units with higher costs and this would increase
electricity prices. To obtain consistent estimates of PI in Equation C-I, total weekly
electricity demand was used as an instrumental variable for the average weekly electricity
price. Electricity demand is a suitable instrumental variable for prices because it is not
correlated with the error term (since the generation of individual units does not affect
total electricity demand) and it is correlated with electricity prices.
Weekly heat input was then regressed on the predicted generation (q it) from
Equation C-1 and on the dummy variables:
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Hlt = ao + aliq it + a 2iEARLY + a3iLATE + E (C-2)
In the last stage, weekly NOx emissions were regressed on the predicted heat input (HI it)
from Equation C-2, the square of the predicted heat input and the dummy variables:
NOxut = to + ptliHI it + R2i(HI-it) 2 + [t3iEARLY + a4iLATE + e (C-3).
The coefficients estimated in these regressions are shown in Table C-6-3. The signs of
the coefficients are as expected. For example, the sign of the coefficient on electricity
prices is positive indicating that the units generated more when prices were higher. The
signs on the coefficients of EARLY and LATE were negative and significant in the
regressions of NOx on predicted heat input in all years and these coefficients were larger
in 2002 and 2005.
The counterfactual estimates generated from the non-ozone coefficients of these
regressions suggested that in 2002 even more reductions occurred in May and June
compared to July through September than the estimates in Section 4.5.4. The estimated
average weekly NOx reductions in the May and June in this case were about 1900 tons
compared to about 1200 tons between July and September. In 2005 these estimates also
suggested that more NOx reductions occurred during May and June than in the later
periods. However, this procedure did not predict generation and NOx emissions as well
as the procedure discussed in Section 4.5.4 (see Figure C-6-5). In particular, the
predictions of NOx emissions in 2005 were not even close. A possible reason for this is
that individual generating units respond to different locational marginal prices. The
average electricity price, which is the load weighted average of all the locational marginal
prices, is not always representative of the prices at each generator due to congestion. This
may have been a more significant problem in 2005.
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Figure C-6-5 Predicted and observed generation for coal units in the OTC region of the PJM and New
England power systems in 1998, 2002, and 2005. The first stage of the predictions regressed generation on
price with total electricity demand as an instrumental variable for price.
Table C-6-3 Predicted coefficients from regressions of generation on average electricity prices (with total
electricity demand as an instrumental variable), heat input on predicted generation, and NOx emissions on
predicted heat input in 1998, 2002, and 2005 using weekly panel data for coal plants in the OTC region in
the New England and PJM power systems.
1998
Generation Standard Heat Input Standard Standard
Coefficient (gen) Error (HI) Error NOx Error
Price 761** 67 -- -- -- --
Early -3028** 939 14485* 8084 -3.4 2.3
Late -215 998 55161** 8025 -3.3 4.0
Constant 18273** 1282 -234143** 36150 24.9** 7.6
Predicted Gen -- -- 2.9** 0.53 -- --
Predicted HI -- -- -- -- 0.00019** 0.00005**
Predicted HIA2 -- -- -- -- 6.5E-11** 2.9E-11**
Number of Observations 4440
Number of Groups 88
2002
Generation Standard Heat Input Standard Standard
Coefficient (gen) Error (HI) Error NOx Error
Price 386** 44 -- -- ----
Early -2366** 612 12276** 4705 -12.3** 1.1
Late -2187** 691 29808** 4133 -11.1** 1.4
Constant 14696** 1192 112319** 15052 -85** 39.2
Predicted Gen -- -- 5.12** 0.60 -- --
Predicted HI -- -- -- -- 0.00089** 0.00029
Predicted HIA2 -- -- -- -- -1.3E-9** 5.44E-10
Number of Observations 6869
Number of Groups 137
2005
Generation Standard Heat Input Standard Standard
Coefficient (gen) Error (HI) Error NOx Error
Price 281** 35 -- -- ----
Early 2123** 702 -3034 4026 -34.5** 1.44
Late -2010** 754 22994** 3530 -28.7** 1.30
Constant 34280** 2065 345741** 18078 -7075 4444
Predicted Gen -- -- -0.01 0.35 -- --
Predicted HI -- -- -- -- 0.041 0.025
Predicted HI^2 - - - -- -5.8E-8 3.57E-08
Number of Observations 4840
Number of Groups 104
** indicates significance at the 5% level
* indicates significance at the 10% level
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Appendix D: Matching Generator Data to PJM FTR Load
Flow Cases
The EIA and EPA generating unit-level data were first matched to the FTR
network model by substation, by the name of the substation. But, within the substations it
is sometimes difficult to determine which generating unit should be assigned to which
generating bus. Some substations have over ten generating unit buses, which are all
located at the same voltage level on the network. But, the buses are not identical because
buses within each substation connect to lines with different characteristics and to
different buses in the remainder of the PJM network. Given this type of ambiguity, a
simple method was used to match the generating units to buses within each substation.
If the FTR model included generation data for a unit, the units were first matched
to those with same hourly generation in the EPA database for days during the same time
of year and level of demand as represented by the FTR model. Then, for the remaining
units, those with the largest capacities in the EIA data were matched to those with the
highest generation in the FTR model. If all the units in a substation had zero or the same
generation in the FTR model, we matched the units to the EPA units at random. Some
further changes to the locations of generators were made on a case-by-case basis as
described in Appendix E.
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Appendix E: Scaling the PJM FTR Load Flow Cases to
Approximate Peak Demand Hours
The monthly FTR base case for July that PJM posted in July 2006 represents an
hour with about 77 GW of load in PJM and 35 GW of load in Classic PJM. This was
about average for the ozone season of 2005. This case is referred to as the "average
demand" case for the PowerWorld simulations. The set of fossil-fuel-fired generating
units in Classic PJM for which we have emissions data generated about 19 GW on
average during the 2005 ozone season and also generated about 19 GW in this FTR case.
Cost curve data were imported into PowerWorld for this set of generators; these are the
generators that were redispatched and those to which the NOx price applied. These
generating units were referred to as the "Classic PJM fossil units" and in each case their
total generation was held constant, the NOx prices causes the reallocation of this
generation to units with lower NOx rates.
In order to simulate NOx reductions from redispatch for an hour with peak
conditions, and because detailed data on nodal loads during peak conditions were not
available through the FTR cases, the load data in the average demand case were scaled.'16
This was not a straightforward exercise because loads on network do not scale uniformly
from average to peak demand hours; the electricity demand increases more in some areas
than in others. The patterns of load impact congestion and the corresponding LMP
patterns. In order to simulate a peak hour with similar characteristics to observed peak
hours the observed generation data from the fossil-fired units in Classic PJM were used
(from the EPA's CEMS data) and the loads were scaled incrementally until LMP patterns
and congested lines were observed that were reasonably similar to those observed in
Classic PJM in the 2005 ozone season.
161 Hourly load data are only available at the zonal level: PJM, "Hourly Load Data", available at
http://www.pim.comtn/ narkets/ispo/adhyr.risp.
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Loads of over 50 GW and generation of about 35 GW from the Classic PJM fossil
units characterized peak demand hours in Classic PJM in the summer of 2005. The
EPA's CEMS data indicated that the Classic PJM fossil units generated about 33 GW on
August 4th, 2005 at 2 pm - one of the peak hours. We used these unit-level data for the
initial generation of Classic PJM fossil units and assumed that generation remained
constant from nuclear, hydro and other units not included in the EPA's CEMS data. For
the latter units, we used the generation data from the July FTR case. Holding the
generation of these units constant is a reasonable assumption for the nuclear plants, which
typically generate near their capacities in all hours, but may be a simplification for the
other units. This assumption likely only created slight changes in the results because of
the small contribution of these other units: EIA data suggest that hydro, wind, and fossil
units for which we do not have data contribute about 5 GW of about 67 GW capacity in
Classic PJM (about 7%). Additionally, if these units could respond to higher NOx prices,
excluding them from our estimates of potential NOx reductions makes our estimates
conservative.
The zonal model indicated that network congestion created about 11 zones with
constant LMPs on August 4 th 2 pm. In order to try to recreate these LMP and congestion
patterns with PowerWorld, the factors by which the generation from Classic PJM fossil
units in each zone increased between the average demand case and August 4th 2 pm
observed data were calculated. The nodal loads in zones with higher than average LMPs
were scaled by factors slightly higher than the corresponding generation scaling factor
(and vice versa for zones with lower LMPs). It was likely that zones on the high-LMP
sides of congested lines were net-importers of power because congestion reflects the fact
that the high-LMP area was importing as much power as possible from remote generators
with lower costs. The load in Classic PJM was scaled to about 53 GW using this method
and imported the new load data into PowerWorld.
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The inaccuracies inherent in the method of scaling the nodal loads and those in
our method of matching generator data to the buses in the FTR case (Appendix D) caused
some problems for solving the power flow simulations. The optimal power flow
simulations dispatch generators, according to their marginal costs, to meet all loads while
minimizing system operating costs and meeting a set of inequality constraints. These
inequality constraints include generator and transmission line capacities. In our cases, we
do not allow PowerWorld to dispatch the nodal loads: the generating units are the only
"controls" that can be changed to minimize cost while holding demand constant. It is
sometimes not possible for the generating units to be dispatched to both fill load and meet
all the inequality constraints. In this situation, PowerWorld prioritizes filling the load and
it reports "unenforceable" line or generator constraints. The flows on lines with
"unenforceable" constraints exceed their rated capacities. These overloaded lines may
actually occur in reality and be acceptable: lines' capacities vary with external conditions
like the weather and the system operator has the discretion to adjust the lines' ratings in
real-time while we do not have enough information to do so. Unenforceable constraints in
the simulations may also be an artifact created by the inaccuracies of the load and
generator data. If, for example, a generator were incorrectly placed at a bus it might cause
large flows over a line that was not intended to handle them.
Unenforceable constraints were observed in both the average and peak cases. The
locations of some of the generators and the magnitudes of the scaled loads were altered in
the peak case to mitigate these problems, but were not all of the unenforceable constraints
could be removed. Depending on the case, between zero and about twenty unenforceable
constraints were observed out of over 3100 lines (less than 1%). Because of these
inaccuracies, the simulation results are reported in relative terms (e.g. the higher NOx-
price cases are compared to the $2,000/ton NOx price case) rather than as absolute results
compared to observed data for the modeled hour (e.g. August 4th at 2 pm).
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Given the matching and scaling inaccuracies, the simplified cost curves, and the
fact that PowerWorld does not allow for simulation of ancillary services markets, it was
not possible to fully recreate historical conditions. The correct magnitudes of demand,
fossil generation, NOx emissions, and congestion were reproduced and therefore the
results are reasonably representative of a power system similar to Classic PJM. From the
scaled load and generation data described above created two peak load flow cases that
reproduced the general characteristics of historical conditions by adjusting the nodal load
data in the scaled case incrementally after loading the data into PowerWorld. One of
these cases approximated the patterns of LMP observed on August 4th at 2pm ("Matched
LMPs") and the other better approximated the observed contingency constraints
("Constraints"). The Classic PJM fossil units generated about 34 GW and emitted about
35 tons of NOx in both simulations; the total load was about 53 GW. For comparison, on
August 4th at 2 pm the observed total load in Classic PJM was about 59 GW and Classic
PJM fossil units generated about 35 GW and emitted about 38 tons of NOx. On August
3 rd at 2 pm, another peak demand hour in PJM, the total load was about 54 GW and the
fossil units generated about 33 GW and emitted about 35 tons of NOx.
On August 4th at 2pm PJM reported active contingency constraints for five lines.
Two of these were reproduced in the Matched LMPs case and four in the Constraints
case, while assuming NOx prices of $2000/ton. In addition, in the Matched LMP case the
basic patterns of LMPs were recreated. For example, the constraint that caused the most
variation in LMP in the observed hour was the Cheswold-Kent line. The nodes on the low
side of this constraint had LMPs about 9% below average and those on the high side had
LMPs about 60% above average (the observed mean LMP in this hour was $287/MWh).
In the Matched LMPs case the nodes on the high and low side of this constraint also had
the largest differences in LMP: 51% below average on the low side and 274% above
average on the high side (the mean LMP in this simulation was $129/MWh). Although
the magnitudes of LMPs are different between the simulated and observed cases, the
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patterns are similar. The inaccuracies discussed above contribute to these differences. In
particular, generator cost curves typically increase steeply at high capacity factors and
our simplified cost curves do not account for this.
In the third peak case, decreasing the assumed generation from other units
increased the share of total generation from the Classic PJM fossil units. As in the other
two peak cases, the total load was bout 53 GW, but in this case the fossil units in Classic
PJM generated about 37 GW and emitted 39 tons of NOx. This case was intended to
simulate a worst-case scenario. The simulations hold the total generation from the Classic
PJM fossil units constant and the NOx reductions in response to the NOx price can only
come from the reallocation of generation between the units. Requiring these units to
generate more reduces the flexibility to reduce emissions through redispatch because it
reduces the excess capacity of the units that can be redispatched.
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